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PATRISTIC SCHOOLS IN THE *SUMMA*



ONE of the features of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas which strikes the casual reader is the wealth of references and quotations contained in every question, every article. The same reader may conclude that St. Thomas had in mind to make his masterpiece appear exceedingly erudite, to bolster up his arguments, and this conclusion has resulted in a very lengthy series of tracts. The student of the *Summa* readily concurs in the general admiration of the vast knowledge St. Thomas had of the literary and intellectual heritage of the past. At the same time, he is aware that the Angelic Doctor set out to give a brief, concise and orderly exposition of the whole of Christian doctrine. The *Summa Theologica* represented the perfection of his thought. His intent was to avoid all useless questions and arguments, to eliminate confusing and tiresome repetitions. Consequently, he introduced into his work only those elements which were necessary for developing an argument or clarifying a point of doctrine. Among those elements are included

the authority, the testimony, of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church.

St. Thomas manifested the highest respect and humility towards the Fathers and saintly Masters of the past. Often he raised objections to their writings merely in order to justify or to clarify their teaching. He was very conscious of the value of authority and tradition in theology. He wove his own thought closely into the framework already established by the great intellectual pioneers. The *Doctor Communis* chose his authorities very judiciously and quoted from them always with a definite purpose in mind. Upon closer examination it becomes clear that among these theologians of earlier periods there were a few who exerted a direct and positive influence on St. Thomas. They were his masters, while, at the same time he brought their teaching to perfection.

All Patristic writers can be generally grouped under two schools—that of Alexandria and that of Antioch. These theological traditions wielded a tremendous and permanent influence on the development of theology until well into the Middle Ages. It is the purpose of this study to sketch the teaching, methods, and importance of these schools. Obviously, only the outstanding representatives of each can be treated here, and those only in outline. Both those theologians who are genetically disciples of Alexandria and Antioch and others spiritually affiliated with them will be treated. The object is to discover what writers exercised the most profound and direct influence on St. Thomas in his *Summa Theologica*, as well as how and in what respect these two theological traditions entered into the framework of his system.

I. THE SCHOOL OF ALEXANDRIA

Beginnings

The great Egyptian metropolis of Alexandria has been associated with learning and culture almost since the days of its foundation by Alexander the Great in 331 B. C. By the second century of the Christian era, it had developed into the para-

mount intellectual metropolis of the world, the center for uniting the thought and influences of East and West. It is not surprising that from the Christian community in this locale there should arise a powerful movement toward the formation of a precise and scientific system of Christian thought. This movement, appearing in history in the person of Clement (150—c. 215), is properly known as the School of Alexandria, a single systematic stream of Christian intellectual expression. Its Hellenic and Judaic predecessors and contemporaries cannot correctly be labelled schools, since within these divisions existed opposing doctrines and contradictory tendencies, e. g., Platonism and Stoicism.

The Gospel of Christ was proclaimed in a definite milieu—Palestine in the reign of the Herods. Later it was propagated abroad among the peoples of the Greco-Roman world, an entirely distinct culture. Although Christianity itself was born in Judaism, the Christian theology developed in a Hellenic environment. At Alexandria there was in addition the significant factor of Hellenic Judaism. Converts from these philosophies were very apt to retain traces of their former doctrines and often reacted vigorously in exaggerated defense of the Christian truths opposed to their previous errors. In order to understand the methods and expressions of the representatives of the Christian school at Alexandria, it is necessary to preface the study with a brief survey of the Greek philosophies and the Jewish system in vogue in the second century.

Alexandria was a depot for a mélange of doctrines. The world at the time was witnessing the breakup of old beliefs and the dissolution of traditional patterns of thought. Concomitantly, strenuous efforts were being made toward a reconstruction and renovation of the old order. Each group attempted to analyze and solve in its own way the idealist and religious problem, the perfection of man. Eclecticism in philosophy (and syncretism in religion) was an open and universal practice. Because the various Greek tendencies were the more powerful and the more metaphysical of the two movements, we shall

treat them first, and secondly Alexandrian Judaism, in order to discover the characteristic teachings of the movements.

The predominant Greek philosophies were the Platonic systems (especially Neo-Platonism) and Stoicism. The latter was a religious moralism, but its dogma was built on a materialist physics. God and the world were confused; the immaterial was confounded with the sensible. The God of the Stoics tended to be identified with the created and the finite. They taught a metaphysics of immanence. In this system

there are no pure spirits: all things are bodies, some more, others less, refined. The mind, which is a body of a rather delicate nature, is identical with God who, just like a subtle fire, an eternal ether, an immanent and hidden force diffused into the world, permeates and moves and rules it, and is its very soul. From God came matter, which, after clothing Him as with a garment, must again be absorbed into Him. From Him are also derived all the forces of nature, even the very spirit of man. He is, in the world, the principle of all activity or energy, not in the sense that He imparts it and creates it from outside; it is He Himself, or, in the strict sense of the word, it emanates from Him. He is, then, by way of pre-eminence, the *λόγος σπερματικός*, the seminal reason of the universe; a universe which He governs by immutable laws, laws proper to Himself; for He is identical with Fate and the fatal order of the world, though at the same time He is reasonable, perfect, exempt from all evil, and the author of all good things.¹

This materialistic Pantheism was considerably attenuated by the second century A. D. through the growth of Stoicism into a preponderantly religious and moral philosophy. Yet the influence of Stoicism will at times "check the flight of Christian thought by loading it with its material imaginations."²

Gradually absorbing Stoicism and surpassing it was the powerful movement, dominant during the period of the beginnings of Christian theology, built upon Platonic elements, which received the name of Neo-Platonism. This philosophy was itself a reaction to the gnosis which was being erected by other

¹ Tixeront, J., *History of Dogmas*, vol. I, p. 23.

² LeBreton, S. J., Jules, *History of the Dogma of the Trinity*, vol. I, "The Origins," p. 68.

Greek doctrinal movements and the various Oriental religious philosophies. It also failed to bring a solution to the intellectual and religious problems of the age.

In its development as a living doctrine Platonism had encountered many other influences and assimilated their ideas. It assumed a more syncretist character, approaching the era of the advent of systematic Christian theology through many channels. The Platonism of this period is far removed from that of Plato and went through still further developments in the succeeding decades, especially under Plotinus. It would be far afield to discuss the progress of Platonism up to this period. It is not to the point to consider it in any one system but rather as an influence. For it was the method and pivotal doctrines of Platonism which influenced the early Christian theologians.

The principal contributions of Platonism were a philosophy of transcendence and a doctrine of dualism. God for the Platonists was so far removed from all creation as to be inaccessible. No predication could be made of the divinity which would fittingly describe it. Every quality and perfection, whether corporal or spiritual, that existed in the creature had to be excluded from inherence in the divinity. The notion of God remained absolutely indeterminate and mysterious. Such excessive transcendence led to the postulating of a multiplicity of intermediary beings between God and man. Neo-Platonism, however, rejected these numerous divine emanations. The Platonist metaphysic of transcendence thus opposed the Stoic philosophy of immanence.

Paralleling their efforts to refine the notion of God of all elements of limitation and imperfection, the Platonists sought to correct the Gnostic confusion of the spiritual and sensible elements. They taught a dualism of the corporal and the spiritual worlds. Sensible reality is an image, a reflection, of the spiritual world. It is also considered a principle of imperfection—a thesis attributed to the infiltration of Oriental notions into the Platonist tradition.

The theories of divine transcendence and the relation of the sensible to the spiritual order were powerful weapons of thought. In the hands of many philosophers they were misused and exaggerated. It was left to the theologians of the Church to employ these principles in the service of theology, to correct their excesses, and to enrich the development of dogma by their fruitful consequences. Platonism was a divine philosophy, or rather a theology. It concentrated on the things above, the realm of the spiritual. The things of this world were examined in the focus of the immaterial. Platonism sought to understand the divine, to discover the secret of union with it. Small wonder that it exerted a deep impression on devout Christian thinkers.

Alexandria was the center of the most numerous and conspicuous Jewish assembly of the Diaspora—the Hellenistic Jews. Contrary to the practice of their Palestinian brethren, who severely rejected all foreign influences and shut themselves up in the word of the Law, the Jews of the Dispersion were by dint of circumstances forced to come to terms with the Gentile culture in which they lived. They were faced with the same problem which later confronted Christian thinkers—how to expound their teaching in a manner palatable to the systematically precise and philosophical Greeks. The Alexandrine Jews borrowed heavily from Greek terminology and thought in order to enrich their own meager philosophy. The greatest exponent of a doctrinal conciliation of Hellenism and Judaism was the Jew, Philo. It was Philonism which obtained at Alexandria in the second century A. D. Since the Diaspora was the bridge by which the Christian faith was diffused throughout the civilized world, it is necessary to describe the salient features of the Philonian teaching.

Philo did not possess any clearly defined system, but rather his thought was stamped with certain ideas which gave direction to his speculations. Because of the influence of his Jewish background, he conceived God as a concrete and personal Being. God alone was properly good, just, and merciful.

Happiness and joy were strictly the possessions of God. But the goodness of God was diffusive and the reason for his role as Creator.

If we inquire into the cause why God has constructed the universe, it seems to me that we can reply with an ancient that the father and the maker of the world was good. . . . He derived the inspiration of doing so from no one—no one existed but Himself; but He knew for Himself that He should spread profusely the riches of His graces on nature, which without a divine gift, could not of itself have any good in it.³

God, then, being the Creator is not the immanent law of the universe of the Stoics. His goodness invites men to a participation in His perfections. However, in the great field of speculation left open by the poverty of Jewish philosophy, Philo was deeply imbued with Platonism. His God was entirely transcendent and undetermined. He was without any quality, *ἄποιος*, since to affirm such of Him would be to limit Him. He is who is, True Being.

In Judaism the divine transcendence is not inculcated with less force, but it has a distinctly moral character; it is the sanctity of Jahve which isolates him, whereas, according to Philo, it is his ideal grandeur. According to the Jewish prophets man cannot see God, because he is impure and his lips are defiled: for Philo such contemplation is impossible because it exceeds the power of human intelligence. According to Philo man can demonstrate, for example, by the reign of order in the world, the existence of a first cause, which he calls God; man can go no further; God can neither be known nor named by him.⁴

All that human reason can do is to arrive at the knowledge that there is a cause of the universe; to wish to go further and to know the nature and qualities of that cause is an extreme piece of folly.⁵

God does not resemble man; for he is not like the heaven nor yet not like the earth; for these things have determinate and material forms; God, on the contrary, is not even comprehensible by the spirit, except insofar as he exists: for what we understand of him, apart from the fact of his existence, is nothing.⁶

³ "De op. mundi," 21-23, Mangey, London, 1742, vol. I, 5.

⁴ LeBreton, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

⁵ "De Poster, Caini," 168, Mangey, vol. I, 258.

⁶ "Quod Deus sit immut.," 62, Mangey, *ibid.*, 258.

Philo's insistence on the inadequacy of the human concept to represent the divinity and the divine perfections is a point which scarcely needed correction. No created idea or concatenation of ideas can claim to exhaust God, nor can it be asserted truly that the divine reality is limited or circumscribed by the mode or content of our intellectual representations. Philo was too conscious of the supreme uniqueness of God to allow such dishonor. The awareness of the analogy of being, the inequality of essences, lies behind his refusal to postulate any quality in the divine being *in se*. For quality, for him, meant determination, the modifying of an essence. Consequently God, being simple and transcending every category of being, could not be constituted and determined in any genus or species. He is the most generic of beings, in His own class above all genera. All other beings are unequal to Him, far from Him in essence (as the Scholastics were to say, infinitely distant from Him). Any passage from this Being to others is as from one genus to another.⁷

On the other hand, Philo admits certain perfections in God. He is eternal, immutable, free, omniscient, and omnipotent. These perfections belong to Him properly and cannot be composed with created essence. There are other properties which are possessed both by God and by man, such as goodness, justice, and wisdom. In God they exist as one with His essence, in the sense that, being even greater, He is their source; in creatures they exist by participation.

God is the summit and the term and the supreme height of happiness, not receiving his perfections from anything else, but diffusing over all things the particular goodness of that source of all beauty which is himself: for all the beauty in the world could never have come into being if it had not been formed to the image of that archetype which is truly beautiful, without origin, happy and incorruptible.⁸

In his love of philosophy Philo neglected much of what God had revealed of Himself to the chosen people, yet he did at-

⁷ Cf. "Leg. Alleg.," II, 86, *ibid.*, 82. "De Sacrif. Abel," 92, *ibid.*, 81.

⁸ "De Cherub.," 86, *ibid.*, 154.

tempt to check the tendency of Platonism to make of God a bare abstraction, unknown and unknowable, which would lead to the extreme of agnosticism.

To establish contact with this transcendent Being, to explain the work of creation and the progress of man to God, Philo was forced to adopt a theory of intermediaries, powers or forces. His doctrine was drawn from a variety of sources: Platonic, Stoic, mythological, Biblical. In his hierarchy of being,

At the head of the scale is God; in the second place is the Logos; in the third and fourth the creative and the royal powers; in the fifth, depending on the creative power, the power of beneficence; in the sixth, deriving from the royal power, the power of punishment; and finally in the seventh, the world composed by the ideas.⁹

Correlative with this hierarchy of being is the hierarchy of knowledge, ascending from that which attains to the exterior world through the lower powers, the powers of mercy and command, the superior powers of creation and kingship, the Logos, until God Himself is reached.¹⁰ On the nature of these intermediaries, and *a fortiori* of the Logos, which is at once their principle and the sum of all of them—whether they are divine or created, infinite or finite—Philo is unable to decide. His statements are contradictory, such as his description of the Logos, who is "neither unbegotten like God, nor begotten like us, but in an intermediary way."¹¹

It was inevitable that Philo's metaphysical principles should profoundly affect his treatment of the contents of the Bible. The written word of God was the jealously cherished heritage of the Jewish nation. The attempts which were made, particularly within the ranks of the Diaspora, to fashion a philosophy were inspired by an apologetic purpose, to defend and to expound in a rational system the truths of Sacred Writ. The Jews were quite conscious of the peculiar character of this Book.

⁹ "In Exod.," II, 68, Aucher, Venice, 1822-26, p. 516.

¹⁰ Cf. "De Confus. ling.," 97, Mangey, vol. I, 419. "De fuga," 97 sqq., *ibid.*, 560. "Leg. Alleg.," III, 100, *ibid.*, 107.

¹¹ "Quis rerum divinarum haeres," 42.

All agreed that it contained both an obvious or literal meaning and a hidden or mystical sense. In their endeavors to understand and explain the doctrines and facts contained in the Sacred Writings one or the other of these elements was emphasized. This accounts for the two Jewish systems of exegesis, the Palestinian and the Alexandrian. Their differences were not so much essential as modal, since at the bottom both admitted a double sense in the Scriptures. It was rather that the isolationist Palestinians held to the literal method of interpretation, while the cosmopolitan Alexandrians emphasized the allegorical. The Jews of Palestine, as evidenced by the Scribes and Pharisees, were bound up in the letter of the Law.

The Alexandrian method of interpretation, as best represented by Philo, was inspired by the desire to harmonize the contents of the Scriptures with the teachings of Greek philosophy. The Alexandrians were ready to see in the Bible the doctrines of the latter philosophy. Moses and the Greeks taught many points in common; in fact, these Jews felt that the Greeks had borrowed some of their ideas from the Bible. The Alexandrians found the method of the allegory a fruitful instrument in the understanding of this harmony. The Stoics had excessively allegorized the ancient mythology, seeing in its characters and figures symbols of the moral and psychological orders. However, Jewish and Philonian allegorism was predicated on the doctrinal transcendence of the Scriptures and the idea of God. Etymologically, the allegory (*ἄλλο-ἀγορεύω*) signified the saying of one thing by which something else is understood. Thus whatever was found in the Bible which was unworthy of God, unreasonable or contradictory, was not to be taken in the literal but in the allegorical or figurative sense. In this way certain laws and events were allegorized by Philo. Yet he maintained both the body and the soul of the Scriptures, denying that the whole was an allegory. Philo's insistence on the exclusive presence of the soul or spiritual sense of the Scriptures is especially apparent in the passages containing anthropomorphisms. The danger in this system to which

many succumbed was to make this sense prevail to the exclusion of the literal and to maintain it as the sole true meaning.

The Christian Apologists made no attempt to construct a theological system;¹² their aims did not require them to employ a scientific exposition of the truths of Christianity according to a well-defined logical method. Their use of philosophy was of an incidental nature. They were not seeking a metaphysical pattern but rather certain forms of expression, details apt for illustrating Christian truths, without being concerned with the perfection of the whole or the sequence of its parts. Some Apologists were very disparaging toward the philosophical systems, whereas the greater number, themselves philosophers before their conversion, saw their utility. St. Justin, a representative of the latter, advances a twofold explanation. The truths which the philosophers realized in their teachings were somehow borrowed or acquired from the Old Testament.¹³ This is the opinion already noted among the Alexandrian Jews. In the second place, the Word, which existed from the beginning, invisibly communicated truth to the minds of the philosophers in some imperfect way and directed their teaching.¹⁴ It seems that this must be understood with reference to the powers of the human mind as they more or less perfectly mirror the Divine Intelligence. Insofar as the Apologists were influenced by any one philosophical system it was Platonism.

The phenomenal spread of the Christian faith by the middle of the second century, bringing it into contact with current philosophies and enrolling under its banner many converts from the latter, inspired a movement toward a more precise understanding of its content. Attempts were made to develop the unexplored rational setting of the revealed truths, to form the latter in exact theological concepts and definitions. With the establishment of the Christian school at Alexandria,¹⁵ scientific

¹² For a more complete treatment cf. the excellent study of A. de la Barre in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, vol. I, pt. I, cols. 805-823, "Ecole Chrétienne d'Alexandrie."

¹³ Justin, *Apol.*, II, 44, 59.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 5, 46; II, 8, 10, 13.

¹⁵ From early times there had been at Alexandria a school of catechumens. By

theology made its successful debut. The lectures delivered by the Masters there, especially by Clement and Origen, propelled an intellectual movement and injected into Christianity a system or school of thought of major importance for the evolution of theology. We shall try to outline here its general spirit.

The virus attacking the Christian body which the Alexandrian teachers rose up to counteract was false Gnosticism. It was the most dangerous and deep-rooted philosophy in Alexandria. The reaction of the Christian scholars to the Gnostics' errors in both reason and faith, together with the contact they had with the philosophical streams already noted at Alexandria, served to determine the character of their providential mission in the development of theology. They were forced to a new doctrinal approach, embracing better-defined principles and a special method.

False Gnosticism threw down the challenge by pretending to the role of a universal synthesis. It was an effort made by philosophic thought to transform Christianity into a religious philosophy or, better, the attempt of religious thought to give to the Christian mysteries a philosophic elucidation more profound than that of the faith.¹⁶ The false gnosis being a science

the last half of the second century it had developed into an important school of scientific theology, the *Didascalia*. It enjoyed at least a semi-official approval, the heads of the school being appointed and withdrawn by the bishop. The auditors were of the most diverse kinds—students of every condition and age, pagans, catechumens, baptized. The rudiments of the faith were taught to the catechumens while a more substantial theology was imparted to Christians anxious to learn. The bases of Catholic belief were discussed even in the presence of pagans. The program of studies was indicated by St. Gregory in his *Panegyric*. First, a general knowledge of the sciences was given, then a study and commentary on the writings of the poets and philosophers of every school except the Epicurean was made. Plato and Aristotle were held in great authority. The teaching was characterized by a moral bent, yet employing a dialectic method of distinguishing and defining the fundamental notions of religion and morality. The Alexandrian school was placed in a milieu of idealist, eclectic, and moral tendencies of Gnostic and Neo-Platonist syncretism. It reached its greatest fame under Origen but declined considerably under his successors, notwithstanding the brilliance contributed by Didymus the Blind. Its intellectual heritage was retained in the theology of the Cappadocian Fathers, who perpetuated the truly traditional elements.

¹⁶ Cayré, A. A.; F., *Manual of Patrology and History of Theology*, vol. I, p. 101.

of a higher order was sufficient to replace the data of revelation. The Gnostic was considered to have penetrated the obscurities and understood the mysteries. Gnosticism taught an exaggerated notion of the inaccessible position of God and His infinite separation from matter. On the other hand, their base conception of matter accounted for the corruption of man and the force drawing him away from God. They postulated a series of intermediary beings of varying grades of perfection which, emanating from the Great Silence or Abyss, served as the bridge between this God and created beings, and as the means of man's ascent to God.

To the Gnostic heresy championed by brilliant intellects and adorned with a severe moral practice, the Church in the second century opposed only her hierarchical tradition—the teaching of the Apostles and their qualified successors, which gradually overcame the danger. There was as yet no doctrinal tradition, no system or rational synthesis of faith, no adequate theology with which to meet the errors. The latter developed and crystallized as a result of the controversies and the teaching of the Masters at Alexandria. It was their mission to state precisely the root ideas of Christian theology, proposed under the aegis of revelation, with the authority of a supernatural tradition, not only as a philosophical teaching but even as a theological doctrine. In the domain of reason they affirmed the ontological transcendence of God, superior to all degrees of being, and consequently a like logical transcendence, His pre-eminence over all categories of thought. They avoided the excess of agnosticism by insisting against the Stoics and anthropomorphists upon the intimate presence of God to all beings as fully consonant with His transcendence. Likewise, they taught the knowledge of God through His creatures. Both of these truths were clearly contained in the Scriptures. Far from isolating themselves from natural truths, they sought, while maintaining their distinction from the super-rational, to include them in the frame of their synthesis, to indicate the possibility of conciliation and a certain coherence with supernatural truths,

tracing their authorship to God, the source of the entire intelligible order. It is useless to seek among the Alexandrians the precision of thought and expression found later among the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages. They frequently employed the common terminology of the time, though not always with the significations of the parent philosophies. For them, as for the Apologist, the Christian deposit was the center of all learning; truth and authority are based on Revelation. Philosophy always holds a secondary place, the traditional doctrine of the Church serving as the point of departure.

On this basis they sought to work out the principles covering the connection of the divine and human sciences. Concerning the utility of the latter there existed a twofold opinion. The generality of Christians, often referred to as the *simplices* or *simpliciores*, were opposed to them, whereas the more educated faithful felt that they must be judiciously employed in the general Christian teaching.¹⁷ Among the scholars themselves there were differences of attitude toward Greek learning and culture. Thus, though both were extraordinarily steeped in it, Clement assumed a very favorable attitude while Origen seldom gave it credit. Nevertheless, in the structure of their thought, the Alexandrian theologians found place for reason's products both *ante* and *post fidem*.

The human sciences were conceived as preambles or means to true wisdom. Philosophy can be exceedingly useful in the attainment of divine truth, as a preparation, a discipline, a disposing cause. This is the view of Clement.¹⁸ Origen viewed learning under the threefold division of ethical, physical, and theoretical or contemplative.¹⁹ These two masters taught a method of ascending from the visible and the created to the invisible and the uncreated, a method insisted upon by the Scholastics and St. Thomas.²⁰

¹⁷ LeBreton, "Le désaccord de la foi populaire et de la théologie savante dans L'Église chrétienne de III^e siècle, *Revue D'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, XIX, 1923.

¹⁸ St. Clement, *Stromata*, I, 20.

¹⁹ Cf. *Prolog. in Cant. Canticorum*.

²⁰ St. Thomas, *Opusculum LXIII*, q. 2, a. 3: "Lumen fidei quod nobis infunditur, non destruit lumen naturalis cognitionis nobis naturaliter inditum, quamvis

With faith as the point of departure, reason could be used to build up a true gnosis. Knowledge deduced from the faith is the most certain of all.²¹ It is to the truths of the faith as the principles of the synthesis that human truths are attached. In this way simple faith (πίστις) is enriched and developed into an understanding faith (γνώσις). This is the concept of theology, the vital and scientific evolution of faith, such as St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and the Scholastics understood it. The Alexandrians realized that the acceptance of the Christian belief still left open a wide field for further researches based on the foundation of this belief and in which a sound philosophy could be the instrument. The method of reasoning which they used was Platonism.

It is not strange that the Alexandrian Fathers should have favored the Platonist tradition. Even aside from the presence

autem naturalis lumen mentis humanae sit insufficiens ad manifestationem eorum quae per fidem manifestantur, tamen impossibile est quod ea quae per fidem nobis traduntur divinitus, sint contraria his quae per naturam nobis sunt indita: oportet enim alterum esse falsum: et cum utrumque sit nobis a Deo, Deus esset nobis auctor falsitatis quod est impossibile, sed magis, cum in imperfectis inveniatur aliqua imitatio perfectorum, quamvis imperfecta; in his quae per naturalem rationem cognoscuntur, sunt quaedam similitudines eorum quae per fidem tradita sunt. Sicut autem sacra doctrina fundatur super lumen fidei, ita philosophia super lumen naturale rationis. Unde impossibile est quod ea quae sunt philosophiae, sint contraria iis quae sunt fidei, sed deficiunt ab eis; continent tamen quasdam similitudines earum, et quaedam ad ea praeambula sicut natura praeambula est ad gratiam. . . . In sacra doctrina, philosophia possumus tripliciter uti. Primo ad demonstrandum ea quae sunt praeambula fidei. . . . Secundo ad notificandum per aliquas similitudines ea quae sunt fidei; sicut Augustinus in libris de Trinitate utitur multis similitudinibus ex doctrinis philosophicis sumptis ad manifestandum Trinitatem. Tertio, ad resistendum his quae contra fidem dicuntur, sive ostendendo esse falsa, sive ostendendo non esse necessaria."

Ibid., ad 7: "Scientiae quae habent ordinem ad invicem, hoc modo se habent quod una potest uti principiis alterius, sicut scientiae posteriores principiis priorum scientiarum, sive sint superiores, sive inferiores. Unde Metaphysica, quae est omnibus superior, utitur his quae in aliis scientiis sunt probata, et similiter Theologia, cum omnes aliae scientiae sint ei quasi famulantes et praeambulae in via generationis, quamvis sint dignitate posteriores, potest uti principiis omnium aliarum."

Cf. St. Albertus, *Omnia Opera*, t. XII, p. 2.

²¹ Cf. Clement, *Stromata* II, 11; I, 20.

of Platonic influences at Alexandria and the fact that many of these men, especially Clement and Origen, knew Plato directly, the Platonic philosophy of itself was a most suitable instrument. Harnack rightly remarks that Platonism was not so much a system as a spirit. Being mystics, the Alexandrians quite inevitably would be attracted by the tone of the Platonist philosophy, which represented being in hierarchy and which was not so much concerned with explaining and understanding the things of this world as in concentrating on those above and the problem of attaining them. Such, in the opinion of R. Arnou, is the secret of its lasting influence on Christian thinkers.²²

Theology by definition is centered on God. It is in their conception of God or in their manner of understanding Him that various theologies are radically differentiated. There is a twofold process in attaining an understanding of God. The first emphasizes the divine transcendence by negating or removing all created and therefore limited perfections from God or qualifying their application. The other affirms the presence of perfections in a supereminent and analogical way. The Alexandrians, intent on maintaining the divine transcendence, employed the negative method, while, unlike Philo, correcting it with the affirmations of positive theology. Moreover, as a reaction to the excesses of Neo-Platonism and the Gnostic exaggerations, the Alexandrians, as indeed all Patristic antiquity, proclaimed the intimate presence of God in the world and His accessibility to human knowledge. They were thus freed from the peril of agnosticism and from the necessity of postulating a series of intermediary beings. It is significant that the theology of the Alexandrian Doctors emphasized the divine element. This was most evident in their controversies, especially the Trinitarian and Christological problems, which lie at the core of any system of Catholic theology. It is too much to demand from them an exactness of terminology and felicity of

²² R. Arnou, "Platonisme des Pères," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, XII, pt. 2.

expression anticipating and precluding later errors as such. They staunchly upheld the distinctive personality of the Word, the divinity of Christ, the real relations of origin in the Trinity. Exaggerations due to the circumstances of controversy which seemed to imply a subordinationist theory were more form of expression than fact. It was to a great degree the intrusion into dogma of some Platonic ideas that gave rise to this or that Trinitarian or Christological error. As R. Arnou points out:

In this sense, Plato can be called the father of heresies. However, he holds this paternity with Aristotle, the Stoics and other profane philosophers. Greek philosophy, especially Plato, could prepare spirits or even offer them the occasion to penetrate farther in the comprehension of revealed truths and in coordinating them, but it supposes revelation and follows it. Some have reversed the role and made the part of philosophy preponderant. They are heretics in the measure that, to explain dogma, they have preferred the tradition of Plato to that of the Apostles.²³

The Scriptures were the theme upon which ecclesiastical science, theology, was founded. The attempts at a synthesis of doctrine based on the written Revelation (and Tradition) as the premise were influenced by the various philosophical and other tendencies which entered into the interpretation of the content of the Scriptures. Judaism and Christianity have always presupposed the existence of a literal and a spiritual sense, the result of belief in the transcendence of the Inspired Word. Controversy and inclination impelled the Alexandrian teachers to favor, sometimes exclusively, the sub-literal sense. Allegorism, symbolism—the tendency to search for a deeper meaning beneath the letter or the fact—characterized them. It was a ready consequence of their theodicy. Platonic thought, in addition to viewing God practically as in no way resembling creatures, conceived of the spiritual and sensible worlds as dualistically opposed, the sensible maintaining its inferior reality from the superior element. A far more attenuated opinion

²³ *Ibid.*

was professed by Origen and his disciples who, like St. Paul,²⁴ saw the sensible as the image of the spiritual world. The Alexandrians were accustomed to see sensible things as symbols of higher realities. Such a procedure was sanctioned by the Scriptures and Tradition.²⁵ To apply this principle of metaphysics to Scripture as an absolute norm invited excesses. The Old Testament lost all but its representative value. Although the text must be understood in its literal, historical meaning and then in the spiritual sense, certain passages, in their literal sense seemingly unworthy of God and His elect, must be taken only in the spiritual sense. The latter is ubiquitous, the lack of a corporal sense being accidental. Yet, where the Fathers seem to deny the literal sense, they are referring to the proper literal, not the figurative sense.

The Alexandrians found it necessary to emphasize and defend the spiritual character of the Bible against pagan critics, as did the Jews before them. Lacking a higher sense the Bible would be a profane instrument, unworthy of God. From it the Christians sought to erect their own philosophy. Allegorism was profitable in refuting the Jews, who held that Christ did not fulfill the prophecies to the letter, and in harmonizing the Old and New Testaments. It was a reaction against excessive literalism, from which Christian Millenarianism and anthropomorphism stemmed. The principles of metaphysical transcendence and Scriptural symbolism were fruitful instruments of Christian thought. In the course of time they were refined and made precise in their application. The sense of tradition, a famous rule with Origen, kept these masters from many of the excesses to which their system was susceptible. It is significant that the great heresies concerning the fundamental tenets of the Christian belief were not of their parentage.

The School of Alexandria boasts a long list of distinguished theologians. Many of them were content merely to repeat the teachings of the masters, especially Origen. We shall attempt to study some of the most representative followers of this tradi-

²⁴ *Romans*, I, 20.

²⁵ *Galatians*, IV, 24.

tion, in whom are discovered positive contributions to the progress of a doctrinal synthesis and who exerted an influence on later theologians, in particular, the Angelic Doctor.

Clement of Alexandria (150—c. 215)

The earliest master of the Didiscalia whose writings have survived is Clement of Alexandria.²⁶ This remarkable scholar introduced into his lectures the intellectual drive of a prodigiously learned and truth-loving philosopher and the apostolic zeal of a convert. His strong attachment to philosophy and the truths of sound reason was surpassed only by his burning attachment to the faith and the Christian mysteries. Despite his open admiration for the fruits of the Greek mind, Clement strongly maintained the absolute superiority of the Christian truth and the faith. He purposed to study reality in its relationship to God. He was a mystic and a moralist, endeavoring by his teaching to induce his hearers to attain that exalted perfection, the deeply spiritual identity with the divine in this life, which he conceived to be the true Christian vocation. His principles and method are revealed in his teaching on certain questions.

Clement's doctrine on faith embraces all the essential notes. Faith is the firm adherence of the mind, something entirely intellectual and absolutely supernatural and free.²⁷ Clement

²⁶ Titus Flavius Clemens was born probably at Athens around 150 A.D. of pagan parents. He received a very careful pagan Greek education. He travelled extensively in Italy, Syria, Palestine, Egypt. At Alexandria he was drawn to the Master Pantaenus. Following his conversion he was later ordained and succeeded Pantaenus as head of the school about 200 A.D. During the persecution of Septimius Severus (202-203) he fled to Cappadocia. He died sometime between 211 and 216 A.D.

The works of Clement comprise his *Exhortation to the Greeks*, *The Tutor*, and *The Stromata*, three parts of an unfinished whole, envisioning apologetics, moral, and dogma. Together with the lesser products—*Quis dives salvetur*, *Hypotyposes* (Sketches) especially in the *Adumbrationes in epistolas canonicas*—they constitute the sources of Clement's thought.

²⁷ *Stromata*, bk. IV, c. XXII: "If, then, we are to give the etymology of *ἐπιστήμη*, knowledge, its signification is to be derived from *στάσις*, placing; for our

only vaguely defined faith in itself, considering it more as the beginning of true knowledge.²⁸ Faith is the foundation of religious knowledge which is its natural development, and the first principle of salvation, not, however, advancing without charity and the other virtues. The soul is united with the invisible, the object of faith. No demonstration can ever cause faith but only make it acceptable.²⁹ Faith, the condition of this life, is crowned with vision in the life after death.³⁰ The

soul, which was formerly borne, now in one way, now in another, it settles in objects. Similarly faith is to be explained etymologically, as the settling (*στέσις*) of our soul respecting that which is."

Ibid., bk. II, c. III: "Now the followers of Basilides regard faith as natural, as they also refer it to choice, [representing it] as finding ideas by intellectual comprehension without demonstration; while the followers of Valentinus assign faith to us, the simple, but will have it that knowledge springs up in their own selves (who are saved by nature) through the advantage of a germ of superior excellence, saying that it is as far removed from faith as the spiritual is from the animal. Further, the followers of Basilides say that faith as well as choice is proper according to every interval; and that in consequence of the supramundane selection mundane faith accompanies all nature, and that the free gift of faith is conformable to the hope of each. Faith, then, is no longer the direct result of free choice, if it is a natural advantage. . . . And the entire peculiarity and difference of belief and unbelief will not fall under either praise or censure, if we reflect rightly, since there attaches to it the antecedent natural necessity proceeding from the Almighty. . . . But God, as I think, [according to these men] turns out to be the distribution to men of natural powers, which has not as the foundation of salvation voluntary faith."

Exhortation, c. I, IV.

²⁸ *Stromata*, bk. II, c. VI: "Faith is the voluntary supposition and anticipation of pre-comprehension."

Ibid., c. IV: "... He, again, who has learned has already turned his preconception into comprehension. And if he who learns, learns not without a preconceived idea which takes in what is expressed, that man has ears to hear the truth. . . . If, then, faith is nothing else than a preconception of the mind in regard to what is the subject of discourse . . . no one shall learn aught without faith, since no one learns aught without preconception."

²⁹ *Stromata*, II, c. II: "... And since choice is the beginning of action, faith is discovered to be the beginning of action, being the foundation of rational choice in the case of anyone who exhibits to himself the previous demonstration through faith. Voluntarily to follow what is useful, is the first principle of understanding. Unswerving choice, then, gives considerable momentum in the direction of knowledge. The exercise of faith directly becomes knowledge, reposing on a sure foundation. . . ."

Stromata, II, c. VI; *ibid.*, c. XII.

³⁰ *Instructor*, bk. I, c. VI.

supernatural character of this gift excludes any claim to it by reason of one's previous intellectual assets, although Clement recognizes the value the latter may have in the service of the faith once received.³¹ Clement's teaching on the role of reason is important. As a pedagogue he searched the philosophers for a starting point or for any help to be found among them. As a theologian he attempted to explain the function of reason in the edifice raised upon the principles of faith.

His profound knowledge of early literature enabled Clement to be the first to expose with abundance, although with a pedagogical and moral purpose, rather than apologetical and theological, the relations of philosophy and Christianity, of reason and faith. He was thus a pioneer and, thanks to him, the School of Alexandria was able to carry out its providential mission.³²

In Clement's plan the position of Greek philosophy *ante fidem* is purely propedeutical. In itself it is inadequate to attain universal truth.³³ Clement was among the first to discover its value in the service of God and His Truth. It had prepared the Gentile world in a measure to accept the faith.³⁴ Philosophy is contributive to and useful in the attainment of divine truth.³⁵ In accord with the practice of the third century, even among the pagans, Clement regarded philosophy in a religious and moral light. Because of the intimate connection between the intellectual and the moral spheres, the methods of philosophy were apt to discipline the spirit, to purify and to instil virtue. Philosophy was for him not any one system but the complex of the truths discovered by the human reason;³⁶ it is the science of divine things and the prac-

³¹ *Stromata*, I, c. VI.

³² Cayré, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

³³ *Stromata*, VI, c. VII: "And they [the Greek philosophers] think that they have hit the truth perfectly; but as we understand them, only partially. They know, then, nothing more than this world."

Stromata, II, c. IV.

³⁴ *Stromata*, I, c. V: "Philosophy, therefore, was a preparation paving the way for him who is perfected in Christ."

³⁵ *Stromata*, I, c. XX; *ibid.*, c. V; VI, c. XV. Cf. note 20, *supra*.

³⁶ *Stromata*, I, c. VII: "... whatever has been well said by each of these sects, which teach righteousness along with a science pervaded by piety—this eclectic whole I call philosophy."

tice of a virtuous Christian life. Moreover, Clement realized the powerful instrument of thought the Greeks possessed in their dialectic. Through it they were able to formulate their teaching on various philosophical problems in precise, set terms, formulas or dogmas (δῶγματα). In opposing the errors of the Greeks and the Gnostic heresies, Clement found it necessary to adopt similar means to express his doctrine.

The value and importance of philosophy in the service of the faith, of reason *post fidem*, in defense of the faith and as an instrument in the deeper study which faith makes of its own mysteries, is incomparable. Its apologetic role is considerable.³⁷ Beyond this is its office of aiding in the development of the faith. This introduces the subject so dear to the thought of Clement—the Christian Gnosis.

There were, at Alexandria, “gnostics,” that is, Christians, who, without denying the traditional dogmas, rejecting none of the obedience due to the Church, aspire to a deeper and more learned knowledge of the truths they profess.³⁸

Clement, foremost among them, sought to fulfill these aspirations with his gnosis. He believed in the existence of a true gnosis, which avoids the rationalism of the false gnostics and the exclusive supernaturalism of narrow-minded Christians, and which, though not necessary for salvation, leads to greater perfection.

The very foundation, the principle and point of departure, for Clement is the faith; it is the criterion of knowledge.³⁹ Christ is the base and the edifice of the faith and the gnosis.⁴⁰ As for the role of reason,

its actual part is to be the helpmate of faith in the study the latter makes of its own deep mysteries; it must aid the faith to build itself into a gnosis. True, the doctrines of philosophy add nothing to the light of Christian truths; but its methods and dialectics train

³⁷ *Stromata*, I, c. XX; *ibid.*, c. IX.

³⁸ LeBreton, “Le désaccord de la foi . . .” (v. note 17, *supra*).

³⁹ *Stromata*, II, c. 2, 4.

⁴⁰ *Stromata*, VII, c. X.

the mind and guide it in its seeking after truth, in its striving after good, in its apostolic endeavors to spread good and truth.⁴¹

The faith (*πίστις*) is generally understood by Clement as common faith, that of the simple Christians, which is sufficient for salvation. This faith may be perfected by knowledge (*γνῶσις*), which seeks a fuller, more intimate understanding of the things of God. The faith is essential, the gnosis its crowning. It is the faith made precise, enriched and developed by means of human learning. In this sense, a gnostic has been called a simple believer arrived at maturity, a Christian who has drawn out the virtualities contained in the faith. The *πίστις* and the *γνῶσις* merely denominated two degrees of the Christian life, the common and the perfect, not an essential difference. Baptism contains this seed of Christian perfection.⁴² Clement insisted upon this idea in opposition to the heretical gnostics who taught a determinist theory, a conception of essential differences founded on the diversity of nature of men. Some were predestined to an inferior Christianity, others to the gnosis. The false gnostics boasted a superior intelligence and considered ordinary Christians as incapable of perfection, children.

It is interesting to note the exalted and highly intellectual perfection which Clement teaches is the vocation of the faithful. It is the normal development of the faith.⁴³ It perfects the faith, purifies and increases love.⁴⁴ A right philosophy applied to the data of the faith can educe further conclusions contained in it.⁴⁵ The gnostic, then, is the perfect man, most likened to Christ who was supremely perfect.⁴⁶ He pursues the good for its own sake, preferring the knowledge of God to eternal salvation, if the two could be separated. For this knowledge springs from faith under the impulse of love. Clement considered this gnosis not as purely speculative knowledge but as a religious

⁴¹ Tixeront, *History of Dogmas*, vol. I, p. 245, and references cited.

⁴² *Instructor*, I, c. VI. This idea of the Christian gnosis as the development of faith was later also that of St. Anselm, St. Augustine and the Scholastics.

⁴³ *Stromata*, V, c. I.

⁴⁴ *Stromata*, VII, c. X; *ibid.*, c. XI.

⁴⁵ *Stromata*, II, c. XI; V, c. I.

⁴⁶ *Stromata*, IV, c. XXI.

knowledge.⁴⁷ This edifice of the faith is not erected without reference to grace, the gifts and charity. The perfection of knowledge is ordained to the perfection of the integral man. Charity is its principle.⁴⁸

In attempting to trace out his pattern of theology, in his efforts to transform Revelation into a theology, faith into a science, Clement not only insisted upon the faith as a cornerstone but insisted also that theological speculation be subject to the Scriptures and to tradition.⁴⁹ It was a sound and fruitful principle, if not always followed by him. Clement's loose theological synthesis is marked by two things, its method and its championship of the divine transcendence.

The exalted notion of the Deity which has already been noted as characteristic of the Alexandrian Masters, seems to be the fulcrum of Clement's theology. It sharpened his attitude towards the dangers of anthropomorphism and made him keenly aware of the imperfections and limitations of our knowledge of God. Mindful of the errors of his time, he strove to maintain a pure and transcendent notion of the divinity. He studied all things from a divine viewpoint, as proceeding from God, manifesting the divine nature and serving to lead man back to God through knowledge and love. He was conscious more of the divine dissimilarity than of man's likeness to Him. Clement's doctrine on the gnosis appears exaggerated, his ideal of Christian perfection lofty, because his God is so transcendent. Man, as an image, only shares in the divine perfections and must seek his perfection in a fuller sharing in God through knowledge and love. The destiny of man is to realize in him-

⁴⁷ *Stromata*, IV, c. XXII; II, c. XIX.

⁴⁸ *Stromata*, V, c. XII; VII, c. XI. It should be noted that there are sufficient indications in Clement's works to deny that he subordinated the role of charity and placed knowledge as the principle of union. He was led into exaggerations by zeal and a reaction to the heresies of Millenarianism and false gnosticism, but they do not destroy his basic concept.

Stromata, VI, c. 15-16; I, c. 1.

⁴⁹ *Stromata*, VII, c. 16: "He ceases to be a man of God and faithful to the Lord, who discards with contempt the ecclesiastical tradition and yields to the opinion of human heresies."

self the divine similitude.⁵⁰ This will explain why Clement emphasizes the divine element in Christ. He realized that any humanizing of the Deity would also lower the God-man.

God is so unique in being and nature as almost to border on abstraction.⁵¹ It follows, then, that our knowledge of Him and the expression of it are entirely inadequate and imperfect. We know Him more as He is not than as He is.⁵² The method of attaining to true, though inadequate, knowledge of God is by the negative way. Clement clung to the principles of negation in theology, denying the presence of both corporeal and spiritual properties in order to maintain an absolutely simple and unlimited Being. Yet he was conscious of the corrective value of an affirmative theology. He attributed to God certain positive perfections attained through a knowledge of creatures which were analogically and supereminently applied to the Supreme Being.⁵³ In this way he sought to preserve a refined notion of God and the things intimately associated with

⁵⁰ *Stromata*, IV, c. 22; II, espec. c. 19.

⁵¹ *Stromata*, II, c. 16; IV, c. 25; V, c. 10-12. *Paedagogus*, I, c. 8.

⁵² *Stromata*, II, c. 16: "For the Divine Being cannot be declared as it exists; but as we who are fettered in the flesh were able to listen, so the prophets spoke to us; the Lord savingly accommodating Himself to the weakness of men."

Stromata, V, c. 11: "... we may reach somehow to the conception of the Almighty, knowing not what He is, but what He is not. . . ."

Ibid., c. 12; VI, c. 18; II, c. 10-11.

⁵³ *Stromata*, V, c. 11-12; I, c. 19. This insistence on a negative theology, albeit corrected by an affirmative method, is also the teaching of St. Thomas and the Schoolmen. Cf. St. Thomas, *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 5 *totum*; also *loc. cit.*, ad 14: "It is because human intelligence is not equal to the divine essence that this same divine essence surpasses our intelligence and is unknown to us; wherefore man reaches the highest point of his knowledge about God when he knows that he knows him not; inasmuch as he knows that that which is God transcends whatever he conceives of him."

De Divinis Nominibus, Prologus: "... Sed quia omnis similitudo creaturae ad Deum deficiens est, et hoc ipsum quod Deus est, omne id quod in creaturis invenitur, excedit; quidquid in creaturis a nobis cognoscitur, ad Deo removetur, secundum quod in creaturis est; ut sic post omne illud quod intellectus noster ex creaturis manductus de Deo concipere potest, hoc ipsum quod Deus est, remanet occultum et ignotum . . . et sic hoc ipsum quod Deus est, cum excedat illud quod a nobis apprehenditur, nobis remanet ignotum."

Loc. cit., cap. I, lect. 3.

Him. The charge of anthropomorphism could never be levelled at him.

It follows quite naturally that symbolic and figurative language would be used by this theologian, and hidden and mysterious significations sought. Clement had much to say on these subjects. Since his theological reasoning was in close contact with the Scriptures,⁵⁴ his ideas on the latter can be outlined. The Scriptures are the source of all true faith.⁵⁵ They are divinely inspired,⁵⁶ offering an irrefutable demonstration of the truth, superior in certitude to anything human and rational.⁵⁷ Clement devotes much space⁵⁸ to explaining the use of symbolism in the Scriptures, the employment of signs and mysterious veils in teaching the divine doctrine. He finds many reasons of convenience, of traditional authority, many examples among the Egyptians and Greeks. Symbolism is especially necessary because of the truths transmitted, which are objects essentially mysterious. The Scriptures hide their sense in order to make us diligent in the search for the truth and in order not to injure the weak. Thus the parable is characteristic of the Scriptures and the teaching of Our Lord. He sought to conduct men from the sensible to the intelligible world, to lead them by these familiar conceptions to an understanding of spiritual realities. Clement describes the parable as terminology borrowed from what is secondary and auxiliary, leading to what is principally intended, a formula rendering superior realities efficaciously intelligible by means of secondary notions.⁵⁹ The use of symbols in the Scriptures is explainable

⁵⁴ *Stromata*, VII, c. 16-17.

⁵⁵ *Stromata*, VII, c. 16.

⁵⁶ *Exhortation*, IX; *Stromata*, I, c. 21.

⁵⁷ *Stromata*, II, c. 4; VII, c. 16.

⁵⁸ *Stromata*, V.

⁵⁹ *Stromata*, VI, c. 15: "For many reasons, then, the Scriptures hide the sense. First, that we may become inquisitive, and be ever on the watch for the discovery of the words of salvation. Then it was not suitable for all to understand, so that they might not receive harm in consequence of taking in another sense the things declared for salvation by the Holy Spirit. . . . Wherefore also He employed metaphorical description; for such is the parable,—a narration based on some

by the loftiness of the truth contained and the need for preserving the purity of the doctrine expressed.⁶⁰ Clement is an apologete for the Scriptures, especially the Old Testament against the gnostics. Defense of the Scriptures is a defense of the true Christian philosophy. He tried to point out the truths which the Scriptures and Greek wisdom held in common, attributing a priority to the former. He uses the symbolic method to justify the obscurity of Scripture.

It has been necessary to deal at some length with Clement of Alexandria. He was essentially a man of transition, the link between primitive Christianity of the Apostolic Fathers and the Apologetes, and Origen and the Doctors of the Church. He was truly the creator of ecclesiastical theology more than anyone else responsible for the evolution of Christian faith and teaching into a systematic body of truth with which to defend and enrich the Christian deposit. He stoutly maintained the supernaturalism of faith. The mutual roles of reason and faith he attempted to delineate. He held firmly to the principle of the divine transcendence and insisted on the inadequacy of human ideas and expressions. In his theology he employed primarily the negative way restrained from excess by the positive method. These principles and methods had their influence on Scriptural exegesis in the use of the allegorical sense and of symbolism. Allegorism was fruitful in dissipating errors such as Millenarianism. If Clement and the Alexandrine Masters seemed at times radically to oppose the body to the spirit, they did bring men to rise above purely material aspirations. The metaphysical principle of transcendence, of the sensible as

subject which is not the principal subject, but similar to the principal subject, and leading him who understands to that which is the true and principal thing."

Stromata, V, c. 4: "All then, in a word, who have spoken of divine things, both Barbarians and Greeks, have veiled the first principles of things, and delivered the truth in enigmas, and symbols, and allegories, and metaphors, and such like tropes."

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, c. 8: "... Very useful, then, is the mode of symbolic interpretation for many purposes; and it is helpful to the right theology, and to piety, and to the display of intelligence, and the practice of brevity, and the exhibition of wisdom. 'For the use of symbolical speech is characteristic of the wise man. . . .'"

Ibid., c. 9, 10, 11.

image of the spiritual, together with the method of symbolic exegesis were pregnant with advantages for Christian theology, as well as dangers. Christian tradition avoided the latter, for example, Origenism. Clement propelled a movement which was taken up and developed by his successors, of whom the most notable was his pupil and greatest follower—Origen.

Origen (185—c. 254)

Origen, the greatest disciple of Clement, the most notable Master of the Didiscalia, was the most voluminous writer in antiquity.⁶¹ The influence of his dynamic intellect was felt in the East and also among Latin theologians for centuries. Origen became the subject of very bitter controversies and the highest praise. The memory of few men and their works have met with so varied a fate in the course of history. Origen was strongly devoted to the Church and attached to ecclesiastical tradition. He attacked a difficulty with boldness and proposed his opinions with humility and docility. He perfected the work of Clement. More than any individual theologian he gave direction to the development of a truly scientific theology. This great Master proposed to explain and defend the truths of the faith embodied in the books of the Scriptures and interpreted by ecclesiastical tradition.

The first step was to define the objects of faith and theology.

⁶¹ Origen was born at Alexandria of Christian parents about 185 A. D. He received a Christian education from his father, St. Leonides, who had him learn the Scriptures by heart. Origen was always seeking the hidden meanings. During the persecution of Septimius Severus, he wished to share his father's martyrdom. At this time he took over the headship of the Didiscalia from Clement. At the same time he studied for a while under Ammonius Saccas in order to broaden his education and become familiar with the doctrines he had to refute. He learned Hebrew and made a critical study of the Bible, resulting in the famous *Hexapla* and *Octapla*. He made several journeys after 212 A. D. Falling into disfavor with his bishop, Origen went to Cesarea in Palestine about 231 A. D. and opened a theological school there. His fame and renown drew many scholars to him, e. g., Gregory Thaumaturgus. He suffered severely for the faith in the persecution of Decius. He died in 253-255 A. D. Of his remaining works, the *De Principiis* represents the first Summa Theologica in history, a science consisting of rational conclusions based upon revelation.

There are certain revealed truths which have been taught to all, which have always been considered necessary even for the *pigriores*.⁶² But over and above these are other matters not explicitly contained in the faith, which are the object of theological speculation, the free investigation and research of the *studiosiores*.⁶³ "Faith attains the objective content of revealed truths (*quia sint*); whilst theology deals with the cause and mode of these truths (*quomodo aut unde sint*)."⁶⁴ "Ecclesiastical preaching sets the limits to the object of faith; everything outside these limits is the object of theology."⁶⁴ These distinctions were very important, albeit not fully applied.

Associated with these is another principle of equal importance, which is echoed throughout Origen's entire writings.⁶⁵ It is the rule of faith as manifested through tradition. Origen always had the highest respect for and docility toward the traditional teaching of the Church. He considered it to be the basis of his theology. The first rule of conduct is not to receive or teach anything as true except what "differs in no way from ecclesiastical and apostolical tradition."⁶⁶ The faith of

⁶² They are: one God, author of the two Testaments, just and good; Jesus Christ born of the Father before all creatures, His servant in creation, yet remaining God; who became incarnate of a Virgin and the Holy Spirit, was truly born, suffered, died, rose again, was taken up into heaven; the Holy Spirit associated in dignity and honor with the Father and Son, the inspirer of the Old Dispensation and the New; the immortality of the soul, its reward or punishments; resurrection of the body; free will; the struggle of the soul with the devil and his angels who truly exist; the creation of the world in time and its future destruction; the inspiration of the Scriptures, their apparent and their hidden meanings; the existence of good angels, God's ministers to men. *De Princ.*, preface, 4-10.

⁶³ They are: Is the Holy Ghost engendered or not? Is He the Son of God? Is the soul *ex semine* traduce, created *ex nihilo*, or pre-existent? What existed before the creation of the world? Are God and the spirits incorporeal (ἀσώματα)? When were the angels created? What are they? Are devils fallen angels? Are the stars animated or not? Listed in Cayré, *op. cit.*, p. 210-211. Cf. *De Princ.*, preface, 4-10.

⁶⁴ Cayré, *op. cit.*, p. 210. Cf. *De Princ.*, preface, 2-3.

⁶⁵ "De Princ.," III, I, 1, *Patrologia Graeca*, XI, col. 249. "In Rom.," comment. II, 11, *P. G.*, XIV, col. 898. *Ibid.*, V, 1, *P. G.*, *ibid.*, col. 1015. "In Matt.," ser. 137, *P. G.*, XIII, col. 1787. *Ibid.*, ser. 47, *P. G.*, *ibid.*, col. 1669.

⁶⁶ *De Princ.*, preface, 2.

the Church is summed up in its baptismal symbol. The one Origen used can only be gathered from his writings.⁶⁷ He did not state with precision the depositaries of the faith and the traditional teachings, nor explain fully the magisterium of the Church. Yet his life testified to his fidelity to it. He vigorously condemned the heretics, especially Valentinus, Basilides, and Marcion, whom he called heterodox.⁶⁸

Origen proposed to justify and explain the traditional doctrine by the use of Scripture and the instrumentality of sound philosophy.⁶⁹ With this intent he employed all the resources of Hellenic philosophy in which he was versed. Like his mentor, Clement, and his early teacher, Ammonius Saccas, Origen was an eclectic. His ideas were rooted in Christian teaching, although expressed in Platonic and Stoic terminology. The philosophic vocabulary of the third century was filled with terms stemming from these two philosophical traditions.⁷⁰ Origen believed with his predecessor that the philosophers had somehow received their truth from Revelation.⁷¹ Clement had sung the praises of philosophy; he was attracted by its value in the service of the faith. Origen, however, although he used it extensively was far less enthusiastic. He appreciated its radical inadequacy and insufficiency as compared to the faith.⁷² He

⁶⁷ "In Matt.," ser. 33, *P. G.*, XIII, col. 1643-1644: "Quidam autem. . . ." "In Joann. XXXII," 9, *P. G.*, XIV, col. 783: "Ante omnia credito. . . ."

⁶⁸ "In Matt. XII," 23. *P. G.*, XIII, col. 1038. "In Joan. II," *P. G.*, XIV, col. 195.

⁶⁹ *De Princ.*, preface, 10.

⁷⁰ Prat, F., *Origène*, Paris, 1907, pp. xiii-xiv: "It is impossible to comprehend anything of Origen's theories if he is regarded as being bound to any particular school; the great fault of Origenism, in its various forms, has been its attempts to find in his writings a logical and exhaustive development of a philosophical system."

Denis, J., *De la Philosophie d'Origène*, p. 59-60: "I do not believe that Origen found any of his essential principles in Greek learning. He would have had the same ideas had he not known the Stoics and Plato. But it is true that he often took from the latter the dress in which his ideas are clothed. . . . he certainly made use of Greek philosophy for the better expression of his doctrines. . . . But as for the ideas themselves, I think that their source must be sought elsewhere."

⁷¹ "In Genesim," hom. XIV, 3, *P. G.*, XII, col. 237-238.

⁷² *Contra Celsum*, III, 75; IV, 14.

considered the most decisive charge against philosophy to be its obvious powerlessness to correct the morals of its devotees.⁷³ Origen was imbued with the methods and spirit of the philosophers rather than their doctrines. His at times strong language belittling philosophy is the expression of the apologete striving to answer the attacks of the pagan Celsus. For him, the Christian truth was the best philosophy, true wisdom, a coherent system. The Christian system was too noble to be compared with the pagan teachings.

Faith and the knowledge of God are supernatural, being the divine gift and in no way attainable by the human mind alone.⁷⁴ It produces a supernatural assent of the mind.⁷⁵ The wisdom which is called divine is absolutely distinct from human wisdom.⁷⁶ Revelation was necessary so that all men might attain to the truth. Not only is the Christian belief not opposed to reason, but it is most in accord with it and would be far superior to all other systems even without reason.⁷⁷ It is in accord with the natural desire implanted in every soul to know God.⁷⁸

Faith establishes the unique place of God in the scheme of reality. Origen did not feel compelled to attempt a proof of this truth. He is no less insistent than Clement on the doctrine of the divine transcendence. God is above all created categories; He is above truth, wisdom, and life; He is them in Himself. He is above intelligence and being, superior to substance in dignity and power.⁷⁹ It was the teaching of Celsus that by composing the notion of God with that of other beings or by separating it from all others, or by analogy, knowledge of God could be had. Origen, basing himself on the words of the Scriptures that no one knows the Father but the Son and those to whom the Son has revealed Him, maintained that the knowledge of God is a grace, surpassing human nature, where-

⁷³ *Ibid.*, VI, 3.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 14.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁷⁶ *De Princ.*, II, 11. *Contra Celsum*, III, 40; V, 43.

⁷⁷ "In Joan.," II, 23, P. G., XIV, col. 162-163. *C. Celsum*, VII, 38; VI, 64.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 13; VI, 13-14; 10.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 11; 13.

fore the philosophers fell into so many errors concerning God. But this knowledge has been given to some through the goodness of God and His love for the human race.⁸⁰

God is not so transcendent that nothing can be known about Him. Origen insisted upon the nature of God insofar as reason can know it. He is simple and incorporeal, absolutely immaterial, incorruptible, not part of the world or the world itself.⁸¹ He is goodness and life itself, essentially active.⁸² He is provident and condescends to help man, though remaining immutable in His being.⁸³ God is absolutely impassible. Such terms in the Bible as divine anger, repentance, et cetera are mere figures that must be so understood.⁸⁴ The power of God is, as it were, limited, not that He could not have produced other than the present reality, but He is powerless to perform contradictions or what is incompatible with His Nature.⁸⁵ Perfection consists in an ever closer likeness to God, a more and more perfect sharing in God and in Christ.⁸⁶

The Trinity was the object of a great deal of theological discussion and official definition in the Eastern Church. Origen clearly taught the distinction of the Three Persons in God. He opposed monarchianism.⁸⁷ He clearly taught the coeternity of the Father and the Son, the latter engendered from all eternity and not created.⁸⁸ He is the Son by participation in the Divine Essence, not by grace and adoption.⁸⁹ Although the Son is known properly only from the Scriptures, the Holy Spirit could

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, VI, 44; 17; VII, 42-46. *De Princ.*, II, 6.

⁸¹ *De Princ.*, I, 1, 5-6; 2, 2. *C. Celsum*, VI, 65, 71. "In Joan.," XIII, 21, *P. G.*, XIV, col. 451, 454.

⁸² "In Joan.," XIII, 25, *P. G.*, XIV, col. 412-413. "In Matt.," XV, 10, *P. G.*, XIII, col. 1278-1283.

⁸³ *C. Celsum*, IV, 5; V, 12; VI, 71.

⁸⁴ *De Princ.*, II, 4, 4. "In Jerem.," hom. XVIII, 6, *P. G.*, XIII, col. 474-478.

⁸⁵ *De Princ.*, II, 9, 1. *C. Celsum*, V, 23.

⁸⁶ *De Princ.*, I, 3; II, 6; III, 6; IV, 1.

⁸⁷ "In Joan.," X, 21, *P. G.*, XIV, col. 376. *Ibid.*, I, 23, *P. G.*, *ibid.*, col. 65.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 1, *P. G.*, XIV, col. 108-109. "In Gen. fragm.," "in Euseb. Contra Marcel.," I, IV, 22. *De Princ.*, IV, 4, 1.

⁸⁹ *Selecta in Psalm.*, hom. XIII, 134. "In Matt.," XXVIII, 18, *P. G.*, XVII, col. 309. *De Princ.*, IV, 1.

not even have been suspected without them.⁹⁰ He is coeternal and consubstantial with the Father and the Son. Origen was doubtful not as to His creation but as to His filiation.⁹¹ He was not sure of the mode of being of the Holy Spirit, since St. John wrote in his prologue *omnia per ipsum* (Word) *facta sunt*. Although his Trinitarian doctrine is filled with contradictions and imprecisions, the constant tradition of the Church caused him to acknowledge the Personality of the Holy Spirit. In this he was more explicit than his predecessors. By reason of his doctrine of transcendence, he seemed to subordinate the Word to the Father, yet he insisted on the divine attributes of Christ. Origen's purpose was to glorify the Son, to manifest His equality with the Father. Although the incompleteness of his thought and the lack of exactness in his terminology offered a mine of material for latter condemnations, much of what he wrote can be explained in an acceptable sense.⁹²

The most famous and the most critically judged of Origen's writings are those which contain his notions on Scripture. They are the principal sources which characterize his method. An outline of his Scriptural teaching and classifications will reveal the great advantages (and at the same time the dangers) of the method, which later Fathers tried to employ.⁹³ The inspiration of the Scriptures is a certainty, synonymous with their divinity, both of which are proven by the divinity of Christianity.⁹⁴ Unlike human works they are the product of a special motion of God.⁹⁵ Origen did not explain the mode of this inspiration, although it consists primarily in an illumination of the intelligence.⁹⁶

Inspired by Plato's trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit, he found in the Scriptures a corporal, a psychic, and a spiritual

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 3.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, I, preface, 4. "In Joan.," II, 6, *P. G.*, XIV, col. 125.

⁹² Tixeront, *La Théologie antiniciéne*, 9th ed., p. 309. Denis, J., *op. cit.*, p. 121-122.

⁹³ Summary of Prat, F., "Origène," *Dict. de la Bible*, IV, col. 1870-1889.

⁹⁴ *De Princ.*, IV, 1, 6, 8.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 6. *C. Celsum*, III, 81; VI, 7.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 48.

sense.⁹⁷ Unfortunately, he all too loosely defined each of these senses. The corporal sense is variously referred to as the body, the flesh, and the letter of the Scriptures, the grammatical, historical or sensible sense. Some parts of the Scriptures have no corporal sense. By this he means the proper literal sense whereby the words are understood in their proper signification. He had in mind the many anthropomorphisms in the Bible which should be taken as metaphors; various passages which would express something unworthy of God if taken literally; precepts impossible or unreasonable according to their obvious sense.

The intermediary is the psychic or moral sense, such as is found in St. Paul.⁹⁸ It embraces whatever is capable of edifying the reader or listener.⁹⁹ This explains its frequent use in homilies for popular edification. In practice, Origen neglects this sense and reduces the Scriptures to their letter and spirit.

The psychic sense is more frequently absorbed by the spiritual or pneumatic sense, otherwise called the *sensus mysticus, allegoricus, spiritalis intelligentia*. According to Origen's explanation the spiritual sense includes the metaphorical or figurative, the typical, the consequent and even the accommodated senses.¹⁰⁰ The spiritual sense was by far the most important in the mind of Origen.¹⁰¹ He frequently confused the mode of signification with the objects signified by this sense. Among these he enumerated all the theological doctrinal senses directly or indirectly contained in the Scriptures and the accommodations, metaphors, and symbolism to which the historical passages are susceptible.

⁹⁷ *De Princ.*, IV, 11-12. "Hom. V in Levit.," V, 1, 5, *P. G.*, XII, col. 447, 455. "Hom. XI in Num.," 1-2, *P. G.*, *ibid.*, col. 641-645. "Hom. II in Levit.," *P. G.*, *ibid.*, col. 422.

⁹⁸ *I Corinthians*, IX, 9. *De Princ.*, IV, 12.

⁹⁹ "Hom. XVII in Gen.," 9, *P. G.*, XII, col. 262.

¹⁰⁰ Origen refers to St. Paul: *Rom.* XI, 4 (accommodated sense); *I Cor.* X, 4 (spiritual sense); X, 11 (typical sense); *Col.* II, 12 (shadow); *Heb.* VIII, 5 (O.T.-N. T.); *I Cor.* IX, 9 (consequent). Figurative and extended sense: *C. Celsum*, IV, 37, 49-52, 71-72, 87; VI, 62. Spiritual sense: *C. Celsum*, IV, 44; VII, 60.

¹⁰¹ *De Princ.*, II, 2, 4; III, 5.

The norms by which Origen sought to interpret the word of God were solid bases for a sound exegesis. The fact remains that they were not always followed or wisely applied. The first rule is to explain the Scriptures in a manner worthy of their Divine Author.¹⁰² Being His work, they must reflect the divine truth, unity, plenitude, and holiness. The interpreter cannot allow anything false, contradictory or opposed to the perfections of God.¹⁰³ From the perfection of divine plenitude Origen deduced the necessity of the spiritual sense, without which the Scriptures would be unworthy of God and not superior to human conceptions.¹⁰⁴

As a corollary, the literal sense must be abandoned when it expresses something impossible or unworthy of God. Just when this occurs Origen does not clearly determine. His examples of passages justifying recourse to metaphors, allegory, et cetera—such as anthropomorphisms, prescriptions like plucking out one's right eye—are supported by satisfactory reasons.¹⁰⁵ It is easy to understand how this principle came to be abused.

The third great rule and the constant theme in Origen's works is the insistence on the teaching of the Church as the principal guide. It was the great safeguard of his own orthodoxy despite his bold intellectual wanderings. It also explains the modesty and reserve with which he proposes his own interpretations.¹⁰⁶

This method maintains the transcendence of God and safeguards the divine perfections. Origen's use of symbolism rendered these concrete and vital while at the same time in no

¹⁰² "In Num.," hom. XXVI, 3, *P. G.*, XII, col. 774. "In Jerem.," hom. XII, *P. G.*, XIII, col. 378.

¹⁰³ "Philocalia VI, e secundo tomo in Evan. Matt.," *P. G.*, XIII, col. 831.

¹⁰⁴ "In Num.," hom. XXVII, 1, *P. G.*, XII, col. 782: "Non possumus hoc dicere de Sancti Spiritus litteris, quod aliquid in eis otiosum sit aut superfluum, etiamsi aliquibus videantur obscura." "In Psalmos," I, 4, *P. G.*, XII, col. 1082. "In Jerem.," hom. XXXIX, *P. G.*, XIII, col. 543.

¹⁰⁵ *De Princ.*, IV, 12-17.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, IV, 9. "In Matt.," serm. XLVI, *P. G.*, XIII, col. 1667: "Sed nos illis credere non debemus, nec exire a prima et ecclesiastica traditione, nec aliter credere nisi quemadmodum per successionem Ecclesiae Dei tradiderunt nobis."

way diminishing them. In this way "he was not only a scholar defending his exegetical methods; he was above all a deeply religious man defending what he held to be most sacred."¹⁰⁷

In retrospect we can point out the principles which the great Alexandrian Doctor contributed to the theological tradition. He drew clear lines for the division of the objects of faith and theology, both of which he firmly rooted in the Scriptures and the teaching of the Church. Without depreciating its value Origen emphasized the inadequacy of reason and philosophy *ante fidem*. Yet with a sound philosophy the theologian can proceed to investigate and solve those questions not explicitly answered by the faith. He continues the teaching of Clement on the divine transcendence. He places positive perfections in God, present by essence. Christians are divided into two non-exclusive classes according to the degree of their sharing in the divine perfections. In the Trinity the divinity of the Persons is taught, their coeternity and the eternal generation of the Son. The coequality of the Persons was not so explicitly taught until the fourth century. In his Trinitarian and Christological teaching it is the divine element which is brought out. Origen's exegetical principles contained the seeds of true greatness. It was left for later Masters to refine and develop them. Like Clement, Origen's work was one of invention, defense and development. His enormous influence in both East and West was largely a good influence. "The Eastern Church has never produced a bolder theological explorer, or rather pioneer, nor a more stimulating sower of ideas."¹⁰⁸

The Cappadocian Fathers

The greatest of the disciples of Origen were the Cappadocian Fathers, St. Basil the Great (c. 330-379), St. Gregory Nazianzen (c. 330-395), and St. Gregory Nyssa (c. 335-395).¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ LeBreton, "Le Désaccord . . .," (v. fn. 17, *supra*), p. 506.

¹⁰⁸ Tixeront, *History of Dogmas*, I, p. 284.

¹⁰⁹ St. Basil the Great was born in 330 A.D. at Caesarea in Cappadocia. His paternal grandmother, Macrina, had been under the guidance of St. Gregory Thaumaturgus and his maternal grandfather was a martyr. He studied at Caesarea,

Bound by the ties of blood and friendship, they were brought still closer together by the general unity of their doctrine. They carried on the traditions of Alexandria and developed in harmony with orthodoxy the teaching of Origen, endeavoring to avoid its excesses. At the same time they were very definitely affected by the influence of the School of Antioch. Since their doctrinal works are least famous for their mutual differences, it will be of more advantage to treat their theology in general from the viewpoint of the greater unity which it certainly possessed.

While acknowledging the primacy of the Christian deposit of faith, the Cappadocians sought to demonstrate this doctrine as a self-sufficient whole, having its reasonable foundations, not contradicting but surpassing reason. In order to present Christian teaching as a scientific system of theology, they enlisted the services of the best philosophical thought, aware of the role of reason in the explanation and exposition of the truths

Constantinople, and Athens. During these years he became the friend of Gregory Nazianzen. They became monks. Together they published selected writings of Origen, called the *Philocalia*. Basil became bishop of Cesarea in 370. Until his death he fought political, ecclesiastical, and doctrinal difficulties. He died in 379. Of his works the two important theological books are the *Against Eunomius*, defending the consubstantiality of the Son and the divinity of the Holy Spirit, and *On The Holy Spirit*, proving the divinity of the Third Person.

St. Gregory of Nyssa, Basil's younger brother, was born at Cesarea about 335 A.D. He was taught by his brother who later made him bishop of Nyssa. He was unsuited to administration and suffered under political troubles. He died in 394. Gregory was a great thinker, a philosopher. He liked clearness and logic, the spirit of systematization. Following his model, Origen, he proposed to reduce to a coherent system the whole of Christian doctrine. He followed Origen's teachings closely. His more important works are *Against Eunomius*, *Against Apollinaris*, and *The Catechetical Discourse*, his work of systematic theology, a fairly complete exposition of Catholic doctrine.

St. Gregory of Nazianzen was born at Arianzus in Cappadocia about 326 A.D. He studied at Cesarea in Cappadocia, the town of the same name in Palestine, at Alexandria, and at Athens. He was baptized in 360, followed the monastic life of Basil but left to aid his father, the bishop of Nazianzus. Basil made him bishop of Sasima which he never visited, and later he was patriarch of Constantinople for a short time. He died about 390. Gregory shone as an orator. His greatest works are his theological sermons, especially the five great *Theological Discourses*, which treat of the difficult mysteries of faith.

of faith. Philosophy always remained an instrument. It was even under suspicion since it was so often appealed to by the heretics. The Fathers employed it as often as required to refute the heretics with their own weapon. Philosophy for them meant the efforts of reason to understand more fully and expose the truths of faith. In using philosophical terms such as *οὐσία*, *φύσις*, *ὑπόστασις*, they were not sanctioning any system but merely employing them in their current popular meaning. Strict philosophy is found somewhat excessively only in Gregory of Nyssa, who was more genuinely a philosopher, and to a far less degree in St. Basil.

The great doctrinal source for the Cappadocian theology was Holy Scripture. In their exegesis, which was under the form of a religious commentary, the influence of both Alexandria and Antioch are apparent. The representative of the former is especially Gregory of Nyssa,¹¹⁰ while that of the latter is St. Basil.¹¹¹ Gregory of Nazianzen made a moderate use of the allegorical method. Their conflicts with the Arians who were trained in the methods of Antioch forced these writers to a more scientific treatment of the Scriptures, while still remaining attached to the allegorical interpretation. At the same time, realizing the development taking place in theology and in order to refute the objections of the Eunomians, they insisted upon the importance of the allied principle of tradition.

The Cappadocian Fathers taught the incomprehensibility of the Divine Being. Faith through Revelation and reason by the contemplation of creatures can know the existence of God, but of His essence we are ignorant.¹¹² Even the Scriptures do

¹¹⁰ Gregory of Nyssa set out to follow the literal method, boasting that he had never violated the texts by figures and allegories. (*P. G.*, XLIV, col. 121, 68.) Yet in the *Life of Moses* he allegorizes to excess. (*P. G.*, *ibid.*, col. 297-430.) He exposes the mystical sense of the *Canticle of Canticles* which he prefaces by praise of Origen and a defense of the spiritual and anagogic senses. (*P. G.*, *ibid.*, col. 772.)

¹¹¹ Although he cooperated with the Nazianzen Doctor in the *Philocalia*, in *Hom. III in Hexameron* (also IX, 1) he rejects the abuse of allegorical interpretations of Scripture.

¹¹² Gregory Nyssa, "C. Eunom." *P. G.*, XLV, col. 933. Basil, CXXVII, *P. G.*, XXXII, col. 188.

not comprehend His nature.¹¹³ However, through His energies or operations many things about God are discerned.¹¹⁴ Nor does the incompleteness of our knowledge deprive it of truth.¹¹⁵ Quite commonly, they describe analogies and affinities between the visible and invisible worlds, a Platonic and Origenist tendency. The soul especially reflects its divine Creator and Archetype.¹¹⁶ Even the Trinity finds its illustrations in human psychology.

The chief importance of the Cappadocians was their contribution to the Trinitarian question. It was their mission to definitively affirm the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit. They fixed the terminology expressing this fact as well as the mutual relations of the Three Persons and their coexistence in the divine Unity. They consecrated the Origenist distinction of nature (*οὐσία*) and person (*ὑπόστασις*). St. Basil was the pioneer, the others followed and completed his work. He distinguished between the common and the singular, teaching that essence corresponds to the former and hypostasis to the latter concept.¹¹⁷ St. Basil asserted that because of the unity of nature, our knowledge of one Person leads to the understanding of the others.

The Fathers of Cappadocia unanimously defended the divinity of the Holy Spirit against the Pneumatomachi. He was consubstantial and equal in dignity with the Father and Son. The knotty question of His origin or procession was variously treated. St. Gregory Nazianzen found it impossible to distinguish precisely how this procession differs from the generation of the Son.¹¹⁸ St. Basil taught His procession from the Father by the Son, which is also the formula of Gregory of Nyssa. The latter went on to state that this power of the Son

¹¹³ Gregory Nyssa, *op. cit.* Gregory Naz., *Orat. XXVIII*, 5, 7, 17.

¹¹⁴ Basil, *Ep. 234*, 1; *Adv. Eunom.* II, 32.

¹¹⁵ Basil, *Ep. 233*, 2.

¹¹⁶ Basil, *Hex.* IX, 6. Greg. Nyssa, "De An. et Res.," *P. G.*, XLVI, col. 41; "De Mortuis," *P. G.*, *ibid.*, col. 509.

¹¹⁷ Cf. *Epistle 38*.

¹¹⁸ *Orat. XXXIX*, 12; *XXIII*, 11; *XXXI*, 18.

has been received from the Father, who, nevertheless, remains the first principle. Such has always been the characteristic formula of Oriental theology.

Christology in the Cappadocian theology was occasioned by the heresy of Apollinaris. For this reason the Cappadocians insisted on the personal unity in Christ, a strong point in the Alexandrian tradition. In this way they avoided the errors of many Antiochenes, since they used similar Antiochene language in affirming the reality and completeness of Christ's nature. Against Apollinaris,¹¹⁹ they taught the existence of a rational soul in Christ; otherwise there would have been no redemption. Following Origen, they used the term "two natures" existing in a personal unity without confusion of their respective properties. This union is essential.¹²⁰ Origen had outlined the theory of communication of idioms; the Cappadocians strongly emphasized it.¹²¹ From it they developed the dogma of the *θεοτόκος*.¹²² Each taught the redemptive purpose of the Incarnation. Gregory of Nyssa insisted on its universal efficacy, that Christ embraced all humanity. The others spoke about the divine image in man and his deification in Christ.¹²³ The Redemption is consistent with God's attributes, displaying His power, righteousness, wisdom, and goodness.

The nature and conditions of man were discussed in order to refute the Manicheans, and consequently the position of free will. This faculty was the result of man's creation as the image of God. In misusing it, in rejecting the good, man weakened but did not destroy it. The blessedness and privileges which he enjoyed in his state before the Fall are called natural, though it is not clear how these theologians understood this term. Their teaching on inherited original sin is very vague.¹²⁴ However,

¹¹⁹ Greg. Naz., *Orat.* II, 23; XXXVII, 2. Greg. Nyssa, *Antirr.* 11, 14, 24, 32.

¹²⁰ Greg. Naz., *Ep.* 101.

¹²¹ Greg. Naz., *Orat.* XXX, 8. Greg. Nyssa, *Ep. ad Theophil.*

¹²² Greg. Naz., *Ep.* 101; *Orat.* XXIX, 4; cf. *Ep.* X.

¹²³ Basil, *De Sp. Sancto*, IX, 33. Greg. Naz., *Orr.* I, 5; XXXIX, 17; XL, 45.

¹²⁴ Greg. Nyssa, *P. G.*, XLIV, col. 336, 337, 1184, 609. Basil, *Hom.* VIII. Greg. Naz., *Orat.* XIX, 13.

for the removal of all sin and for the attainment of salvation, grace is absolutely necessary.¹²⁵ Likewise, the concurrence of free will is required. Although admitting the importance of grace and man's dependence on it, they are not too precise in delineating the relations of one to another. Nor did they divide adequately the natural and supernatural moral goods. Gregory of Nyssa seemed to introduce grace only in the good action itself.¹²⁶ The Doctor of Nazianzen offered the most complete treatment. Without God's grace it is impossible to will rightly, to choose the good; the willing itself and the call to holiness are from Him and not from our natural aptitude. Yet salvation is both His work and ours, demanding our cooperation.¹²⁷ The question of grace as such had not arisen at this time to require an exactness of theological teaching. It was only incidentally treated in the refutation of Manicheism.

The Cappadocian Fathers, although holding a position somewhere between the Alexandrian and the Antiochene traditions, are more properly classed with the former school. Their authority in both Oriental and Latin theology was very great. They were especially the Masters of St. John Damascene, who frequently quoted St. Gregory Nazianzen. Their works are cited throughout the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas, who lauds the authority of the Nazianzen:

At the same time the contrary is not to be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, whose authority in Christian doctrine is of such weight that no one has ever raised objection to his teaching. . . .¹²⁸

Through St. Ambrose, a student of the writings of St. Basil, Cappadocian influence took hold in the West. These theologians were mystics whose notions were highly elevated, a tendency which put them in contact with contemporary non-Christian thought which was Neo-Platonist in tone. Such

¹²⁵ Basil, *De Sp. Sancto*, 18, 55; *Hom. in Psalm. XXIX*, 2; in *Psal. XXXII*, 2.

¹²⁶ "De Orat. dominica," IV, P. G., XLIV, col. 1165. *De Instituto Christiano*, P. G., XLIV, col. 304.

¹²⁷ *Orat. XXXVII*, 13, 15, 21-22.

¹²⁸ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 61, a. 3.

tendencies were developed more openly by Pseudo-Dionysius. The Cappadocian endeavor to present a scientific theology produced, in the work of St. Gregory Nyssa, the finest Summa of Christian thought between Origen and St. John Damascene.

II. THE SCHOOL OF ANTIOCH

Beginnings

In the forward march of Christian theology, the School of Alexandria was complemented by the teaching of the great scholars who followed the tradition of the School of Antioch. The doctrine of the Church benefited by the best features of both traditions. The Antiochene school did not possess the vast intellectual heritage of Alexandria nor was it able to boast an equal list of great masters. Its rise was occasioned by the natural reaction to the exaggerations and errors of many Alexandrians. Although this school fell into disrepute after a comparatively short existence because of the heresies taught by its disciples, its principles and method continued to be valued and applied, especially in modern times.

Antioch, the great metropolis of Syria, was founded about 300 B. C. by the Seleucids as their capital. It soon became the third city of the Roman world. Like Alexandria this Greek city was a microcosm in itself. Its Jewish population became very numerous and powerful. Their influence was felt by the pagans. Later the early Christian community was affected by much that was Jewish, because of this environment or because many of the Christians were converts from Judaism. However, it must be remembered that it was at Antioch that the faithful first received the name of "Christians." The Christian Church grew rapidly there and was able to send out missionaries and to help the brethren elsewhere with alms. Very early it had attained a privileged position by reason of its numbers, the authority and prestige of its bishops, and the firmness of its teaching. Up until the middle of the third century, the Antiochene Church was not seriously troubled with heresy. The

bishop had always been the vigilant custodian of orthodoxy. The error of Docetism which was preached at Antioch in the early second century was very vigorously opposed by St. Ignatius of Antioch. He insisted on the reality of Christ's flesh, His sufferings, death, and resurrection.

At the end of the second century there existed at Antioch no catechetical or theological school such as existed at Alexandria. The teaching at Antioch was done by the Church. There were no great Masters as in Egypt, but the Antiochene theologians were the bishops of the place. However, since the time of St. Ignatius, Antioch had added nothing to the world of thought and the expression of doctrine. The first reference to any distinctly theological teaching was at the time of the condemnation of Paul of Samosata in 268 A.D.¹²⁹ He succeeded in arousing the Christian world and launching a movement whose repercussions were felt for a long time afterwards. It is difficult to state definitely that Paul represented a distinct school of thought at Antioch. In opposition to the Alexandrian notion of the Logos, he denied the divinity of Christ. God had merely revealed Himself more fully to the Prophet Jesus. In God there are not really Three Persons but One Person. Reason (λόγος) and Wisdom (σοφία) are distinguished in God not as subsisting in themselves but merely as modes or attributes of God. Christ was not God but a man united to Wisdom in an accidental union whereby God dwells within Him. Other points in this doctrine include

the value of personal deeds, opposed to the excellence resulting from nature alone. What comes from nature has nothing meritorious nor superior; it is the effort of the will, the personal merit that constitutes true greatness. Jesus is not God by nature: He is more than that; He has become such by His virtue. On the other hand, by its way of explaining the union of the man and the Word, the system foreshadowed Nestorianism.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Ignatius, *Ad Magnesios*, XI; *Ad Trallenses*, IX; *Ad Smyrnaeos*, I-VI; *Ad Ephesios*, XVIII. Bardy, "Paul de Samosate," *Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense*, 1929.

¹³⁰ Tixeront, *History of Dogmas*, I, p. 403.

Lucian of Antioch (martyred in 312 A. D.), who was also the teacher of Arius, certainly founded the school of Antioch about 260 A. D. He is said to have studied in the schools of Edessa and Cesarea. Probably the influence of Origen at the latter place attracted him to biblical studies. His exegetical method differed from Origen's, especially in the importance he assigned to the literal sense. The allegorical excesses found among the Alexandrians and his own preference for Aristotelian philosophy inclined him to this method. Through Lucian, the Adoptianism of Paul of Samosata was linked with the teaching of Lucian's pupil, Arius. They taught the existence of a created Logos. Lucian lacked the sense of ecclesiastical tradition and the mystical spirit which guided the great Alexandrians. Subordinationist tendencies filtered into Antiochene theology after Lucian, the defined teaching of the Church notwithstanding.

Diodore of Tarsus (c. 330-c. 391)

Diodore of Tarsus, who succeeded to the See of Antioch in 378 A. D., was renowned for both virtue and learning. He had a remarkably extensive knowledge which embraced all the sciences of his time. At the same time he had a disinterested zeal for spreading the Faith by both word and pen. During his lifetime he was considered one of the lights of orthodoxy. His disciple, St. John Chrysostom, always held him in admiration. It was another pupil, Nestorius, who drew from the Master's teaching all its latent heresy.

In his exegesis Diodore founded those rational principles which form an inseparable part of the Antiochene School. To allegorism he opposed the literal sense, or theory, the search for the spiritual sense through the literal. In his writings against Apollinaris in defense of the integrity of Christ's human nature, he used certain inexact and unfortunate expressions which brought about his condemnation by synods held at Constantinople (499 A. D.) and Antioch (508 A. D.). Diodore was inclined to exaggerate the distinction of the two natures in Christ, nearly affirming two personalities. He held that the

Son of God dwelt in the Son of David as in a temple, the man born of Mary is not by nature but by grace the Son of God. Such is also the manner of expression of those who later taught the moral union of the natures in Christ. It cannot be said that he consciously held these teachings in their heretical sense.¹³¹

Before proceeding to treat in detail those few great representatives of the Antiochene tradition whose works have come down to us more or less in their entirety, it will be useful to sum up the characteristic tendencies which by the end of the fourth century were clearly in evidence.

The principle of the literal method was a wise brake upon the dangers of the Alexandrian exegesis. It, however, courted the very proximate danger of rationalism. In giving too much value to the letter, the spirit and the divine element of the Scriptures were neglected. In place of the mystical purpose of their rivals, the Antiochenes employed a moral teaching which was salutary in the hands of a Chrysostom but savored of Pelagianism in a Theodore. The penchant for Aristotelian philosophy

induced, on the one hand, an extremely precise, positive, and analytical research method, but, on the other hand, lacked inspiration and inclined to that species of rationalism which so easily blunts the sense of tradition.¹³²

The Antiochenes were not particularly concerned with metaphysical speculation on the being of God or proofs of His existence. Diodore had proposed solely a cosmological proof in his work *Against Fate*.¹³³ They also taught a Providence extending to particulars. In their doctrine on the Trinity these Masters depended more upon exegesis than upon metaphysical arguments. They affirmed the distinction of Persons in the Trinity, which they called hypostases, a term easily apt to convey the notion of three different substances. Its misuse by Paul of Samosata, and the tendency of the Alexandrians to

¹³¹ Pirot, L., *L'Oeuvre exégétique de Theodore de Mopsuestia*, p. 33-34.

¹³² Cayré, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

¹³³ Photius, *P. G.*, CIII, col. 833.

admit a subordinationism lest the divine unity be sacrificed, led the Antiochenes to oppose the Nicene *ὁμοούσιος*.

The historical study of Scripture and the lofty conception of human nature led to an emphasis on the humanity of Christ. The Alexandrians had begun with the truth that He who assumed human nature was personally God and had elevated human nature to a vital union with Himself. The Antiochenes took as their starting point the truth of the reality and completeness of Christ's human experiences. Opposition to Apollinarism sharpened their Christological doctrine. The true and complete human nature in Christ, His free will and the lack of confusion of the two natures or of transformation of the human into the divine nature were emphasized by the Antiochenes. Their Aristotelian conception of *οὐσία* as an individual particular being made it difficult for them to conceive of a complete nature that was not at the same time personal. Those who fell into heresy in this school did not fail to assert a true moral and intellectual development in the humanity of Christ as well as the presence of two distinct personalities.

Theodore of Mopsuestia (350-428)

Theodore of Mopsuestia was a pupil of Diodore and a fellow student of St. John Chrysostom. As an independent thinker and a systematic theologian, he was the greatest of the Masters of Antioch. He erected a fully thought-out system on the nature and destiny of man, the Person and mission of Christ, as well as on sin, the fall, free will, and grace, which is distinctly Pelagian in tone. The Scriptures were the primary source of Christian doctrine. They were inspired, but in different degrees. The highest degree is exemplified in the prophetic books, which type is a sort of prophetic ecstasy. Entirely unconscious of external reality, the prophet received in his own mind certain spiritual impressions of things hidden or future, which is true Biblical inspiration. Other books, such as Proverbs, are of inferior inspiration, called the spirit of prudence. The inspiration of the Spirit truly influenced the sacred

authors, but the variances in style are due to the individual differences of the authors. To the Alexandrian exegesis Theodore opposed an excessive literalism. The historical books contain true history from which true spiritual lessons are to be deduced, not indiscriminately imposed. He recognized a limited typical sense in the Holy Writings.¹³⁴ The Old Testament obscurity results from the shadows and imperfect truths it contains, not the truth itself. Thus figurative language is used in reference to its original object.¹³⁵ In his exegesis Theodore gave no thought to tradition.

Theoretically, Theodore admits the authority of the Fathers and of the Councils; in practice, in his exegesis, he never takes them into account. He is rigorously and strictly personal in his work. He places too much confidence in himself, and that was perhaps the source of his errors.¹³⁶

He was led to reduce greatly the number of Messianic psalms and prophecies.

What is known of Theodore's doctrine concerning the Trinity is in his firm opposition to the Arians and Pneumatomachi. He taught the natural procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone. It was especially his Christological teaching which survived in manuscript and influence. An Antiochene, Theodore was concerned with maintaining the truth of Christ's human nature, avoiding a confusion of the two. Practically, he was unable to separate personality from nature. Verbally he preserved the unity of Person in Christ.¹³⁷ In reality, he taught a dual personality, postulating a mere moral union. The Word became flesh in appearance only, since the Word was not changed into flesh.¹³⁸ He admitted a real ignorance in Christ and a true progress in knowledge. The Godhead imparted

¹³⁴ *Proem. in Jon.*

¹³⁵ *In Joel*, 2, 28.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 981, "De Incarnatione Filii Dei," VIII: "When we distinguish the natures we say that the nature of the God Word is complete, and that His Person is also complete, since it cannot be said that a hypostasis is impersonal. (Similarly we say) that the nature of the man is complete and his person complete also. But when we consider the union we say that there is only one person."

¹³⁷ Pirot, L., *op. cit.*, p. 324.

¹³⁸ *P. G.*, LXVI, col. 985.

wisdom to Christ only gradually. [Theodore denied that God was born of Mary.¹³⁹ She is called θεοτόκος because God dwells in the man she bore.¹⁴⁰] He recognized three possible modes of divine indwelling: by essence, which is the particular reward of the Saints; by operation, which is had in all creatures; by divine approval or complacency, which is had in Christ. God dwelt in Christ as in a Son.¹⁴¹ Although other men participate partially in the grace of the Holy Spirit, Christ received the plenitude.¹⁴² Such a union made it easy for Christ to advance in virtue.¹⁴³ Worship is due to Christ because of the One assuming his operations.¹⁴⁴

In Theodore's system the Incarnation is viewed more as the accomplishment of man's destiny than as his freedom from the consequences of sin. The work of the Redemption was merely moral in the sense that Christ became our model and showed us the way. This fits in with the exalted notion of human nature. Man is the link between the spiritual and the material, the revealer of God in the bosom of creation. He has in himself the powers necessary to accomplish his destiny, especially free will, the power of self-determination, exercised in conjunction with the guidance of the Spirit. Human nature, created liable to change and mortality, and subject to the passions, is by the Fall under the penalty of actual death, the opposition of the passions, and increased propensity to sin. Original sin is not inherited as Adam's sin, but it is death, the result of one's own transgressions. There is a very positive affinity between Theodore and Pelagius through Julian of Eclanum.

It is not necessary to discuss the teaching of the heretic Nestorius. He represents the worst excesses to which the Antiochene school was susceptible. In him, rationalism in doctrine and exegesis triumphed over the traditional teaching of the Church.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 997.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, col. 992.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, col. 976.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, col. 980.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, col. 977, 986.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 991, 996.

St. John Chrysostom (c. 344-407)

St. John Chrysostom was one of the most outstanding Greek Fathers and the greatest Doctor and noblest representative of the Antiochene School.¹⁴⁵ He was not a theologian in the strict sense of the term, but paramountly a moralist. His use of theology was not speculative but for the purpose of practical edification. A preacher, he was a man of action, a moralist. He preached to those who wished to live good lives and were not concerned with penetrating the deep mysteries of Christian revelation. He believed that those who lived well would think well. Theological controversies did not interest him. His lifetime spanned a period of quiet following the Arian disputes and preceding the Nestorian and Eutychian controversies.

The well of Chrysostom's ideas was the Holy Scriptures. He had studied them under Diodore and Meletius of Antioch. His sermons were constructed of two parts, doctrinal and moral. The first opened with a text from Scripture upon which a literal explanation was given in accordance with the Antiochene exegesis and according to which the teachings of the Faith were explained. The second part consisted of moral applications. The method of literal exegesis to which St. John was attached did not exclude all allegorism, but he insisted that its moderate use be strictly founded upon the letter. His sense of tradition as the rule of faith preserved him from the pitfalls into which others fell.

St. John had a very lofty conception of God and His attributes. However, he did not analyze the latter in themselves but viewed them in reference to man's journey to God. He was a man of his school in the field of Christology, emphasizing the

¹⁴⁵ St. John Chrysostom was born at Antioch about 344 A.D. He studied rhetoric with Libanius and philosophy with Andragatius. In 370 he was baptized and ordained lector. In 374 he retired into solitude for six years. He returned to Antioch in 380 and was ordained priest in 386. In 397 he was called to the See of Constantinople. Uncompromising with evil, he was forced into exile where he died in 407. St. John was a brilliant and zealous preacher. His sermons and short treatises are an inexhaustible source of his moral teaching.

duality of natures rather than the unity of Person in Christ. The mode of this union Chrysostom did not attempt to state, being content to use vague terms, common and indetermined expressions. How Christ is one, only He knows.¹⁴⁶ Although there are two distinct and unconfused natures in Him, there is only one Christ.¹⁴⁷ It is this fact which Chrysostom insists upon in accordance with the Faith. His realization of the greatness of this mystery, as also of the Trinity, and his humility, sense of tradition, and moral purpose drew him from profound speculations on these truths and preserved him in orthodoxy. Christ, consubstantial with the Father,¹⁴⁸ took to Himself our sinful flesh, though without sin.¹⁴⁹ His was a true human nature, not an appearance or fiction, in proof of which He died and thereby also manifested its frailty.¹⁵⁰ Chrysostom did not fail to exalt Christ's divine attributes, despite insistence upon His human properties. The ignorance which Christ expressed concerning the Day of Judgment St. John interprets as a prudent answer to a rash question.¹⁵¹

The statements of St. Chrysostom about the Blessed Virgin Mary are difficult to explain. His failure to call her *θεοτόκος* is understandable in view of the Antiochene dislike of the term. However, he seemed to emphasize her human sentiments rather than manifest her unique position in the divine economy. He even went so far as to place in Mary certain unbecoming sentiments toward Christ.¹⁵² It may be that his historical and literal method led him to see Mary more as the mother of the man than as the Mother of God.

¹⁴⁶ "Hom. XI in Jo.," 2, *P. G.*, LIX, col. 80.

¹⁴⁷ "Hom. VII in Ep. ad Philip.," 2, 3, *P. G.*, LXII, col. 231 sq. "Hom. VII cont. Anom.," 6, *P. G.*, XLVIII, col. 765.

¹⁴⁸ "Hom. I in Matt.," 2, *P. G.*, LVII, col. 17.

¹⁴⁹ "Hom. XIII in Ep. ad Rom.," 5, *P. G.*, LX, col. 515.

¹⁵⁰ "In Illud: Pater si est possibile," 4, *P. G.*, LI, col. 37 sq. "Hom. in Ascen.," 3, *P. G.*, L, col. 446. "In Joan.," Hom. XI, 2, *P. G.*, LIX, col. 80. *Ibid.*, LXIII, 1, 2, *ibid.*, 349; *ibid.*, LXVII, 1, 2, *ibid.*, 371; *ibid.*, LXXXVII, 1, *ibid.*, 474.

¹⁵¹ "Hom. LXXXVII in Matt.," *P. G.*, LVIII, col. 702-703.

¹⁵² "Hom. IV in Matt.," 5, *P. G.*, LVII, col. 45. "Hom. XXI in Joan.," 2, *P. G.*, LIX, col. 130-131. "Hom. XLIV in Matt.," *P. G.*, LVII, col. 463. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 27, a. 4, ad 3: "In verbis illis Chrysostomus excessit. . ."

In his teaching on the Redemption, St. John added nothing to the traditional doctrine of the Church. The prime motive for Christ's becoming Incarnate was the Redemption.¹⁵³ Christ had voluntarily substituted Himself, in perfect accord with the will of His Father, to accomplish our salvation, the work of love.¹⁵⁴ The work of salvation was the deliverance from sin,¹⁵⁵ yet its positive effect was to make men sons of God.¹⁵⁶ The sacrifice which Christ made on the Cross has merited a super-abundant efficacy.¹⁵⁷

It is in regard to original sin and grace that the Antiochene theological tradition strongly appears. It is here that the source of Chrysostom's appeal to and authority over the Pelagians is found. St. Augustine often opposed the Pelagians who cited St. Chrysostom, holding that they misinterpreted him. It is true that the Doctor of Antioch was not analyzing the question of grace theologically with the rigid and exact precision of that science. He had the practical purpose of exciting strong personal moral action and effort in his listeners. His education and environment influenced his expression. He insisted upon the sovereign power of human liberty. Man had been created immortal,¹⁵⁸ but he abused his liberty and fell from his primitive state. With mortality came concupiscence, though in itself it is not a fault or a sin. He insisted that human liberty remains intact. Each one is responsible for his acts, chooses his own rule of conduct.¹⁵⁹ God has manifested His mercy to all in the same way. One person rejects and another accepts

¹⁵³ "Hom. V in Ep. ad Hebr.," 1, *P. G.*, LXIII, col. 478.

¹⁵⁴ "Hom. XI in Ep. II ad Cor.," 3, 4, *P. G.*, LXI, col. 478. "Hom. LX in Joan.," 2, 3, *P. G.*, LIX, col. 330. "Hom. XXVI in Joan.," 1, 2, *P. G.*, LIX, col. 158. "Hom. XV in Ep. ad Rom.," 2, *P. G.*, LX, col. 543. "Hom. XX in Ep. ad Ephes.," 2, *P. G.*, LXII, col. 137.

¹⁵⁵ "Hom. II in Ep. ad Gal.," 8, *P. G.*, LXI, col. 646.

¹⁵⁶ "Hom. XI in Joan.," 1, *P. G.*, LIX, col. 79.

¹⁵⁷ "Hom. X in Ep. ad Rom.," 2, *P. G.*, LX, col. 477. "Hom. XVII in Ep. ad Hebr.," 2, *P. G.*, LXIII, col. 129.

¹⁵⁸ "Hom. XI ad popul. Antioch.," 2, *P. G.*, LXIX, col. 121.

¹⁵⁹ "Hom. XIX in Ep. ad Rom.," 1, *P. G.*, LX, col. 507. "Hom. XIX in Gen.," 1, *P. G.*, LIII, col. 158. "Hom. XX in Gen.," 3, *P. G.*, LIII, col. 169.

His grace, according to the individual's own will.¹⁶⁰ Grace is universally necessary for all actions in order that they be done well or meritoriously.¹⁶¹ Good is from us and from God.¹⁶² Divine grace cooperates with us, performing the chief part in our works but not all.¹⁶³ Following St. Paul on the point that God works in us both to will and to do,¹⁶⁴ on the other hand he holds that we begin of ourselves to wish the good, to tend toward it and to desire it, while God strengthens this intent and desire and bestows the power to realize the good effectively.¹⁶⁵ St. Chrysostom distinguished in God the *voluntas prima*, by which He wills sinners not to perish, and *voluntas secunda*, by which He wills their punishment—an anticipation of the antecedent and consequent wills of St. John Damascene and St. Thomas Aquinas.¹⁶⁶

St. John Chrysostom was the great moralist, the Doctor of the spiritual life. As a theologian he is a witness to the Antiochene tradition, preserving its advantages and rescuing it from complete disrepute by his lively sense of ecclesiastical tradition.

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(To be continued.)

¹⁶⁰ "Hom. XVI in Ep. ad Rom.," 9, *P. G.*, LX, col. 561. "Hom. XVIII in Ep. ad Rom.," 5, *P. G.*, LX, col. 579.

¹⁶¹ "Hom. XIV in Ep. ad Rom.," 7, *P. G.*, LX, col. 532. "Hom. XXV in Gen.," 7, *P. G.*, LIII, col. 228. "Hom. I in Ep. ad Ephes.," 2, *P. G.*, LXII, col. 13.

¹⁶² "Hom. X in Joan.," 1, *P. G.*, LIX, col. 73.

¹⁶³ "Hom. XIX in Ep. ad Rom.," 1. "Hom. XII in Ep. ad Hebr.," 3.

¹⁶⁴ "Hom. VIII in Ep. ad Philip.," 1, 2.

¹⁶⁵ "Hom. XXV in Gen.," 7. "Hom. XII in Ep. ad Hebr.," 3. "Hom. VIII in Ep. ad Philip.," 1, 2.

¹⁶⁶ "De Fide Orth.," II, c. 29 c. fin., *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1.

FUNCTIONS, FACTORS, AND FACULTIES



FOR a modern psychologist, to speak of *functions* is a matter of course, to discuss *factors* a necessity, to use the term *faculty* forbidden. The typical attitude toward these notions is perfectly defined. The notions themselves are less well defined. One may turn over the pages of many volumes and never come across a definition of "function." The interpretation of "factors" is a controversial question. The forbidden term "faculty" seems to correspond in the minds of those who mention it—only to reject it—to a definite meaning; this meaning, however, is false.

Under these circumstances it may not be useless to inquire into the precise signification of these three terms. Such an investigation seems the more indicated as the recently developed "factorial analysis" has been viewed very differently by those, on the one hand, who detest even the name of faculty, and those, on the other hand, who believe this notion to be perfectly legitimate and even indispensable. The first object to the "factors," or at least to a certain interpretation of these, because they apparently threaten to bring back the ideas of a faculty-psychology; the latter welcome the new concept for the same reason.

I shall endeavor to show that the fear of the first group is as unfounded as the hope of the other. Particularly I want to show:

(1) That the ostensible similarity between the two concepts of faculty and factor is more apparent than real, and that insofar as there is any relation it is not of the kind feared by the one and praised by the other group;

(2) That the theory of faculty which its enemies have in mind is neither the one taught by the Scholastics of old nor the one maintained by their followers of today, that this "most

pernicious" idea exists mainly in the minds of its enemies, and that in truth the faculty-psychology is something very different from what its critics imagine it to be;

(3) That the modern and "scientific" psychologist has no reason to fear the revival of faculty-psychology, simply because this theory has never been abandoned and in fact underlies the very concepts of any psychology, however scientific or modern it may be.

In pursuit of this plan, I shall not attempt to render an exhaustive account of the theory of faculties. Even less shall I try to survey the already enormous literature on factorial analysis and its achievements. On the first point, most textbooks on Thomistic philosophy or psychology give a satisfactory report. The second point can equally well be studied without difficulty in current literature. I shall deal only with those aspects of both these notions which are in need of clarification. The references, therefore, are merely illustrations. They are not intended as a survey of all the various interpretations of the "factors of the mind" and even less as a discussion of the merits and peculiarities of the various methods used in factorial analysis.

Usually the modern psychologist has nothing but contempt for the notion of faculty. There is, however, one notable exception. R. S. Woodworth wrote this sentence: "If we substitute for 'faculty' a more modern-sounding word such as 'function' there is nothing repugnant or absurd about this theory."¹ Everybody speaks of functions. But nobody seems to know exactly what a function is. Since the word is "more modern-sounding," it must have a particular significance which makes it fit into the conceptual pattern of modern psychology.

If one searches for a definition, the results are meager. Baldwin's Dictionary has this to say: "Function, in biology and psychology: any normal activity, process, or performance accomplished by an organism or an organ." Eisler identifies

¹ R. S. Woodworth, *Experimental Psychology*, 2d ed., New York; H. Holt, 1939, p. 178.

function with "achievement, mode of action, or performance of an organ; in psychology as a mental experience (*seelisches Erleben*) as an action or reaction on the part of an ego."² He tells us also that the term occurs first in Tommaso Campanella and Ludovico Vives, and that the term *functiones corporis* was used only as late as Descartes. Thus it would seem that the notion is originally a psychological one and was transferred to physiology, whereas one commonly thinks that psychology took over the term from physiology. Gould's *Medical Dictionary* defines function as "the normal or special action of a part of the organism."³

Although no definition is given in the textbooks on physiology and psychology, one can gather that the general use of the term is rather in relation to "parts," that is, organs or performances, than to the whole. It is true that one may say, and does say in common parlance, of someone that his mind functions all right, or normally, or that an organism functions perfectly. But it seems that the term is used mainly and properly in regard to some part the achievements of which are to the advantage of a whole; thus the organ functions for the whole organism. In the same sense we also say of a machine that it functions satisfactorily, if it performs the services for which it is designed and which are expected of it. Similarly, a person may be said to function within the whole of an "organization"; an employee of the state has his "function," delegated to him by the people or the ruler.

The main idea of function, therefore, apparently is that it comprises a set of performances in the service of a greater whole. A part of a body is considered an organ when and insofar as it "functions" in such a sense. A mass of fat which has been accumulated somewhere in the body is not usually called an organ because it has no definite function; even though it can be considered eventually as a stored reserve, to be con-

² R. Eisler, *Woerterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe*, 4th ed., 1927. Vol. I, p. 450.

³ Gould's *Medical Dictionary*, 5th ed., Philadelphia, 1941.

sumed in case of starvation, and even though it may be anatomically characterized, it is not an organ in the proper sense of the term because it has no definite function, that is, has no proper performances of its own, and by its own activity, which are helpful for the whole organism. To perform for the whole has been taken by O. Schwarz as the very criterion of an organ.⁴

Physiology, however, speaks of functions also in cases in which the performance is not bound to one definite organ. The metabolic activities are described as functions. Parts of them can be localized in certain organs; the hormones which regulate metabolism are produced in individual endocrine glands; the transformation of the carbohydrates of food into glycogene is mostly done in the liver, etc. But the general metabolic processes, the oxygen intake and the output of carbonic acid, the production of heat, and so on, result from the life processes in all the cells of the organism. Thus it would seem that there are "functions" performed by the organism as a whole and not by any of its parts.

Nonetheless, metabolism is but a partial function of the organism. If we speak of metabolism, or discuss it in a separate chapter in a textbook on physiology, we disregard for the time being most of the other functions, be they localized or general. We may speak of the metabolism of an isolated organ, e. g., of the heart. When we do so, we disregard the circulatory function of the organ. The chapter on metabolism disregards, for instance, the sensory functions, or the locomo-

⁴ O. Schwarz, "Das Problem des Organismus," in *Psychogenese und Psychotherapie körperlicher Symptome*, ed. O. Schwarz, Vienna-Berlin, J. Springer, 1925, p. 18: "Die Relation hat Richtung, die Struktur Sinn, das Organ eine Leistung, und die menschliche Handlung einen Zweck." In a later work, the idea has become more definite: "Machines have achievements (*Leistung*), organs have functions in the service of the total organism because they are members (*eingegliedert*) of the whole." Organs, therefore, function, but the total organism acts or behaves. "An action is constituted by the active turning towards the environment, entailing an integration of several individual functions by central regulation." "Central," in this context, does not necessarily mean "achieved by the central nervous system." O. Schwarz, *Medizinische Anthropologie*, Leipzig, 1929, Hirzel, pp. 48, 67.

tive activities; it considers them only insofar as any such function is directly involved, e. g., because of its needing so and so many calories.

The notion of function, therefore, retains its signification. It refers to a "part"; but this part must not be understood only in a strictly anatomical sense. In fact, the idea of "organ" has to be somehow corrected or enlarged. One may speak of the blood, or of all the white blood corpuscles as one "organ," although there is no anatomically circumscribed place where this "organ" is located. Or the many lymphatic glands may be spoken of as one organ; it is more customary to refer to them as an "organ-system," but this only a terminological nicety; in fact they form one organ.

The anatomical definition of an "organ" as a well defined, separable part of the body, characterized by a definite micro-structure, is therefore insufficient, at least in regard to its signification in physiology. There are not only anatomical but also "functional" parts, or, if this name should appear redundant in a discussion of "function," one may speak of "performative" parts. But, as the name of "partial functions" is quite common, so one may speak of "functional parts."

One using such terms as "functional parts" seems to come into serious conflict with an idea which plays an increasingly important role in today's discussions on problems of physiology—or pathology—and of psychology as well. I refer, of course, to the "holistic" trend in these fields. The organism "functions as a whole"; the mind "functions as a whole." To speak of partial functions and to treat them as if they were independent entities is tantamount to misunderstanding the real problem and doing violence to the facts.

Connected with this criticism is another, of different origin, submitted by the "holistic" school and by others. Anyone speaking of partial functions in psychology is accused by these critics of "reification," of "substantializing fictitious entities," of taking a name, coined for the sake of convenience or, even worse, taken over from popular psychology, for a reality, and

thus of falsification of the "given." But no holist, however extreme, has as yet accused physiologists of "reification" when the latter speak of the liver as a reality, or of its performances, e. g., the production of bile, as real functions. Of course not; because we can see the liver, we can measure the amount of bile. But perception cannot be "seen" and neither can an act of will; when one speaks of measuring them, he uses this term, perhaps, in a non-genuine sense. At least, whatever is measured is not the "thing" itself but some other phenomenon, such as stimuli, or some change in visible reality, some aspect of behavior which is then traced back to a mental function for the existence of which there is no proof.

The primary reason for this attitude is presumably the incapacity or the unwillingness to recognize any reality outside the extended, spatial, and material world. This incapacity or unwillingness obviously contributed in a large degree to the success of the theory of cerebral localization. The immaterial entities, whether called faculties or performances of the mind, were apparently transformed by this idea into functions of subdivisions of the brain, equivalent, at least in the thoughts of some, to real organs possessing a relative independence. Now this theory has been to a large extent discredited. The whole conception of strict localization and of functional units, such as reflexes, is in fact crumbling. Reflexes are neither as immutable nor as independent as they had been believed to be. Centers are not what the discoverers of localization claimed. In truth, there was never an absolute certainty regarding centers as "seats" of definite nervous or mental functions. The whole theory of localization would not have developed at all in the way it did, if certain elementary demands of logic had been followed. What are the facts? The findings obtained by experiment and clinical analysis can be summarized by saying that it is certain that the intactness of certain brain regions is a necessary condition for certain achievements. It is, of course, absolutely true that stimulation of the so-called motor region of the brain produces contraction of muscles and that the vari-

ous groups of the latter are "represented" in well defined spots on the cortex. It is equally true that certain lesions produce with great regularity—although perhaps not invariably—certain defects. But this does not prove that the respective parts of the cortex are the "seats" of any such functions. Like every general hypothesis, this one results from a syllogism of which the empirical findings form the minor. The major, however, is the preconceived idea that every distinguishable performance must be attributed to an equally distinguishable part of the body. This major proposition is nothing else but what Rudolf Virchow called "the anatomical idea in medicine." Biological sciences, including medicine, have moved since Virchow's time from a prevalently anatomical to a prevalently "functional" viewpoint.

As we shall see later, one of the criticisms raised against the theory of faculties consists in this: that this theory is based on an illegitimate analogy between bodily functions and the organs where they "reside" on one hand, and mental performances on the other. The history of "cerebral localization" seems to show that the same fallacy, if fallacy it is, may be committed also in the opposite direction.

The idea of defining functions by the organs to which the former belong, then, is not satisfactory. If there are striking coincidences, there are also cases in which this parallel does not hold. We are, therefore, more or less thrown back to the stage of pre-scientific, popular distinctions. These must, of course, be corrected in many instances. Thus, it would not do to separate heat production and metabolism in homoiothermic animals, although to retain a certain body temperature and to provide nourishment seem at first sight to be very different performances on the part of the organism. In the main, however, we have apparently no other means of distinguishing functions than their phenomenal differences.

One may object that there is no need to make any such divisions for other reasons than those of convenience and research. Convenience is served because subsuming a number of

elementary or complex phenomena under one name is a time-saving procedure and proves harmless as long as one avoids "reification." For research purposes, we have to select certain facts and isolate them if we want to study them at all. But we must keep in mind that any such isolation is artificial, that in truth there is no such thing as "the functions of the liver" but only the liver functioning within the total context of the organism. We can indeed study the liver separated from the organism in the kind of experiment in which a "surviving" organ is made the subject of research; we may, for instance, determine what becomes of a chemical compound sent through the liver, and answer many similar questions. We may presume that the liver will behave in the same way also when functioning as an organ in the strict sense, that is, within the context of the organism. But we never can be absolutely sure of this. Our presumptions must be tested on the intact organism.

This "holistic" view is, as we know, not at all new. The ancients and also Aquinas emphasized that a part of the body when separated from the rest ceases to be what it was in relation to the other parts and the whole. An eye separated from the body is no longer an eye in the proper sense, just as a corpse is no longer a man, even though we may speak, indulging in some kind of sentimental illusion, of the corpse as "the deceased." In truth he has not only deceased but has ceased to be.

But even the most consistent holism cannot fail to recognize, and not for reasons of methodology alone, that the whole is capable of manifold and obviously different performances. The usual formula refers to the different performances as so many different "aspects" of the one whole, or states that the whole is capable of various functions according to the inner and outer conditions to which it responds.

The last-named conception has its indubitable value. It recognizes not only that the organism responds as a whole, however much one or the other "aspect" may stand in the

foreground; it recognizes also that it responds to the total situation. Admitting this, we have also to admit that we cannot know beforehand which "aspects" of the situation may be relevant, nor can we claim that the order or degree of relevance will be always the same. On the contrary, it becomes eminently possible that relevance has no fixed and unchangeable value but varies with the total condition of the organism. Previous influences may have altered permanently or temporarily the way in which an organism responds to a situation. To this corresponds on the level of mental response and human behavior the complex of the many difficult questions centering around notions like "set," "attitude," "experience," etc.

Under such circumstances, there remains only one method by which to arrive at a somewhat reliable knowledge of the interrelations between situation and performance, situation referring here to inner as well as to outer conditions. The one procedure promising results is statistical analysis.

Statistics has been, since it began to develop from Bernouilli's time, the one procedure apt for dealing with facts the determinants of which are too numerous and too little known to permit the establishment of "laws" like those of physics. The increasing use of statistics is the result not only of the great progress this branch of mathematics has made in recent times, but also in part of the growing need for such procedures. This need became greater on one hand because of practical necessities. The development of insurance of all kinds is the best-known example; but there are innumerable other practical problems which demand the use of statistical methods. Some of these methods had to be developed and were developed solely for the sake of dealing with one or another problem and later proved capable of much wider application. On the other hand, it was realized that many phenomena, especially those related to human existence, are of such complex structure that, for the time being or for all time, the statistical approach is the only possible one.

When statistics began to develop, its main concern was with

frequency, and, therefore, with the probability of such or such an event happening. In recent times the method of correlations has permitted the extension of statistics to quantitative expression of the relations obtaining between events of different kind. The correlation establishes a relation between frequencies; if two phenomena stand in correlation one to the other, it can be presumed that there is some link between the two. If, furthermore, the correlation applies not only to frequency but also to quantity; that is, if not only the phenomenon A is associated with a certain regularity with the phenomenon B, but also the magnitude of A, whatever this figure may mean, is correlated to the magnitude of B, there is reason to assume a definite interdependency of the two. But the correlation does not indicate anything about the nature of this interdependence. A may be a partial cause of B, or vice versa, or they may both be effects of a third known or unknown phenomenon C. Least of all does the computation of correlations enable us to make any statement as to the nature of this C.

According to the "holistic" interpretation, everything within an organism is related somehow with everything else within it. But this relation may be so distant that it does not show in correlational calculus. Personality being a unit, there must be some relation between, say, the ability to do mental arithmetic and a preference for the paintings of Perugino over those of Luca Signorelli. But if we were to test the arithmetical ability and the preferences for paintings in a great number of persons, it is doubtful that any correlation would result, let alone one of significant magnitude. This seems a pretty reliable prediction; the absence of such a correlation is credible without carrying out the tests. It is credible because a pre-scientific analysis of the two performances shows them to be very different in kind.

However, were I to claim that by pre-scientific analysis, simply by reflecting on the procedure of mentally solving arithmetical problems, I discovered all or at least the most relevant conditions for such an achievement, I might be very much mis-

taken. I might, of course, be right insofar as my own mind is concerned; but I might be quite wrong if I were to generalize. There are persons who do mental arithmetic mainly by means of visualization; they figure out the problems, as it were, on an imagined paper with an imagined pencil. This does not enable one to say that visual imagination is a necessary condition for this achievement. On the other hand, anyone can predict that a certain capacity for retention is a necessary condition; no one can solve any problem if he is unable to remember the problem or the partial steps towards its solution.

Correlational computation, like any other statistical procedure, does not permit any conclusion about an individual. Its figures refer to averages. Suppose one finds a very high correlation between two types of achievement—to be concrete, between the number of solutions in certain tests and others concerning the clarity of mental visual images. Then it is correct to say that the latter property enters as a relevant condition into the total set of conditions on which depends the first achievement. But this discovery does not preclude the possibility that another person, devoid of such imagery, may also do very well in the first series of tests; there are many such tests which can be done by reasoning.⁵

If there is found in the results of several series of tests a correlation between some pair of them, although the numerical value may be rather different, we are invariably led to presume some underlying determinant⁶ common to the types of achievement tested. This has been stated clearly by Cyril Burt,⁷ so

⁵ See the remark of Cyril Burt: "I myself was once assured by a psychological investigator that I had a good visuo-spatial imagery because I excelled most other testees in tasks to test this ability; actually, I solved them all by rapidly converting them into verbal form—a trick which I long ago acquired to compensate for my weak visualization." *The Factors of the Mind*, New York, 1941, Macmillan, p. 312, note. This observation, incidentally, serves to emphasize the need for introspective reports, whenever obtainable, even in apparently simple test situations.

⁶ I use the neutral term "determinant" in order not to prejudice anything concerning interpretation, as would be the case were I to speak of "cause," nor to employ the term "factor," the meaning of which has still to be elucidated.

⁷ *The Factors of the Mind*, p. 4 f.

that a brief summary of his remarks will serve best as an introduction to the following discussion.

The psychologist, so Dr. Burt says, is able only to state partial dependences, the degree of which is measured by a coefficient of correlation. C. Spearman spoke of "the system of correlation . . . as expressing the hidden underlying cause of the variations investigated."⁸ This hidden underlying cause, the same that J. S. Mill called the "common connecting fact of causation," is now regularly designated by the name "factor."

It is evident, and Dr. Burt does not fail to point out, that in considering the "factor" as "expressing the underlying cause," the level of mere factuality is already left behind; by speaking of causes we pass over to the level of interpretation.

One must absolutely agree with the eminent English psychologist when he emphatically declares (p. 256): "Factors as such must be defined, not by trying to identify them with concrete causal entities but by specifying the operations by which they are to be obtained." In other words, a factor has primarily a signification only within a definite system of statistical operations. This being the case, it is in no way astonishing to find that the procedure of factorial analysis allows for a wide application. As Burt has shown, it may be used equally well to establish correlation between various mental operations or trace them back to some "general factor," and to establish types of personalities.

In regard to subsequent discussions it may be well to point out here that factorial analysis yields results which have nothing at all to do with the notion of "faculty." Thus the analysis of tests of the functions of the vestibular organ and of balance uncovers nine different factors, among which are two combinations of semicircular canals, kinesthetic sensitivity and response, tensions reinforcing response, and a visual factor.⁹ Or the

⁸ C. Spearman, "The Proof and Measurement of the Association between Two Things," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1904, XV, 74.

⁹ R. I. Bass, "An Analysis of the Components of Tests of Semicircular Canal Function and of Static and Dynamic Balance," *Res. Quart. Am. Ass. Health. Phys. Educ.*, 1939, X, 33.

study of "verbal abilities" establishes factors like memory for rote learning, word fluency (implying two sub-factors), verbal relation (with two or three components), fluency in oral speech, facility in attaching appropriate names and symbols, speed of articulatory movements.¹⁰

No commentary is needed to show that these factors cannot have anything in common with the traditional notion of "faculty." Nor can this be the case with the eight factors allegedly determining memory abilities.¹¹ They are: a general recognition memory factor for words, three different visual factors, a logical factor involved in learning word meaning, and three more the significance of which did not become clear. Incidentally, the logical factor itself is of a complex nature.

The procedures by which such a general factor is computed do no more than demonstrate the "existence" of the factor. Whether it "exists" otherwise than within the particular "statistical discourse" is another question which will demand our attention later. In any case, the factor is statistically significant, but has as such no real significance. This was recognized many years ago by Dr. T. V. Moore, when he remarked that "the tetrade equation only proves the fact of the existence of this general factor. It tells us nothing of its nature."¹²

On the other hand, there are some authors who believe that the factors should be given a definite concrete significance. When they speak of "abilities" of the mind, or identify one or the other factor with, e. g., "general intelligence," they do more than just give a convenient name to a statistically significant magnitude. They proceed towards the same "reification," not indeed of a name but a figure, of which they accuse their predecessors. "The student of factor-analysis in psychology is tempted to reify the factors named, and to visualize a logical analysis as a physical separation, tacitly assuming that, if dis-

¹⁰ J. B. Carroll, "A Factor Analysis of Verbal Abilities," *Psychometrika*, 1941, VI, 279.

¹¹ H. B. Carlson, "Factor Analysis of Memory Abilities," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1937, XXI, 477.

¹² T. V. Moore, "The General Factor in Intelligence," *Proceedings of the Catholic Philosophical Association*, 1929, V, 29.

tinct abilities are ever to be discovered, they will be concrete and separable 'organs' like the heart or the lungs, and that the 'mental mechanisms' which form them will be localized in separate . . . cortical areas."¹³ That the latter hope is rather illusory, has been pointed out above.

The inclination characterized by Burt and indeed found in many psychologists is the result of other motives besides the desire for concreteness and the hope of discovering tangible "causes." Apart from the often unnoticed but nonetheless influential trend towards a materialistic interpretation as alone "scientific," there are other ideas at work which I do not hesitate to call prejudices, in the sense that they determine as preconceived and therefore unexamined principles the whole attitude of the scientist or psychologist. Generally speaking, these prejudices may be summarized in what may be aptly called the "idolatry of the scientific method," wherein "scientific" is taken in the extremely narrow sense of "physicalistic." This particular prejudice rests on the quite unproved assumption that a reliable knowledge of reality can be obtained only by methods fashioned on the pattern of physics. For this assumption there is no proof whatsoever. Rather, the various attempts at building up a "scientific" sociology, history, or psychology might be used as proof to the contrary. The phrase that "we have not yet advanced far enough" or not yet developed adequate procedures for making, e. g., sociology "truly scientific," is meaningless. First it must be demonstrated that such procedures are adequate to the subject matter. This demonstration, I hold, is impossible.¹⁴

¹³ C. Burt, *op. cit.*, p. 17. See also *ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁴ Dr. Burt seems, I am glad to notice, to hold similar opinions. Although he too would like to discover definite "neural events" as the basis of mental phenomena and thus render them more tangible, as it were, he is fully aware of the difference in kind between physics and psychology. He writes, for instance: "I myself should argue that, if simplicity is a reason for the acceptance of an explanation in a simple science, simplicity is a reason against its acceptance in a science whose subject-matter is highly complex." *Op. cit.*, p. 25. I am not quite sure whether Dr. Burt would agree that complexity is not a merely quantitative difference; but if he did, his position would be rather like the one I believe to be inevitable if any true progress in sciences of man and mind is to be realized.

Some psychologists claim that distinguishable properties must also be separable. To consider "the attribute not as a part of the concrete individual, but only as an aspect" is regarded as tantamount to "nothing less than a denial of the validity of scientific method."¹⁴ In this statement, two features deserve attention. One is the naive identification of "scientific" with the methodological principles of physics; the other is the manifest incapacity for understanding what Scholastic philosophy calls a "real distinction." This incapacity explains to a large extent the misinterpretations of the idea of faculties.

The fact that the factors cannot be identified with or related to any definite "primary abilities" or elementary functions, whether of the mind or of the nervous system, in no way invalidates their practical usefulness. For instance, factorial analysis may enable us to discover certain aspects of a testing situation through which the tests may be rendered more effective, more revealing, and more homogeneous. The critical remarks submitted here are not at all directed against factorial analysis as a method; they question only a certain type of interpretation. Philosophy has nothing to say on ascertained facts, but much on hypothetical interpretations.

Thus factors are, as Dr. Burt justly emphasizes, "in their essential nature principles of classification . . . rendered more discriminative and exact by being cast in quantitative form"; they are "logical principles rather than psychological principles."¹⁵

¹⁴ R. B. Cattell, "Measurement versus Intuition in Applied Psychology," *Character and Personality*, 1937, VI, 114. The contemptuous manner in which this author deals with the notions of "structure" and "configuration" shows incidentally his utter inability to think along any other lines than those of physicalism. Not that the proponents of structure or *Gestalt* psychology are not guilty of exaggerations and misstatements, but unprejudiced judgment must admit that in their work there is much of value for general psychology.

¹⁵ C. Burt, *op. cit.*, p. 101, 103. Perhaps a word ought to be said by way of justification for the extensive use I make of Dr. Burt's work notwithstanding the existence of numerous other treatises on the subject of factorial analysis. The reason is simple: Dr. Burt is practically the only one who gives any consideration to

Because of this nature of the factors they can be used to classify not only tests and traits but also personalities, or even data not pertaining to psychology at all. In fact, those students of factorial analysis who refer the factors to ultimate processes or elements of the nervous system classify by means of psychological analysis non-psychic data which are of a purely hypothetical character, it is true, but are nonetheless considered real by these authors. Even Burt feels that he has to recur to such hypothetic entities as "bonds." If one takes account of the rapid changes going on in neurophysiology, a little more caution seems advisable. Mental facts are, after all, observable, either directly in introspection or indirectly in their manifestations, e. g., in tests; but "neural events" and individual structures of the brain are not. Nor is it a necessary assumption that individual differences as observable in mental achievements have to be traced back to structural, anatomical differences of the brain. On one and the same excellent piano one may play well or in an execrable manner. If Sir Charles Sherrington is right in his theory—and there is much to be said for it—that the brain is the "organ of liaison" between mind and matter, the individual differences in intelligence and other "abilities" may have also a non-cerebral origin.¹⁶ This does not, of course, amount to denying that the brain, especially by its eventual defectiveness, does not play a determinant role; the idea submitted is only that the plus-variations need not depend on any "richness" of the brain.

This part of the discussion may be suitably closed by one more quotation from Dr. Burt's book: "To resolve a test-performance into 'g' and 's' no more demonstrates the existence of a general and a specific 'ability' than describing a breeze as north-west implies the combination of two currents from separate quarters of the sky."¹⁷

the underlying methodological, gnoseological, and metaphysical questions; perhaps he is, among the psychologists, the only one whose philosophical training, it would seem, enables him to see and efficiently to discuss these problems.

¹⁶ Sir Charles Sherrington, *Man on His Nature*, New York, 1941, Macmillan.

¹⁷ Burt, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

However incomplete the survey on the problems of factorial analysis be, it shows clearly, I think, that the factors which result from such analysis can in no sense be used for the demonstration of any real "abilities," "capacities," or "faculties."

The idea that the factors might supply an empirical demonstration of the "existence" of faculties or that they imply the threat of bringing back the "untenable" theory of faculties, of which the mere spectre makes the "scientific" psychologist shudder, is "untenable" itself. Because of the last-mentioned fear, some of the psychologists working with factorial analysis are at pains to show that the factors have nothing in common with the faculties. In truth, they have no need to worry about this danger; it exists only in the minds of those who misinterpret factors on the one hand and faculties on the other. To illustrate, C. Spearman criticizes Thurstone because the latter's views "lead back to an untenable revival of the ancient doctrine of faculties."¹⁸ Or the method itself is questioned because of the aforesaid danger.¹⁹

As a non-Scholastic representative of those who consider factors as a revival of faculties, and rather welcome than reject this idea, one may name C. C. Pratt. His conception of faculties is rather questionable. Here, however, it suffices to quote the closing passage of his article:²⁰ "The argument . . . has been that the concept of 'faculties,' in the sense of mental capacities distributed along quantitative continua and revealed phenomenologically as act-qualities, is of the utmost importance for any psychology which does not restrict itself to sensory existentialism; and that a methodical program of scientific inquiry into the principles of human faculty is offered . . . by Spearman."

¹⁸ C. Spearman, "Thurstone's Work Reworked," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1939, XXX, 1. See also H. Rogosin, "Scientific Method in Current Psychology," *Philosophy of Science* (1942), IX, 183: "The mathematical studies of Thurstone, etc. suggest a recrudescence of the belief in the 'facultative' treatment of mental functions."

¹⁹ A. Anastasi, "Faculties and Factors," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1935, XXXV, 391.

²⁰ C. C. Pratt, "Faculty Psychology," *Psychological Review*, 1929, XXXVI, 142.

Dr. R. E. Brennan may represent the Scholastic viewpoint. "The orientation of the entire field of psychometrics towards an explicit recognition of the faculty theory is best seen when we examine some . . . conclusions that emerge from mental measurements." There is agreement, the author says, on three points: (1) "there are established differences in the way that man operates"; (2) "each difference represents at least a general tendency to act in a particular way"; (3) "all such general tendencies are native." "If, then, we substitute 'faculty' for 'general tendency' . . . we arrive at a formulation not only in accordance but actually identical with the one of traditional faculty-psychology."²¹

If, however, the meaning of "factors" is as has been stated above, neither the hopes of Pratt nor the claims of Brennan remain tenable. One cannot, by factorial analysis, "prove" the existence of a faculty. Neither is a factor necessarily indicative of a faculty. It may be, but it does not have to be. The criterion of a faculty as well as the proof of its existence must be sought elsewhere. If, on the other hand, the existence of a certain faculty can be demonstrated, the discovery of a general factor for all performances pertaining to this faculty is to be expected. Such a general factor, discovered *after* the existence of a faculty has been demonstrated, may serve as a kind of empirical confirmation. It may, eventually, also happen that factorial analysis will teach us that one or the other performance we credited to a certain faculty does not belong there or does not depend on this one faculty exclusively or chiefly. But this is, so far as I can see, all that faculty-psychology is entitled to expect from factorial analysis. This, to repeat once more, does not at all invalidate the method. The method indubitably is one of the greater achievements in the field of psychometrics. And there are many things to be done in psychology which have no relation to the question of the faculties.

²¹ R. E. Brennan, *Thomistic Psychology*, New York, 1941, Macmillan, pp. 253-256.

But many, perhaps the majority, of the psychologists working in the line of factorial analysis believe that the factors are indicative of "abilities," "hidden underlying causes,"²² "primary traits" and such. And so these psychologists really come somehow closer to faculty-psychology than they care to do. But that which they fear they approach, and from which they so anxiously want to keep away, is a mere figment of their imagination, and not the faculty-psychology as it existed and exists.

It has been pointed out by many defenders of faculty-psychology that the theory which was ridiculed by Locke and finally abolished by Herbart is not the classical doctrine. Many speak as does C. C. Pratt, who writes: "In the hands of C. Wolff and the later phrenologists, the doctrine of faculties fell into disrepute." The "later phrenologists" indulged, undoubtedly, in utterly fantastic interpretations; but in principle they were not worse than their "scientific" successors with their strictly localized centers, their neural events, and nervous bonds. But Wolff truly does not deserve to be classed with these phrenologists. Nor is it so sure that it is his fault that the theory of faculties presented itself to the minds of its critics as an obsolete, nonsensical construction. Wolff seems to share the fate of many other authors of the past; he is often quoted, oftener misquoted, and seldom, if at all, read.

Few of the critics of faculty-psychology state what they think this theory to be. They are satisfied with criticizing it. W. James called it "vague and erroneous";²³ McDougall, "long discredited."²⁴ It consists of "gross, unanalyzed terms of a popular psychology"²⁵ and it is even "most pernicious."²⁶

²² See, for instance, W. Stephenson, "The Foundations of Psychometry," *Psychometrika*, 1936, I, 208. "That these few fundamental factors—their number, incidentally, varies from one to twenty—account for, explain, or are the cause of, all human conduct."

²³ W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, New York, 1890, Holt, Vol. I, p. 28.

²⁴ W. McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, New York, 1923, Scribner's, p. 13.

²⁵ G. T. Ladd and R. S. Woodworth, *Elements of Psychophysical Psychology*, New York, 1911, Scribner's, p. 274.

²⁶ M. Bentley, *The Field of Psychology*, New York, 1924, Appleton-Century, p. 35.

This sounds very disconcerting. But what the nature of this awful invention is, remains unsaid. The list of depreciating remarks could be made much longer. There is no need for completeness. One statement more, however, must be reported because it reveals a rather curious mentality, at least curious in a scientist. The theory of faculties, we read, "is vanishing from the world of expert thought, and no more need be said about it than that it is false and *would be useless to human welfare if true.*"²⁷

The objections against faculty-psychology are ably summarized by J. S. Moore and H. Gurnee, "Modern scientific psychology has," so these authors write, "rejected absolutely the entire faculty conception" because (1) the division into faculties is an *artificial*, not a natural, division, based on a false analogy with the organs of the body, and the mind works as a unit, not as a collection of separate faculties; (2) the reference to faculties merely *classifies* mental states but does not explain them; (3) the conception of faculties as causes or forces is a confusion of the empirical point of view with the *metaphysical*.²⁸

The first of these objections against the theory of faculties contains two different criticisms. First, that the division in faculties is artificial; second, that it disregards the unity of the mind because based on a false analogy with bodily organs. Both these remarks seem little to the point.

To take the second first, one may recall that the "division" into organs, although suggested by anatomy, does not destroy the unity of the organism. The holistic interpretation does not deny that the liver has its particular function, distinct from those of the heart or the kidney, and so on. We have seen also

²⁷ E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, Vol. I, New York, 1903, Lemcke & Bruechner, p. 174. Italics mine. Two expressions in this quotation deserve attention. First, the notion of "expert thought"; secondly, the idea that a truth which is "useless to human welfare," can be simply put aside. Who is to decide, one wants to know, what truths are useful and what are not for human welfare.

²⁸ J. S. Moore and H. Gurnee, *The Foundations of Psychology*, Princeton, 1933, Princeton University Press, p. 9.

that there are distinguishable functions which cannot be related simply to an anatomically defined organ. The distinction of functions and not of organs is the real analogy. Aquinas emphasizes that certain faculties indeed can be "localized" and related to definite organs, but others cannot, and are nonetheless distinct and distinguishable entities.²⁹ If faculties are sometimes spoken of as "organs" of the soul, they are given this name not because of an analogy with bodily organs, but because of the original signification of the word; the faculties are "tools" of the soul, something by means of which the soul executes certain operations.

Why any division into faculties, or the one usually accepted by the Thomistic school, should be "artificial" is not easy to see. Rather, one is inclined to call it but too "natural." In fact, this is the reproach made by some; the theory is rejected because of its pertaining to "popular psychology." Now, it is improbable that popular psychology should hit on an artificial division. If, on the other hand, the mere establishing of any division whatsoever is considered artificial, as set over against the "unity" of the mind, one may agree with this statement. But then it is directed against a division in "abilities" or "functions" as well. And some kind of division is inevitable, because we cannot study a complex unit otherwise than by distinguishing, be it only in way of a preliminary methodological procedure, at least according to various "aspects." But we have seen that even among the modern and scientific psychologists there are some who are anxious to maintain the reality of the "underlying causes" and refuse to speak of mere "aspects."

Thus it would seem that this first objection does not carry any real weight. The question whether the notion of faculties entails any "division" in the strict sense of the word will occupy us later. But it surely entails or amounts to an attempt at classification of mental operations.

The faculty-psychology has often been criticized for provid-

²⁹ See, for instance, *In II de anima* 1, IV, ad c. II, 413 b 29, ed. Pirotta, No. 269.

ing only a principle of classification and, as the basis thereof, a description but not an explanation. Especially, E. B. Titchener found fault with faculty-psychology because "the subsumption under them [faculties] of the ideas, feelings, impulses, etc. which are really given in introspection, does not help us . . . towards an understanding" and is "at best a merely descriptive psychology and can never rise to the level of explanation."³⁰

When Titchener and his contemporaries spoke of "explanation" they had two ideas in their minds. One was the establishing of strict relations between mental and neural processes; the other was the reduction of "complex" mental states to more elementary ones. The latter principle prevailed in sensistic and associationistic psychologies as they were prevalent then. It is not to be gainsaid that similar ideas are still alive in many psychological conceptions of today, although there are sufficient reasons for abandoning both types of ideas, at least insofar as they are considered true "explanatory" principles. If it is true that at first the reaction against sensism and associationism went too far, it is not less true that the range in which these principles apply is infinitely smaller than many psychologists thought and still think.

One may therefore ask what the meaning of "explanation" in psychology is supposed to be. Fifty years ago W. Dilthey proclaimed that "we explain nature, but understand the mind." This is not the place to raise the question whether there is anything like an explanation of nature in the sense envisioned by the scientists and philosophers of two generations ago, or even one generation ago. It would seem as if Kirchhoff's famous formula, that a law of nature is the simplest description of phenomena, has come to be accepted more and more generally. Explanation, if attempted at all, is left to philosophical speculation. The well-known works of Eddington and Jeans bear witness to this tendency. Of course, the scientists prefer to do their own philosophizing; they have not yet forgotten the truly

³⁰ E. B. Titchener, *Experimental Psychology*, New York, 1905, Macmillan, Vol. I, p. 188.

unjustified "imperialistic" inroads certain philosophers made into the field of science. Historical facts, however unpleasant, have no relevance in philosophical systematization. It would be wise to shelve definitely the various speculations on natural philosophy on the part of the followers of Schelling, Hegel, and also of some Neo-Scholastics. The errors of individual philosophers are no more to be blamed on philosophy than the mistakes of scientists on science.

When, therefore, we come to the question of explanation in psychology, the problem here too is mainly a philosophical one.

In this regard I have to take exception to a view proposed by Dr. Burt. He writes: "Just as we cannot deduce the essential character of the elementary processes in the retina from a mere analysis of colour equations, so we cannot determine the nature of intelligence without supplementary evidence from anatomy, physiology, and genetics."³¹

It is obviously true that we cannot deduce the nature of retinal processes from the color equations. Neither can we deduce the nature of "neural events" from other observation of mental phenomena. But neither can we deduce the color equation or the way intelligence operates from any, however detailed, knowledge of physiological processes. Such a knowledge will be, of course, very interesting, but it will not teach us anything on the "nature" of intelligence. No analysis of retinal processes can ever tell us that there is something like color; no knowledge of brain anatomy or physiology can ever tell us that there is something like reasoning. These facts have to be experienced in the only field where they are found, i. e., in introspection. If there is any discoverable and univocal relation between brain processes and mental states, it may be helpful in arranging for certain investigations or it may serve as a method of checking on introspective data, but it will never advance our understanding of things mental even the fraction of an inch.

If it is a criticism to say that any psychology remains on

³¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 218.

the level of description and does not progress towards explanation, this criticism applies to all psychologies of any type whatsoever. In this regard, faculty-psychology is not in the least worse than all the other psychologies. The many so-called explanations which have been proposed are, without any exceptions, purely hypothetical or, to be more correct, fictitious.

So far, the reproaches raised against faculty-psychology are either untenable or do not refer to this theory in its particular nature. Before other criticisms can be reviewed, it is necessary to state briefly and clearly what the essence of faculty-psychology is, and also what it is not but is believed to be by those who either are not acquainted with the facts or have created in their minds an idea which has no counterpart in the history of psychology.

The following paragraphs are not intended to say anything new on the notion of faculties. They are only meant to summarize, for the sake of the present discussion, some few points which are of importance. To report in detail on the Thomistic conception is the more unnecessary since this has been done effectively by Dr. Hart, and the essentials of the theory are stated in most treatises on Thomism.³²

The historians of psychology have acknowledged that the theory of faculties never amounted to any real division of the mind or the soul into separable entities. Aristotle, the father of the theory, "asserted the idea of the unity of the soul, since neither of the faculties . . . is capable of operating in independence of the rest."³³ "A unitary soul was capable of acting in a variety of ways, but entered fully in each of its various activities at various times. This conception is closely related to a view . . . that each function is the function not of a part or element in the organism but of the whole organism."³⁴

³² C. A. Hart, *The Thomistic Concept of Mental Faculty*, Washington, D. C., 1930, Catholic University of America Press. See also C. A. Dubray, *The Theory of Psychological Dispositions*, Psychol. Rev. Mon. Supp. No. 30, 1905. R. E. Brennan, *Thomistic Psychology*, New York, 1941, Macmillan, pp. 238-259.

³³ O. Klemm, *A History of Psychology*, New York, 1914, p. 49.

³⁴ G. Murphy, *A Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology*, New York, 1929, Harcourt Brace, p. 39.

The modern authors just quoted show a better understanding of faculty-psychology than did Locke, with whose ironical remarks the fight against the theory started. "We may as properly say that the singing faculty sings . . . as that the will chooses or that the understanding conceives."⁸⁵ But Locke does not mention any author who would have said what Locke criticizes. No doubt many used such expressions; we use them to-day, even within scientific psychology. But we are aware, and our predecessors were not less aware, of the fact that we use these expressions only as convenient abbreviations. No physiologist, however much he may be convinced of the "holistic" view, ever will say that "the organism, by means of the liver, produces bile." He simply says that the liver produces bile. Nor did Aristotle or St. Thomas or any other see why they should express themselves in such a cumbrous and roundabout manner and incessantly repeat that the human mind or the human soul performs this or that activity, by means of something called faculty.⁸⁶

Concerning especially the idea that the faculties were conceived as "parts of the soul," one has to consider that the term "part" is indeed used by St. Thomas, but in a very different respect. "The faculties are called parts, not of the essence of the soul, but of its total power, as one would say that the power of the governor of a province is a part of the total power of the king."⁸⁷ This is something utterly different from

⁸⁵ J. Locke, *Essay on Human Understanding*, Bk. II, c. XXI, § 17.

⁸⁶ Not that Aristotle or his medieval followers forgot to mention the thorough dependence of the faculties on the one soul to which they belong but of which they are not properly "parts." It suffices to refer to, e.g., *Q. D. de Anima*, q. un., a. 13, c.: "*Potentia* [one knows that St. Thomas never uses the term faculty, but always speaks of *potentiae animae*] *nihil aliud est quam principium operationis alicuius sive sit actio sive sit passio; non quidem principium quod est subjectum agens aut patiens, sed id quo agens agit vel patiens patitur.*" Also: "*Potentia animae nihil aliud est quam proximum principium operationis animae.*" *Summa Theologica* I, q. 78, a. 4, corp.

⁸⁷ "*Potentiae animae dicuntur partes non essentiae animae sed totalis virtutis eius; sicut si diceretur quod potentia ballivi est pars totius potestatis regiae.*" *Q. D. de Spiritualibus Creaturis*, q. un., a. 11, ad 10.

considering the soul "composed" of relatively independent or even separable "parts."

Thus the Scholastics would have been in perfect agreement with Locke and would not have felt that the latter's criticism applied to them at all. Nor is the conception of faculties and their relation to the whole in any way different in C. v. Wolff. It is, therefore, not easy to see why this philosopher is considered the "founder of modern faculty-psychology."³⁸ What Wolff says is, in fact, not other than what Aquinas had taught. It suffices to quote here one passage of his *Psychologia empirica*: "In the same sense as any active potency is customarily called generically a faculty, so also must the active potencies of the soul be called its faculties."³⁹

³⁸ G. Murphy, p. 29.

³⁹ I quote the lengthy title of this work in full, because it gives some idea of the real scope and intention Wolff had in mind: *Psychologia empirica methodo scientifica pertractata, qua ea, quae de anima humana indubia experientiae fide constant, continentur et ad solidam philosophiae universae practicae ac theologiae naturalis tractationem via sternitur*. Frankfurt a. Leipzig, 1732. *Quemadmodum potentia activa in genere Facultas dici solet* (§ 76 *Ontologia*); *ita etiam potentiae activae animae Facultates ipsius appellantur*. Pt. I, Sec. II, c. I, § 29, p. 20. Wolff remarks, in an additional note, that there is no inconvenience in including the passive potencies too under the name of faculties. The passive potencies do not condition any activity in the proper sense. They cannot, therefore, be made substantial entities. This remark of the *Psychologia empirica* shows that there is little of a tendency to "substantialize" the faculties. Be it noted, in passing, that the emphasis laid by Wolff, in the subtitle he chose, on the *indubia experientiae fides* makes him less of an a-prioristic rationalist than the usual discussion one reads of his system would lead one to suppose.

The passage in the *Philosophia Prima s. Ontologia*, ed. nov. Frankfurt, Leipzig, 1736, Pt. II, Sec. II, c. 2, § 716, p. 538, reads: *Possibilitas agendi dicitur Potentia simpliciter: subinde cum addito Potentia activa: possibilitas vero patiendi potentia passiva appellatur. Tribuitur nempe enti potentia quatenus per ea quae eidem insunt, actio concipitur possibilis; potentia autem patiendi quatenus per ea quae eidem insunt pati potest. Potentia activa vocatur etiam Facultas*. On the possible in general, see *Ibid.*, Pt. I, Sec. II, c. 1, § 85.

Wolff's ontology has been ably treated in a slender volume by H. Pichler, *Ueber Chr. Wolffs Ontologie*, Leipzig, 1910, Duerr. An exhaustive study of the whole philosophy of Wolff may be found in M. Campo, *Cristiano Wolff e il Razionalismo precritico*, 2 Vol., Milan, 1939, Vita e Pensiero (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore: Scienze Filosofiche, Vol. XXX). This work does not consider Wolff's psychology in particular, except insofar as it is related to the general principles and

Wolff fully realizes that the origin of the notion of faculty is not in the field of empirical observation, except insofar as that we are made aware in that field of irreducible differences between mental states; the true origin is in metaphysics. Therefore he refers to his *Ontologia* for further information. But the "metempirical" origin of a notion does not preclude its applicability and usefulness also in the field of observable data.

On the whole, the conception of Wolff is the same as the Aristotelian-Thomistic one, that "the soul is one in act and multiple in potency."⁴⁰ The multiplicity of potencies must be assumed because of the diversity of operations.

The difficulty which apparently most of the critics of faculty-psychology encounter, and which proves to be an obstacle to their correctly understanding the basic notions, is probably the assertion that the faculties are really distinct from one another and really distinct from the soul. It is hardly necessary to point out that this proposition was not held by all medieval thinkers; especially towards the end of the Middle Ages there were many who either followed Scotus and admitted only a "formal distinction," or denied the existence of any distinction between the soul and its powers.⁴¹

problems of his philosophy. A thorough treatment of Wolffian psychology is still a desideratum.

The faculties are, according to Wolff, not only *potentiae* of the one and indivisible soul. They are specific expressions of one uniform and fundamental power of the soul. There is but one *vis animae*, and the faculties are its modifications. The one *vis*, so to speak, flows out through different channels. One must admit that this conception is not too distant from modern notions of "mental energy," found, e. g., in Spearman, Burt, and others. See *Psychologia Rationalis*, etc., Frankfurt, Leipzig, 1734, §§ 66, 67, 81.

Wolff was so little willing to consider the faculties as "parts" of the soul that he expressly refutes this opinion. The soul, he asserts, is a simple substance; if we were to attribute to it a number of real powers, it would be a composed substance. *Ibid.*, § 57.

Wolff has even a faint idea of measuring the powers of the mind; these powers exist in degrees. "*Je mehr man den Zusammenhang der Wahrheiten einsiehet, je mehr hat man Vernunft.*" *Vernuenfliche Gedanken von Gott, Welt und Seele*, I, § 370.

⁴⁰ In *II de Anima*, ad c. II; 414 b 10; I, IV, no. 264, ed. Pirotta: *anima una actu et multiplex in potentia*.

⁴¹ The various conceptions on this matter are briefly reviewed by F. Suarez,

The last opinion was obviously also Herbart's. He is often quoted as having dealt the death blow to faculty-psychology. It is, however, interesting to inquire into Herbart's reasons for his absolute condemnation of the idea of faculties. His antagonism is based purely and exclusively on metaphysical principles. His opposition to the notion of faculty is but the special form his general view takes on when applied to problems of the soul. He holds that the concept of a thing with several inhering properties is self-contradictory; one cannot be many. A plurality of properties is incompatible with the unity of things.

In other words, Herbart no less than any medieval scholar started from ontological speculations. In this respect he proves to be of the same mind as any Nominalist. This is indeed rather suggestive. One is tempted to assume that the reasons of the modern and scientific psychologists too are mainly philosophical, metaphysical, and that their rejection of faculty-psychology has more to do with their often unacknowledged and unconscious metaphysical background than with any facts or metaphysical principles.

Locke could not, notwithstanding his ironical comments, deny the existence of innate powers of the soul. The faculties he threw out in the first book are, and not even very surreptitiously, reintroduced in the second. He covers this up somehow by using the term "powers" instead of "faculties"; but this is in truth only going back to the original terminology and does not imply any material alteration of the idea.⁴²

de Anima II, c. 1, opp. Vol. III, Paris 1856, Vives, p. 572 f. "*Prima opinio est nullo modo distingui potentias ab anima, sed ipsam esse suum intellectum, suum sensum, etc. Ita Gregorius (Arimin.) Gabriel (Biel), . . . Occam, . . . Saxonia (Joan. de) . . . Marsilius (Patav.), . . . Buridanus. Secunda opinio est distingui formaliter non vero realiter. Ita Scotus . . . Thomas de Garbo . . . Tertia opinio ait potentias animae vegetantis ab ea non distingui, maxime vero sensitivas atque intellectivas, sic Bonaventura . . . , Durandus (a St. Porc.)*." The last opinion, held by Suarez himself and attributed also to Aquinas, is that the powers are really distinct from the soul. As one sees, all authors quoted as adhering to the first opinion belong to the Nominalistic school. As in many other instances, here too the moderns are descendants of the late medieval Nominalists.

⁴² See C. A. Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 99. The reference is to Locke's *Essay*, Bk. II, c. 21, § 17.

The moderns are more or less in the same situation. C. Spearman says by way of characterization of the actual stand on the question: "For although nowadays all psychologists join heartily enough in condemning the faculties, most are but renouncing the old name whilst retaining the old thing. Under some such title as Power, Capacity, Ability, are hidden ideas which are not essentially distinct from the old conceptions of the faculties."⁴³ Spearman himself has written a justly famous work, entitled *The Abilities of Man*. But he feels that his conception is different from the openly avowed or the masked theory of faculties. It had been commonly assumed, so the eminent English psychologist avers, that the ability to attend to printed numbers would run parallel to the ability to attend to vocational duties; and many similar such parallels or identities of "function" were assumed. But this assumption needed, at least, some corroborating evidence. Here is the point where factorial analysis was developed. The main novelty of the viewpoint is stated by Spearman thus: "The notion of faculties had been based on differences in the *form* of mental operations. An obvious amendment was to take also into account the differences in content."⁴⁴ This may be true, not of faculties in the traditional sense, but of "functions" as they were treated in current psychology. In the former, however, the distinction of faculties rests, as one well knows, not on a formal characteristic of operations alone, but also on the objects, or as Spearman prefers to say, the content of these operations. The principle of distinction is *secundum operationes et objecta*.

It is a hopeless task to discover any author of the distant or more recent past who would actually have held the kind of theory concerning faculties against which the psychologists of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries direct their attacks, nor anyone whose ideas might fit the caricature drawn by Locke.

⁴³ C. Spearman, "G and after—A School to End Schools," *Psychologies of 1930*, Worcester, 1930, Clark University Press, p. 309.

⁴⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 341.

The name of faculty seems to have been used first by Campanella. He is reported to have used this term as synonymous with power or *vis*.⁴⁵ He also, apparently, is the first to submit a division into three great classes (different from the various ternaries of St. Augustine), reminiscent of the division adopted much later by N. Tetens and made famous by Kant's use of it. The three powers of the mind, or *Seelenvermoegen*, of Tetens are: *Verstand*, (or *Vernunft*), *Wille*, *Gefuehl*. But neither Tetens nor Kant ever conceived of these powers as parts of the mind, let alone the soul.

Nor has any of their predecessors, so far as I can find out, ever proposed a theory like the one criticized. It must have originated in the minds not of the attacked but of the attackers. And it can have originated there only because of certain metaphysical principles.

It should not be forgotten that denying a metaphysical proposition is tantamount to uttering one. As one cannot disprove any thesis on economics by referring to principles of chemistry, so one cannot invalidate a proposition of metaphysical intent by referring to facts of science or of psychology.

It is quite correct to say that the theory of faculties is primarily speculative. But so is the denial of its truth.

All facts which are pointed out by the critics of faculty-psychology are fully recognized by this very theory. None of its defenders thought to deny the essential unity of the mind, or to establish the faculties as so many independent entities, or to pretend that "the will chooses," unless in the sense of an abbreviated method of expression. No one has emphasized this more than St. Thomas. "To understand is, properly spoken, not an achievement of the intellect but of the soul by means of the intellect, as warming is not an achievement of warmth but of the fire by means of warmth."⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae*, Vol. IV, Pt. II, Lipsiae, 1744, p. 129: "*Quantum praedicamentum est vis s. facultas quae est potentia essentialis virtus, ad actum et actionem emergens. Reducuntur autem omnes facultates ad potestativas, cognoscitivas, et appetitivas.*"

⁴⁶ Q. D. de Veritate, q. 10, a. 9, ad 3. "*Quod intelligere proprie loquendo non*

Suppose, now, that a notion like the one of faculties is incapable. Why it should be will be inquired into immediately. What is the minimum of tenets on which a faculty-psychology in agreement with the general principles of Thomistic philosophy has to insist?

There are, I think, not more than three such fundamental propositions:

(1) There are faculties. The mental operations being distinct, and so also their objects (or "contents"), the potencies which are the proximate causes of these different operations must be distinct too. Although inherent in the one substance of the human person, they must be really distinct from one another and from the whole to which they belong, be this whole called soul, or consciousness, or mind, or organism.

(2) These faculties are divided at least into two groups fundamentally distinct *in genere*. The thesis that the rational faculties are essentially different in kind, in operation, and also, naturally, in their proper objects must be maintained.

It may be questionable whether the distinction between the vegetative and the sensory faculties is of equally fundamental importance. To make the distinction seems natural enough. But it is conceivable that the main difference, namely the direct awareness of the sensory operations on the part of the mind, as set over against the "unconsciousness" of the purely vegetative operations, is of secondary importance. One may admit that such a conception has little to be said in its favor, and also that it is hard, even impossible, to imagine a state of affairs in which the difference between the two classes of faculties would be abolished. But there is no cogent metaphysical reason for declaring this notion impossible. We are concerned here not with listing what may be asserted with certainty in regard to the nature of the faculties, but with what must be asserted if the fundamental principles of Thomism are to remain intact.

est intellectus sed animae per intellectum; sicut nec calefacere est caloris sed ignis per calorem."

In this respect, it is obvious that a denial of the essential difference between the rational and the non-rational faculties must result in a breaking down of the whole system; the principle of individuation by matter, the interpretation of the universals, the evidence of the first principles of reason, and many other basic propositions would fall if this thesis were abandoned.

(3) There is a fundamental difference between cognitive faculties—and of course their operations—on the one hand, and appetitive or orectic faculties on the other. This distinction must be maintained because it is intimately related to the idea of freedom.

This distinction will encounter hardly any opposition. Even the physiologist distinguishes between the “afferent” and the “efferent” branch of the reflex or neuronie arc. His view is corroborated by the findings of the anatomist who describes “receptory” and “effector” organs.

The fundamental tenets of Thomism remain quite unshaken, even if it is admitted that there are more or fewer faculties than are listed in the traditional psychologies. It does not alter the whole conception of Thomistic anthropology if we should be compelled by the evidence of facts to abandon, for instance, the differentiation between imagination and memory, or to draw the dividing line otherwise than we have been accustomed to do. Just as it does not make any difference whether “touch” is one sense or faculty or whether under this name there are comprised several distinct faculties, like the sense of pressure, thermaesthesia, the sense of pain, kinaesthesia, somesthesia, perhaps pallaesthesia, perhaps even more senses.

The question of the number of faculties is one of empirical observation and careful analysis of facts. The three theses listed above, however, are indispensable.

It should not prove difficult to show that these three propositions are perfectly compatible with any findings whatsoever brought forth by direct introspective observation or by experimental analysis.

Ultimately, to repeat this once more, it is introspection, the psychologist’s immediate knowledge of the functioning of the

mind, which supplies him with the only criterion he can find. This, of course, is not conceded by the "scientific" psychologists. But it is a principle according to which they themselves act.

What is, for instance, the meaning of the expression that is used, in working out factors or "vectors" of the mind, with regard to shifting the basis of calculation—or, as the technical term reads, to "rotating the axis"—until the resulting figures become "psychologically significant?"⁴⁵ When is anything "psychologically significant?" Whatever the mathematical details be, significance refers ultimately to the "universe of discourse" of psychology. To be meaningful, a term must, in final analysis, apply to something of common experience. Even though this experience may not be "public" in the sense of being a demonstrable physical experiment, it is one common to all men, and a statement about such things is perfectly intelligible. Intelligibility, be it said in passing, does not mean that a statement must be evident and acceptable to everyone. Statements about colors may be intelligible, because they refer to a sense experience, but to a blind person they are not acceptable or credible, because the immediate experience is lacking. Blindness, however, is a defect not limited to the eye of the body.

Whether a figure found by some statistical method is relevant or not cannot be decided by statistics. A high correlation is, of course, suggestive of some underlying reality. But whether it is truly indicative of such reality is a question to be answered by other methods. I know of parts in the European Alps where statistics would indubitably discover a high correlation between the number of cats kept and the frequency of trespassing against the game laws; at the same time there would be a negative correlation between the last figure and the number of dogs. Whether these findings have any significance at all can be ascertained only if one knows that the game laws, for many generations, forbade the keeping of dogs, that these laws, natur-

⁴⁵ L. L. Thurstone, *The Vectors of the Mind*, Chicago, 1935, Chicago University Press.

ally, proved an incitement for unlawful hunting, and that these habits, having become "mores" and passed on from generation to generation, are back of the statistical figure. At the same time, there may be, within the same population, a marked preference for a certain pattern of fabric worn by the women. The correlation with other traits will be equally high. But this fact is caused by purely accidental influences, such as a wholesale house "dumping" some shop-worn articles on the peasants. The correlation has no sociological significance.

It is the same with psychological data. Whether there is significance or not, however suggestive the figures, must be determined through an analysis of the total situation. But the total situation must first be present to the inquirer.

Before reaching the conclusion one more point deserves brief comment. In works on factorial analysis one comes across the expression that this or that factor "exists." This phrase is obviously suggestive of the erroneous interpretation referred to before. If "existing" is taken to mean that the factor proves the presence of a real "ability" of the mind, one soon begins considering it also a "proof" for the existence of faculties.

This term of "existing factors," however, has primarily a purely mathematical significance. The factor "exists" as a solution of an equation is said to exist. The conditions of such an existence are the faultlessness of computation and the observance of all the *cautelae* to be used in statistics.

It is quite another thing to claim that the factor is indicative of something real. On this the factor as such does not tell us anything. To be meaningful in this sense, the factor must be of such a nature as to make plausible its correspondence to some real property. Whether this be the case is a question difficult to answer and surely not answerable by means of another statistical inquiry. It is perfectly possible that there may be meaningless factors.

The factors as such, I have pointed out, cannot supply us with a "proof" for the existence of faculties. But a certain indication that something like faculties must be assumed may

be deduced not from the factors one finds but from those which one does not find.

If the mind—or the person—were really functioning as a unit in an absolute sense, then it would seem that any performance whatsoever ought to be positively and significantly correlated to any other. This, as we know, is not the case. The whole method of correlation and factorial analysis rests on the supposition that such a universal factor will not be found. The “general” factor, to be significant, must not be too general.

Thus, factorial analysis does not prove the existence of faculties, but it proves the existence of an idea, very little if at all different from the notion of faculties, in the minds of those psychologists who developed factorial analysis and used it so successfully.

Whenever we try to give an account of the way the mind functions we are forced to use terms like “function,” or “ability,” or “faculty.” It is undeniable that the mental operations differ from one another. This obvious fact is also the reason why the figuring of correlation of factors is meaningful. It rests on the supposition that certain operations belong together, and others do not, or not to the same degree. There are differences not only in kind but also in kinship, and this notwithstanding the fact that the mind operates as a unity and cannot be split into parts of even a relatively independent existence. When the physiologist speaks of “integration” and co-ordination, when the psychologist speaks, e. g., of “sentiments” being “organized around an emotional nucleus,” or of attitudes and their mutual relations, they presuppose that there are functions which may, eventually, combine in this way or in that way, although they never are independent of one another or of the whole.

These are elementary facts which no psychology ever can ignore. One may call statements concerning these facts “merely descriptive”; but description is the indispensable basis of all further investigation. It is true that the theory of faculty gives no “explanation.” But neither does any other psy-

chology. The so-called explanations are either unjustified, hypothetical, and even fantastic translations of statements on observable facts into a non-psychological language, or they are mere rewordings of these statements in the language of psychology, substituting some new terms for the names of directly observable data. Or, finally, explanation is, openly or disguisedly, of a metaphysical nature.

The modern scientist, and following his lead the modern psychologist too, show a marked reluctance to admit, within their proper fields, any idea even faintly reminiscent of metaphysics. They recognize, of course, that metaphysics may have to inquire into the ultimate foundations and problems even of the special sciences, provided that metaphysics can be proven to be a legitimate undertaking and not a collection of "meaningless propositions." The psychologist, in particular, claims that his field stands in exactly the same relation to metaphysics as any other field, of physics or of chemistry. But this is where the mistake is made.

Psychology does not stand to philosophy in the same relation and at the same distance as physics stands. The failure to arrive at a consistent and satisfactory conception of psychology, its subject matter and its task, on the basis of assimilating it to physics, ought to be a warning sign. No matter how much the statistical methods are developed, no matter how closely the terminology and methodology are fashioned on the patterns of science, psychology inevitably remains a discipline *sui generis* and different in many respects from science. The much-cherished name of "scientific psychology" is either but the expression of the legitimate and obvious desire to be as critical of results, as careful in observation, and as conscientious in method as science has been and is, or it expresses the pretension and hypothetical assumption that there is a perfect "unity of science," that is, that the same principles and methods can be applied everywhere. In the first instance the name is redundant; in the second it is utopian. It is utopian not because it anticipates a state to be realized in a far off

future or to be approached asymptotically, but because it rests on an utter misconstruction of the facts.

Not only is it true that, as Dr. Burt said in a remark quoted before, the principle of simplicity is legitimate and useful only in a field of relatively simple structure, and that therefore to make the simplicity of a theory a criterion or, at least, an indication of its truth, is fallacious in psychology;⁴⁶ it is true also that many other principles which prove to be helpful in physics are not at all so in psychology.

It has been emphasized very forcibly, although not discovered, by M. Heidegger that in all philosophical questioning there is a unique coincidence of three terms which, in science and in many other special disciplines, fall apart. That about which the question is, that wherefrom the answer is expected, and that which asks the question are one and the same. Philosophy asks about being; and being—at least that is Heidegger's claim—is encountered primarily in our own being; therefore to know being we address the question to ourselves; and we are, obviously, also the one who questions.

Whether Heidegger's position is correct or not, when it is submitted as characterizing philosophy, it is evidently the position in which the psychologist inevitably finds himself placed.⁴⁷ Even if he gathers his materials from "objective" observation, under carefully controlled conditions, of others and their behavior, responses, and so on, and abstains from using any introspective data—often much to the disadvantage of his own

⁴⁶ Dr. Jon. Cohn, many years ago, in a motto he placed on the title of a work dealing with dialectics, coined the phrase: *simplex sigillum nec veri nec falsi*. There is, indeed, no *a-priori* reason why a formula descriptive of a certain set of natural phenomena should be "truer" when simpler. This is a mere prejudice, born either of a rationalistic or a positivistic conception. In the notion of *Denkoeconomie* as used by E. Mach and his followers, both tendencies are blended in a rather curious manner.

⁴⁷ M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Halle a. S. 1929, Niemeyer, p. 5 f. Perhaps this fact is the reason, or one of the reasons, why one frequently wonders in reading Heidegger, whether one is moving in the field of pure ontology or of psychology. And this notwithstanding the author's attempt to define precisely the line separating the two fields, *op. cit.*, p. 45 ff.

conclusions—he has ultimately to refer all these data to his personal experience, because this is the only way to find out about their “psychological significance.”⁴⁸

The very categories in which any statement of things mental is couched are originally derived from self-experience and must constantly be referred back to it to retain their “psychological significance.” The physicist is not concerned with the ultimate significance of any name he uses; he can define his terms within his particular universe of discourse. He is not concerned with objective reality, as the metaphysician understands this term, but with phenomena and their relations. His formulae are true whether he believes in Natural Realism, or in Subjective Idealism. Not so the psychologist.

One may think the so-called “understanding” (*verstehende*) psychology a dead-end road, to set out on which might be calamitous for psychology. I do not want to discuss this point. But I want to submit that the name and the underlying view reveal an aspect of psychology which is too often forgotten.

All endeavor to achieve knowledge is motivated by man's unquenchable desire to understand the world in which he lives and of which he forms a part. Knowledge which did not contribute to this goal would not be knowledge. The remark of Thorndike, quoted above, that there might be a truth “useless for human welfare” rests on a total misconception of the nature of truth and of human welfare too. Man cannot be separated from his welfare. To know as much as possible is part of man's welfare. But knowledge sometimes lets us see more deeply into reality, and sometimes remains on the surface. Science, contrary to a common belief which scientists have

⁴⁸ R. Hoenigswald said in his *Principien der Denkpsychologie*, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1929, Teubner, that the only difference between introspection or self-observation and the data supplied by a psychological experiment is that in the second case the function achieved by one person in the first case is divided between the two persons involved, the observer and the experimenter. This author had in mind, of course, experiments in which the observer reports on his experiences. But his statement applies, in truth, to all psychological experiments—unless they be not psychological at all but merely neurophysiological—because the meaning or significance of the data collected can be elucidated only on the basis of the experimenter's self-knowledge.

taken the greatest pains to foster, does not penetrate into the depths of being.

There are differences between the various branches of knowledge even on the level of "empiriology," to borrow this term from Maritain. The subject matter of psychology is, so to speak, more intimately connected with the last riddles of reality than is physics.⁴⁹

Whether the psychologist acknowledges this fact or not, it exists, and it does not cease to influence his mode of thought. He cannot get rid of a certain number of philosophical ideas, because they are inextricably linked up with the subject matter he studies. One of these ideas is the idea of faculties.

When Spearman commented on the habit of avoiding a name but continuing to imply the existence of the thing, he meant this remark as a criticism of the average psychologist's mentality, reproaching him for not achieving a perfect clarity on this point. But nobody can deal with psychological problems without classifying the various performances of the mind, and nobody can classify performances without conceiving of the thing which performs as being able to do so. The physicist can dispense with such ideas because he does not deal with things in their totality but only with the quantifiable aspect of them, or rather not even with this aspect but with the relations obtaining between the various aspects of things, provided these aspects can be stated in the language of magnitudes.

Certainly the mind functions as a unit. That is exactly what the theory of faculties presupposes. But the mind does not display at once all the modes of functioning of which it is

⁴⁹ It is rather unfortunate that the words "science" and "scientific" have come to signify only knowledge of the type of physics. Disciplines the nature of which either forbids or at least renders difficult the application of physicalistic categories, or whose advances are not noticeably furthered by the introduction of so-called scientific procedures, may be as rich in valuable information and as reliable in their statements as any other couched in mathematical symbols. This narrow use of the term "science" creates also certain misunderstandings, since neither the French, nor the Italian, nor the German language knows of such restrictions. They have retained the original meaning of *scientia*. *Psychologie scientifique* is opposed in French to popular and uncritical ideas on the mind, but it does not mean restriction to physicalistic methodology.

capable. If the mind were so functioning in its totality that it would get directly, by its very substance, in touch with the situation within which its function is displayed, it could not perform in one way now and in another then. There must be something in the mind enabling it to perform differently according to the needs either of the situation or of its own innermost nature. This something, obviously, corresponds to what we are accustomed to call an accident. And these accidents of the mind are the faculties.

I cannot see how any psychologist can do without an assumption of such a kind. Whether he calls it a faculty or some other name does not make any difference. He cannot avoid thinking along such lines, simply because the facts force him to do so.

Nonetheless, the faculty is nothing one can directly observe. The distinction between substance and accident is not one of empirical science. Nor does it play any role in "science." But it does play an important role in psychology, because psychology is of a nature different from that of physics.

The theory of faculties which so horrifies the modern psychologist that its revival appears to him as a real danger for his particular science exists nowhere but in the mind of these psychologists. They have created the spectre, and then they tremble that it might come back. It will not because it has no reality.

Nor is there any danger that factorial analysis will bring back this fictitious faculty psychology. What never existed cannot be brought back. But, on the other hand, neither can factorial analysis be used as an argument in favor of faculty psychology.

Faculty psychology does not need to be buttressed by any argument. It is not only the natural, it is the inevitable and fundamental attitude, or rather the formulation of this attitude, underlying any endeavor whatsoever to achieve clarity on and to attain knowledge of things mental.

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THE VIRTUE OF HUMILITY

(Concluded)



V. THE PLACE OF HUMILITY AMONG THE VIRTUES

In a previous installment * we have endeavored to give a clear idea of humility itself. It remains to correlate it with the other virtues, to determine its place and rank among them, and its similarities to several of them. We know that it inheres in the will and influences especially the lower irascible appetite; but what is its exact position? Is it an intellectual, theological, or moral virtue? If moral, is it cardinal, or merely reducible to one of the cardinal virtues? And if the last hypothesis be true, is it a subjective, integral, or potential part of that cardinal virtue?

We can discard at once the possibility that humility is an intellectual virtue. Despite the peculiar intellectual preparation it requires due to its dependence on self-knowledge, its function is to moderate the passion and affection of hope. It pertains essentially not to the cognoscitive but to the appetitive side of the soul. But is it theological? It is the formal motive which gives rise to this question. Subjection to God out of reverence for Him seems allied to the motives of the theological virtues,¹³⁵ which by their objects reach out to God and touch Him. As charity loves God because of His infinite goodness, as faith believes in God because of His infinite veracity and infallibility, so humility subjects itself to God because of His infinite authority as Creator, Provider, Uplifter, and Redeemer of man.

* THE THOMIST, Vol. VII, No. 2 (April 1944), pp. 185 ff.

¹³⁵ Cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 33, q. 3, a. 3, ad 6: "... humilitas videtur virtutibus [theologicis] propinquissima esse, quia per eam homo se ex reverentia Deo subjicit, et per consequens alii propter Deum. . . ."

On close inspection, the argument loses all its force. Humility, indeed, "regards principally the reverence by which one is subjected to God."¹³⁶ Yet this is its formal motive, not the formal object, which is not God Himself as in the case of the theological virtues, but the moderation of the irascible appetite in its élan toward the excellent. Moreover, the formal motive of humility, if one considers it carefully, is not the divine authority itself, i. e., God as He is infinitely superior to His creatures, but rather the reverence which He inspires, the obligation which the soul feels to follow His guidance. Hence lowliness of heart is not one of the theological virtues, since neither its object nor its motive attains God Himself.

Surely humility ought to be ranked, then, on the next lower grade, for the praises accorded it by the Fathers and Doctors, and the titles with which they grace it, seem to imply that it is as indispensable as the cardinal or principal virtues themselves. It is called the foundation of the spiritual life, the root and cause of all the virtues, their mother, nurse, and chaperon. Its role in the Redemption is unique.

As Augustine says, "The entire life of Christ on earth, through the humanity he deigned to assume, was an instruction in right living."¹³⁷ But it was His humility that He proposed especially for our imitation, saying, "Learn of me, for I am meek and humble of heart."¹³⁸ And Gregory¹³⁹ says that "the keynote of our redemption is found to be the humility of God."¹⁴⁰

Thomas did not hesitate to write that "the whole New Law consists in two things: in humility and meekness."¹⁴¹ Judged

¹³⁶ "Humilitas enim praecepit respicit reverentiam, qua quis subicitur Deo."—Art. 4, arg. 1.

¹³⁷ *De vera religione*, Cap. XVI, 32. M L 34, 135.

¹³⁸ *Matt.*, xi, 29.

¹³⁹ *Liber regulae pastoralis*, III, Cap. XVII (Admonit. XVIII). M L 77, 78 B.

¹⁴⁰ "Sicut Augustinus dicit, 'tota vita Christi in terris, per hominem quem suscipere dignatus est, disciplina morum fuit.' Sed praecepit humilitatem suam imitandam proposuit, dicens, 'Discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde.' Et Gregorius dicit quod 'argumentum redemptionis nostrae inventa est humilitas Dei.'—Art. 5, arg. 4.

¹⁴¹ We give the whole passage: "Et quid est illud: 'Discite a me quia mitis sum et humilis corde'? Tota enim lex nova consistit in duobus: in mansuetudine

by its role in the spiritual life, too, humility certainly seems to be "principal." It conforms the soul to reason in a matter about which the soul is restive and balky, the appetite for excellence; and it has to do with one of the principal passions, hope.¹⁴² As a matter of fact, if it is the custodian and groundwork of *all* the virtues, strengthening them by its own strength, it seems even more important than the four ordinarily named as principal.

But that it cannot be ranked among them is evident as soon as the nature of the cardinal virtues is called to mind.¹⁴³ They are good habits that help the soul act reasonably in its most basic operations, which are the hardest to keep within the limits of the moral law. They are "the hinges upon which a man's life swings; they are the root virtues to which all the other perfect or complete virtues can be reduced."¹⁴⁴ Just as true peace in man's noblest faculty, the mind, tranquilizes the whole soul and even the body, so these virtues, because they moderate man's most important activities, directly produce in each voluntary faculty a general tendency to be subject to reason in all its acts.¹⁴⁵

This tendency naturally varies with the activity it qualifies. Thus, with regard to man's social intercourse, it takes the form of an inclination to give others their due; with regard to the passions, it appears as a repression and check of those that tend

et humilitate. Per mansuetudinem homo ordinatur ad proximum. Unde Psalmus (101:1): 'Memento, Domine, David, et omnis mansuetudinis ejus.' Per humilitatem ordinatur ad se, et ad Deum. Isaias (66:2): 'Super quem requiescit spiritus meus, nisi super quietum et humilem?' Unde humilitas facit hominem capacem Dei."—*Comment. in Matt.*, XI, n. 3, p. 163a.

¹⁴² Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 25, a. 4, corp.

¹⁴³ For St. Thomas' refusal to admit humility into the company of the cardinal virtues cf.: *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 61, a. 3, arg. 2; II-II, q. 141, a. 7, arg. 3, & ad 3. *III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, quaest. 4, ad 3. *De virtutibus in communi*, q. unica, a. 12, ad 26. *De virtutibus cardinalibus*, q. unica, a. 1, arg. 13, & ad 13.

¹⁴⁴ Farrell, *op. cit.*, II, 205.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 137, a. 2, corp.: "Virtus principalis est cui principaliter adscribitur aliquid quod pertinet ad laudem virtutis, inquantum scilicet exercet illud circa propriam materiam in qua difficillimum et optimum est illud observare."

to be excessive, and as a tonic for those that might hold the soul back from the good of reason. Fortitude, for example, is a cardinal virtue because it confirms and strengthens the soul in circumstances in which it is most difficult to be firm and strong, namely, in imminent danger of death. Patience also hardens the soul, but only so far as the little crises entailed by daily life and the rubbing of elbows with one's fellowmen are concerned. Although this is difficult enough, it is far easier than attacking a tank with a torch, or facing a firing squad; and therefore patience is not a cardinal virtue.

The same holds true for humility, the chief operation of which is repression. It keeps restive hope from leaping the pale of reason; and though the curbing of lust for glory and honor is hard enough, it is only "medium hard" in comparison with the difficulty of restraining the appetite for food, hard drink, and sex pleasure. "Anger and hope do not move a man as the fear of death does."¹⁴⁶ Hence, though the matter of humility is one of the soul's basic activities—hope, the élan of the soul toward what is convenient to it—yet, because it does not deal with what is *most* basic and primitive, the individual's urge to preserve his own life and that of the species to which he belongs, it is not a cardinal virtue. As for the fact that it regulates a principal passion, St. Thomas says:

The objects of hope are higher than the objects of concupiscence, and, because of this, hope is placed as a principal passion in the irascible. But the objects of concupiscence and touch-delectation move the appetite more vehemently, because they are more natural. Hence temperance, which sets up moderation in these things, is a principal virtue [but not humility].¹⁴⁷

Lastly, while humility roots, guards, and strengthens all the

¹⁴⁶ "Non enim ita movent hominem ira et spes, sicut timor mortis."—*De virtutibus in communi*, q. unica, a. 12, ad 26.

¹⁴⁷ "Ea quorum est spes sunt altiora his quorum est concupiscentia; et, propter hoc, spes ponitur passio principalis in irascibili. Sed ea quorum est concupiscentia et delectatio tactus, vehementius movent appetitum: quia sunt magis naturalia. Et ideo temperantia, quae in his modum statuit, est virtus principalis."—*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 141, a. 7, ad 3.

virtues, it does so only indirectly, by doing away with their greatest obstacle, pride, which "creeps into good works, to destroy them."¹⁴⁸ It does not directly strengthen them in the way that a cardinal virtue confirms the other virtues over which it has influence: by subjecting the most important activity of some faculty to the reins of reason, thus preparing the entire faculty for the good work of the secondary virtues in less important operations.¹⁴⁹

If humility is not a cardinal virtue, it must at least belong to one of them—to prudence, justice, fortitude, or temperance—as an integral, subjective, or potential part. In order that an act of virtue be perfect, many conditions must be fulfilled, many things presupposed. Thus, prudence requires the use of reason, intelligence, circumspection, foresight, docility, caution, memory, and shrewdness. Such prerequisites for moral activity are the *integral* parts of a virtue. Secondly, all the principal virtues except fortitude are general virtues, divided into several *subjective* parts or species, as temperance into abstinence, sobriety, chastity, and virginity. Thirdly, each of the four has grouped around it those secondary habits for whose operations it has broken the tough soil of the soul, and which imitate but fall short of its own way of functioning—its *potential* parts.¹⁵⁰

Since humility is more than a condition necessary for a perfect act of virtue, being a specific habit with its proper formal object and motive, it cannot be merely an integral part; and since its matter is not principal but secondary, it cannot be a subjective one. It must, therefore, be a potential part; but of which of the four cardinal virtues? Certainly not of prudence, which is essentially an intellectual virtue;¹⁵¹ nor of justice, of which the principal function is not to rationalize the appetite

¹⁴⁸ "Alia quippe quaecunque iniquitas in malis operibus exercetur ut fiant; superbia vero etiam bonis operibus insidiatur ut pereant." St. Augustine, *Regula*, n. 2. M L 33, 1379.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. *III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, quaest. 4, ad 3; *De virtutibus in communi*, q. unica, a. 12, ad 26.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 48, a. 1, corp.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, q. 47, a. 1.

interiorly but to pay a debt to God or neighbor; nor of fortitude, since "humility represses more than it uses hope or confidence in itself,"¹⁵² whereas fortitude supports and enkindles the soul. It must be annexed to temperance, whose office it is to restrain the appetite, to repress the eager outward movement of the heart toward sense pleasures.¹⁵³ Indeed, in the manner in which it attains its object, humility resembles only temperance, which primarily checks passion and reins it in, whipping it into ardor merely on occasion and secondarily.¹⁵⁴ This identity of *manner* being the essential and formal reason why a secondary virtue is reduced to a principal,¹⁵⁵ the fact that temperance resides in the concupiscible part of the sense appetite while humility is in the will as irascible, does not assign the latter to a place with magnanimity under fortitude.¹⁵⁶ For "any virtue that produces moderation in any matter, and represses the appetite in its tendency toward some object, can be placed as a potential part of temperance."¹⁵⁷

Where among the potential parts of temperance is humility to be found? The Angelic Doctor locates it as the first part of moderation, *modestia*, "the virtue which moderates things that present ordinary difficulties."¹⁵⁸ It reduces to order those unruly movements of the soul which have not already been tempered by either continency (which deals with the motions of a will disturbed violently by the sex appetite), or meekness (which soothes anger's burning desire for revenge). Of these unruly tendencies, there are four left:

Of which one is the élan of the soul toward excellence, which *humility* moderates. A second is the desire of things pertaining to

¹⁵² "Humilitas autem plus reprimit spem vel fiduciam de seipso quam ea utatur."—Art. 2, ad 3.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, q. 141, a. 2, corp.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Art. 4, ad 2.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Art. 4, corp.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Art. 4, ad 2 & ad 3.

¹⁵⁷ "... quaecunque virtus moderationem quandam operatur in aliqua materia et refraenationem appetitus in aliquid tendentis, poni potest pars temperantiae, sicut virtus ei adjuncta."—*Summa Theol.*, q. 144, a. unic., corp.

¹⁵⁸ "... virtus moderativa eorum quae mediocrem habent difficultatem."—Faucher, *op. cit.*, note to II-II, q. 160, a. 1.

knowledge; in this, *studiosity*, to which curiosity is opposed, acts as moderator. There is a third [decorum], which pertains to the movements and acts of the body: namely, that they be done decently and honestly, both in play and at serious times. But the fourth [modesty] is what pertains to outward apparel, for example clothes and other like things.¹⁵⁹

This moderation is not a special virtue in the sense that humility is, but something generic.¹⁶⁰ It is the name for a group of special virtues whose common *motif* is the restraining of the soul in those urges which are not as hard to control as its primitive craving for the pleasures of touch, but which offer genuine difficulty because of their insubordination. Under moderation, consequently, is to be classed humility, "*inquantum scilicet humilitas nihil aliud est quam quaedam moderatio spiritus.*"¹⁶¹

VI. THE RANK OF HUMILITY

In the moral section of the *Summa*, there is a query Thomas makes over and over again: Is such and such a virtue the greatest of them all? It was natural to make the same inquiry about humility, and, because of the difficulties encountered in answering it, the problem should be discussed here. No attempt, of course, will be made to prove that lowliness of heart is the most excellent of all; that would be absurd. But we shall endeavor to assign humility a place in harmony with the particular excellence attributed to it by Christ and the Christian tradition.

¹⁵⁹ "Quorum unum est motus animi ad aliquam excellentiam; quem moderatur humilitas. Secundum autem est desiderium eorum quae pertinent ad cognitionem; in hoc moderatur studiositas, quae opponitur curiositati. Tertium autem, quod pertinet ad corporales motus et actiones: ut scilicet decenter et honeste fiant tam in his quae serio quam in his quae ludo aguntur. Quartum autem est quod pertinet ad exteriorem apparatus: puta, in vestibus et in aliis hujusmodi."—*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 160, a. 2, *corp.*

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, ad 2: "Sub modestia continentur diversae virtutes, quae a diversis assignantur. Unde nihil prohibet modestiam esse circa ea quae requirunt diversas virtutes." Moderation is an arbitrary grouping of virtues.

¹⁶¹ Art. 4. *corp.*

If, recalling the praises which the Fathers and early theologians of the Church gave to humility, we ponder the importance that Christianity has assigned to that virtue, and if, on the other hand, we think of the indispensability of many others, even disregarding the theological—of religion and obedience for example—we hesitate to say what rank humility should hold among them. Remembering, too, their connection naturally in prudence and supernaturally in charity, and the fact that it is impossible to have any of them if the very least is lost, while the possession of a single one of them secures the presence of the whole radiant galaxy—remembering all this, we become almost afraid to consider lowliness of heart nobler than any of its companions.

Furthermore, St. Thomas' own position, on the surface at least, is not clear.¹⁶² In his treatise on humility, he assigns it first place after the theological and intellectual virtues and justice, particularly legal justice.¹⁶³ But previously he had called religion greater than all the moral virtues;¹⁶⁴ had maintained that obedience was to be preferred to other moral virtues;¹⁶⁵ that the first place after justice belongs to fortitude;¹⁶⁶ that the virtue of mercy was to be preferred to all the other virtues which regard one's neighbor, implying that it was above even justice!¹⁶⁷

To dispel the intellectual smoke screen that these apparently conflicting statements cast over the truth, it will be necessary to proceed step by step: to see what virtues are certainly of nobler rank than humility; then to state precisely the principle that will be employed to grade those remaining; lastly, to apply the principle in each case that offers difficulty.

¹⁶² Note that we say "on the surface." We have endeavored in the following pages to explain the "contradictions" in the text of St. Thomas, which arise from the fact that each of these virtues is superior to others from some one formal aspect.

¹⁶³ Cf. Art. 5, *corp.*

¹⁶⁴ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 81, a. 6.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 104, a. 3.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 123, a. 12.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 30, a. 4.

This procedure will show us that, in the Angelic Doctor's mind, humility is truly superior to all the moral virtues except justice, even to religion. But it will also show us the sense in which this conclusion is true—the particular *way* in which humility is nobler than other virtues. It would be foolish to maintain that it is unqualifiedly superior, since it is evident that in some sense religion, for instance, must be superior.

With regard to the theological and intellectual virtues, there is no problem. Humility is inferior, because humility is not as closely connected as they are with the attaining of man's last end. The purpose of virtue is to help reason arrive at its goal, and hence the theological virtues, which reach up to man's last end, God Himself, and take hold of Him, are the greatest of all. Next will be those good habits which assist reason to see and determine upon the best means for arriving at its goal—the intellectual virtues; and after them those that facilitate all that man does interiorly and exteriorly to move toward his goal—the virtues perfecting the appetites.¹⁶⁸ Since it is in this last category that humility is found, it is undeniably of less dignity than those of the first and second.

The question, then, resolves itself to this: What is the rank of humility among the moral virtues? Whereas the function of the theological virtues is to enable man to attain God, his last end, and the function of the intellectual virtues is to understand the means of arriving at that end, the function of these moral virtues is to control man's activity toward his goal by regulating it according to right reason: to assist and guide all his appetitive faculties in their operations.

A little thought will make it clear that there are various viewpoints from which the perfection of the virtues can be regarded, and that their rank will vary with each consideration. They

¹⁶⁸ Cf. Art. 5, *corp.*: "Bonum humane virtutis in ordine rationis consistit. Qui quidem principaliter attenditur respectu finis. Unde virtutes theologice, quae habent ultimum finem pro objecto, sunt potentissimae. Secundario autem attenditur prout secundum rationem finis ordinantur ea quae sunt ad finem. Et haec quidem ordinatio essentialiter consistit in ipsa ratione ordinante; participative autem in appetitu per rationem ordinato."

might, for instance, be judged in the light of the potencies in which they inhere, or in the light of their formal objects, or in the light of their greater or less necessity to different individuals, or in the light of the wider or narrower extent to which they control man's appetite, his activity toward his goal. It is from the last viewpoint that the relative perfection of the virtues will be determined here. To what degree does humility influence human life as it is consciously directed to its end? If this extent is greater than that of the other moral virtues, then lowliness of heart is, in this one way at least, more perfect than they.

Legal justice, which inclines the individual to give the community of which he is a part everything that is its due, controls man's activity toward his goal *in its universality*. In other words, there is no operation, however secret and personal, be it thought or desire or delectation, which escapes the watchful eye of legal justice, despite the fact that in itself it always involves relationship with another person.¹⁶⁹ The reason for this is that even acts which themselves have no bearing on others whatsoever, affect in many ways the person who performs them, being the begetters, sustainers, or disrupters of habits. Strongly though obliquely, like indirect lighting, they influence his life as a member of society. Legal justice, then, has universal control of human operation, and sanctions only those personal and internal acts which will help or at least not hinder man in his relationship to the community. To put it more philosophically, legal justice controls every act of the appetite, rational, sensible, concupiscible, and irascible. There is a distant parallel in the stern hand that human prudence holds over the diet and exercise of a marriage-minded débutante.

The primacy of justice over the other moral virtues is easily seen. Whereas it regulates, directly or indirectly, the whole of human appetite, most others regulate merely one phase of it. Thus, sobriety keeps desire for inebriating liquor within reasonable bounds; studiosity enkindles or quiets intellectual curi-

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, & II-II, q. 123, a. 12, *corp.*

osity; veracity encourages one to reveal himself in his social contacts as he really is.¹⁷⁰

Humility, on the other hand, like legal justice, is a universal virtue. We have seen that its material object is everything. It makes one act reasonably in any and every line of activity, whether there is question of passion or affection of the will, or operation toward God or neighbor. But it cannot surpass or even equal the role of legal justice. Its office being merely to *subject* the soul to what is above it, it only disposes man to subordinate himself completely and wholeheartedly to justice's universal control of the appetite. This it is able to do because, subjecting man to God out of reverence for Him, it sees in the refusal of the appetite to be under reason's control the death-blow to its submission to God. Yet humility here surpasses the other moral virtues, which effect this willing subjection of the soul in some one particular field alone.¹⁷¹

The theological and intellectual virtues, then, and justice—at least legal justice—are surely loftier than humility. What is the principle which St. Thomas uses as his measuring-rod? The discussion just finished contains it: One moral virtue is greater than another if it subjects the appetite more universally to the intellect's determination that its ultimate goal is to be pursued in every act. In other words, one way of grading the virtues is to discover how extensively they bring reason into human action, how widely they participate in the "good of reason." Humility will be greater than any virtue which shares the good of reason less than it. Succinctly, it is to be ranked according to how reasonably it makes a man act. Let us apply this principle to each of the virtues about which the text of the *Summa* causes difficulty: to mercy, particular justice, fortitude, religion, and obedience.

First, mercy, which is compassion or sorrow for another's misery, constraining one to lend all the assistance in his power. It is called the greatest of virtues by St. Thomas, second only to charity, "*quia misericordia maxime superioris est.*"¹⁷² Those

¹⁷⁰ Cf. Art. 5, *corp.*

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 30, a. 4, *corp.*

five words are to be noted carefully. They make it evident that the Saint credits mercy with this exalted rank not for what it is formally in itself, but for something that is quite incidental to it—the superiority of the merciful to those whom they are led to compassionate and assist. Giving implies abundance; receiving implies deficiency.

Superiority exists for the purpose of bringing to their goal inferiors who are themselves incapable of achieving it, or who cannot do so without great difficulty. This, the supplementing of the defects of inferiors, is essential to the notion of superiority, since it is its very *raison d'être*. But superiority as found in man is wholly accidental to him. Considered as a creature, he exists not to supply the defects of others, but to be subject. The very word *creature* connotes dependence upon a Creator. Insofar, then, as the circumstances of another's misery make a creature a superior, his noblest act, next to an act of charity, is an act of mercy toward his "subject." But because he is a creature before he is a superior, because the former qualification is essential to him while the latter is purely accidental, humility, which follows immediately on his subjection to God as a creature, is more proper to him than mercy, which follows on his superiority over others. Lowliness of heart is, therefore, more excellent a thing than mercy. Moreover, the fact that mercy is the property and characteristic of a superior, proving that he has something which the person who is the object of his charity lacks, indicates nothing about mercy's participation in the good of reason. Mercy subjects the will to the good of reason in the one narrow matter of another's miseries, humility does so in all matters.¹⁷⁸

There is still less difficulty about particular justice, but here the conclusion is against humility, not for it. The only reason the question comes up at all is St. Thomas' statement that "after the theological virtues, and the intellectual ones, which regard reason itself, and after justice, *especially legal justice*,

¹⁷⁸ Cajetan, *Commentarium*, in II-II, q. 161, a. 5: XXV fin.

humility is greater than the rest.”¹⁷⁴ The conclusion is indeed absolute that justice, i. e., all justice, is before humility; but the emphasis on legal justice causes a shadow of doubt to arise. Cajetan clears it away easily, and it is not only his interpretation but certainly Thomas’ meaning.¹⁷⁵

The root reason whence the excellence of particular justice over humility springs, is the same that the author gave before: that justice as a virtue is good not only for the one possessing it, but is directly for the good of another. For this is the greatest work of justice and is considered as worthy of the greatest praise. . . . But humility is directly the good only of its possessor, like other moral virtues which regard the passions. . . .¹⁷⁶

Moreover, he goes on to say, humility postulates particular justice as an accident postulates its substance. The subjection of the will to God supposes that the good of reason demands God be given what is His. If the rational faculty saw no reason for rendering everyone his due, it would be irrational and immoral to offer subjection to anyone, even to the divine Being; it would be a lowering of man’s condition, “vileness of soul and human deformity.”¹⁷⁷ Particular justice is, then, to be classed above lowliness of heart.

¹⁷⁴ “. . . post virtutes theologicas et virtutes intellectuales, quae respiciunt ipsam rationem, et post justitiam, praesertim legalem, potior ceteris est humilitas.”—Art. 5, corp.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 12, corp.: “. . . etiam si loquamur de justitia particulari, praecellit inter alias virtutes morales, duplici ratione: . . . quia scilicet est in nobiliori parte animae, idest in appetitu rationali . . . [et quia] aliae virtutes laudantur solum secundum bonum ipsius virtuosi: justitia autem laudatur secundum quod virtuosus ad alium bene se habet; et sic justitia quodammodo est bonum alterius. . . .”

¹⁷⁶ “. . . radix unde excellentia justitiae particularis supra humilitatem pullulat, est illa quam. . . . Auctor superius docuit: quia scilicet justitiae virtus est bona non solum habenti, sed directe est ad bonum alterius (hoc enim maximum virtutis opus, et praecipua laude dignum censetur, ut patet in locis allegatis); humilitas autem non directe nisi habentis est bonum, sicut et caeterae virtutes morales quae circa passiones ponuntur.”—Cajetan, *Commentarium*, in II-II, q. 161, a. 5: XIV.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*: “. . . humilitas praesupponit justitiam, sicut accidens substantiam; appetitus enim per modum subditi ad Deum et id quod Dei est, supponit justitiam, qua homo Deo, et id quod ex parte se habet hominis, ei quod ex parte se tenet Dei, jus suum tribuit. . . . Humilitas, nisi super justitia fundetur, qua unicuique jus suum debetur, vilitas animi et deformitas humana esset.”

A close study of the article in the *Summa* on the rank of fortitude¹⁷⁸ is necessary in order to coordinate it with the parallel article on humility. We notice that though the title of the former is general—*Utrum fortitudo praececellat inter omnes virtutes*—Thomas in the foreword to the question limits himself to the place of fortitude among the cardinal virtues; and that in the article his conclusion is merely that fortitude precedes temperance. "Hence among the cardinal virtues prudence is the greatest; second, justice; third, fortitude; fourth, temperance. And after these, the other virtues."¹⁷⁹ Does this place fortitude above humility? We think not. Note that the Doctor is employing here, though in different words, the principle that we ourselves are using: that its participation in the good of reason determines the nobility of a virtue. Applying this to justice, he establishes its precedency, inasmuch as it executes this good of reason, i. e., inasmuch as it "orders all the acts of all the virtues of man to his social end, the common good."¹⁸⁰

Justice executes this good [of reason], inasmuch as it pertains to it to place the good of reason in all things human. But other virtues [merely] conserve this good, inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest the latter lead man away from the good of reason. And, among these, fortitude holds the principal place.¹⁸¹

Note the lacuna. Justice perfects the will, fortitude moderates passion. Between the two, there is room for any will-virtue that shares the good of reason more fully than fortitude. There is room, hypothetically, for obedience, for religion, for humility. The first two are not our concern here, but what of humility? Again our principle; again our conclusion: the

¹⁷⁸ II-II, q. 123, a. 12.

¹⁷⁹ "Unde, inter virtutes cardinales, est potior prudentia; secunda, iustitia; tertia, fortitudo; quarta, temperantia. Et, post has, caeterae virtutes."—*Ibid.*, corp.

¹⁸⁰ Farrell, *op. cit.*, III, 175.

¹⁸¹ "Iustitia autem est hujus boni factiva, in quantum scilicet ad ipsam pertinet ordinem rationis ponere in omnibus rebus humanis. Aliae autem virtutes sunt conservativae hujus boni, in quantum scilicet moderantur passiones, ne abducant hominem a bono rationis. Et, in ordine harum, fortitudo tenet locum praecipuum . . ."—*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 123, a. 12, corp.

good of reason is shared more fully by humility than it is by fortitude, because the latter makes man subject himself to the good of reason in the face of danger of death, whereas "humility renders man rightly subject or wide open to the good of reason, not in this or that matter, but universally."¹⁸² It follows that lowliness of heart is to be preferred among the moral virtues even to the cardinal one of fortitude.

With regard to religion, there are great difficulties in the way of a correct solution. Thomas reasons to its eminence thus: What is near the last end, is better than something farther away from it. Now the purpose of all the virtues is to produce acts which will bring man closer to God, his final end. Among the virtues, religion produces acts that have as their object the worship of the Deity, and hence it brings man straight to God Himself. "*Et ideo religio praeeminet inter alias virtutes morales.*"¹⁸³ These words seem to be flatly contradicted by others later on: "*Et ideo, post iustitiam, praesertim legalem, potior caeteris [virtutibus moralibus] est humilitas.*"¹⁸⁴ At any rate, the two articles have divided the best of the Commentators, Cajetan and John of St. Thomas. It is perhaps significant that the latter maintained the supremacy of religion over lowliness of heart.¹⁸⁵

The difficulties that becloud the issue are mainly two: the fact that humility is concerned with the good of the individual, not the good of another, while religion has as its object God Himself; and the fact that religion is a potential part of justice, which excels lowliness of heart and determines its morality.¹⁸⁶

It is true that humility achieves directly only the good of its possessor, by regulating his irascible appetite, whereas religion aims directly at God and His worship. But even though the latter strives to pay God the debt of honor and esteem due

¹⁸² "Humilitas reddit hominem recte subditum seu patulum bono rationis, non in hac vel illa materia, sed universaliter."—Cajetan, *Commentarium*, in II-II, q. 161, a. 5: XXV. Cf. Art. 5, corp.; *ibid.*, ad 2.

¹⁸³ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 81, a. 6.

¹⁸⁴ Art. 5, corp.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. *Cursus Theologicus*, Tomus VII, in II-IIam, Disp. XIX, a. 6, n. 25.

¹⁸⁶ *Supra*, p. 375 (note 177).

Him, it does not succeed. Its act does not attain to God as the acts of the theological virtues do;¹⁸⁷ rather, it reverts to the soul eliciting it. The divine Being is only the *finis cui* of religion.

In worshipping God, we do not in reality attain God in those acts by which we are said to worship Him, but we attain ourselves or things outside of us. . . . In truth, the act of worship attains ourselves or things that are ours, offering them to God.¹⁸⁸

Hence the partial superiority that religion has over humility in concerning itself with operations and not passions or affections is considerably lessened by the fact that these operations directly touch only the soul eliciting them, not God at Whom they are aimed.

As for the dependence of humility on justice as an accident on its substance and the close connection of justice and religion, these facts are here irrelevant. Humility depends, it is true, on justice, but not on religion. The formal motive of the latter is indeed reverence for God, as is the formal motive of humility. Yet the latter does not *borrow* it from religion, as will be seen later.¹⁸⁹ Both have as their principle filial fear.¹⁹⁰

Finally, to apply our principle: we aver that the good of reason is more widely participated by humility than it is by religion, for, whereas religion renders man's will and all his faculties subject to the good of reason in the one matter of God's worship, humility renders man subject to that good not only so far as God is concerned, but also so far as one's neighbor and oneself, one's reason, will, sensitive appetite, and body are concerned. Religion has a special and high place among the moral virtues, singled out from them by its closeness to the ultimate goal of human life; but from the viewpoint of exten-

¹⁸⁷ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 81, a. 5, *corp.*; *ibid.*, ad 2.

¹⁸⁸ " . . . colendo Deum, non Deum secundum rem attingimus actibus illis quibus illum colere dicimur, sed attingimus nos ipsos aut res extra; quamvis grammaticaliter colere Deum attingere Deum significet, pro quanto ly 'colere' significat terminari ad Deum. Secundum tamen veritatem rei, actus colendi ad nos aut nostra attingit, offerendo illa Deo."—Cajetan, *Commentarium*, in II-II, q. 81, a. 5.

¹⁸⁹ *Infra*, pp. 386-390.

¹⁹⁰ *Infra*, pp. 399-408.

sion and participation in the good of reason, it is inferior to humility.¹⁹¹

Lastly, a word about obedience. There is less difficulty here, and apparently no doubt about the mind of St. Thomas: humility is to be ranked above it. In the first place, the conclusion of his article on the place of obedience¹⁹² is strictly limited. "The virtue of obedience, which for God's sake despises one's own will, is more praiseworthy than other moral virtues which for God's sake despise other goods."¹⁹³ In other words, obedience is nobler than virtues which lead man to despise created things less excellent than human freedom. But humility contemns not only one's own will, but everything conceivable as excellent that could possibly disturb its subjection to God. And—to apply our principle for the last time—there is more of the good of reason in lowliness of heart, since obedience renders the will subject to that good only in those matters which are the objects of precepts given by competent authority or which here and now are looked upon by the will formally and precisely under the aspect of being a duty;¹⁹⁴ whereas humility renders the entire appetite subject to the good of reason in all matters, since the motive of subjection to God and reverence for Him is universally applicable and utterly unrestricted.

As an interesting conclusion to this section, we append a list of the virtues mentioned above, as graded by Cajetan¹⁹⁵ according to the principle of extensive participation in the good of reason. They will rank in dignity as follows: the theological virtues; the intellectual virtues, including prudence; legal justice; particular justice; humility; fortitude; temperance; religion; obedience; mercy. It is as startling a lineup as a disclosure of

¹⁹¹ Cf. Cajetan, *Commentarium*, in II-II, q. 161, a. 5: XXV.

¹⁹² *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 104, a. 3.

¹⁹³ "... laudabilior est obedientiae virtus, quae propter Deum contemnit propriam voluntatem, quam aliae virtutes morales, quae propter Deum alia bona contemnunt."—*Ibid.*, corp.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 2, corp.

¹⁹⁵ *Commentarium*, in II-II, q. 161, a. 5: XXIV, XXV; esp. XXV fin.

ages in a community of nuns. But its very strangeness brings us back to the truth already emphasized: we are not trying to prove that humility is absolutely the most excellent of all the moral virtues; rather, we are endeavoring to discover why Christian tradition places it so high among the virtues. The reason is, as we have seen, its uniquely wide participation in the good of reason, the fact that, subjecting the entire appetite out of reverence for God, it renders it docile to the voice of reason.

VII. HUMILITY, MAGNANIMITY, AND PHILOTIMIA

From the decline of Greek philosophy to the thirteenth century, and from the decline of Scholasticism till only a few years ago, the study of magnanimity suffered almost universal neglect. The very word, magnanimous, is misunderstood today—so much so that in a recent authoritative translation of Aristotle *megalopsychia* appears as “pride”¹⁹⁶—and is interpreted as meaning broadminded or liberal. Perhaps the nature of the virtue is responsible for its neglect and misapprehension, presenting as it does a most amazing paradox.

Superficially considered, it seems to be an antipode of humility.¹⁹⁷ Studied carefully, it approaches so close to the latter as to be almost indistinguishable from its secondary function of stoking hope. Seen in act, it again appears to be locked in a death struggle with lowliness of heart, for it involves an advance toward what is truly great, with confidence in one's own powers, whereas under the same circumstances humility recoils, sure of its own impotence and worthlessness.¹⁹⁸

Magnanimity may be described as the mark of a man who grapples with great things and seeks out honor and glory, confident in his own power and ability.¹⁹⁹ According to Aris-

¹⁹⁶ *The Works of Aristotle translated into English under the Editorship of W. D. Ross* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908-1931), Vol. IX, “*Ethica Nicomachea*,” iv, 3 *passim*. Cf. note 2 *ibid*.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. *infra*.

¹⁹⁸ Cf. *infra*.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 129, aa. 1-3.

tote, it makes him ungrateful, ironic, hard to live with, even scornful of others.²⁰⁰ In the eyes of his fellows, the great man may seem as swollen up with pride as a penny balloon with wind. To the casual observer, he is the brother of Lucifer and an archenemy of the humble Christ.

When it is known more intimately, however, magnanimity shows itself in far more lovely light. Though it fires the soul to seek what is absolutely great—not merely what is great in proportion to the limited talents of ordinary men—it moderates this impulse according to the dictates of right reason and hence is a virtue. In its quest of excellence, it does not aim directly at honor and glory; they cannot be its object, because from its lofty height it sees that, outside its usefulness as a means to virtue, the regard of men is something small and negligible. Its purpose is rather the achievement of all manner of deeds which in themselves and independently of the will and desire of the magnanimous man, merit the highest respect and veneration.²⁰¹

As for the unamiable effects that magnanimity has, these too are seen to be anything but unamiable if considered closely. The man of great soul appears at times to be ungrateful, but only because he dislikes to receive favors so extensive that he cannot hope to repay and surpass them. This, St. Thomas assures us, belongs to the very perfection of gratitude, in which he wishes to excel, as he does in all the virtues.²⁰² In conversation "he uses irony [irony for the Schoolmen meant self-disparagement, not sarcasm], not as it is opposed to truth, so that he affirms of himself abject things that are untrue, or denies great things that are true; but because he does not reveal his entire greatness."²⁰³ He is well liked by his friends, but not by every chance acquaintance, "since he altogether avoids adula-

²⁰⁰ *Ethica Nicomachea* iv, 3. 1124b 25-1125a 12. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 129, a. 3, arg. 5.

²⁰¹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 129, a. 3. N.B. answers to all objections.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, ad 5.

²⁰³ "... utitur ironia, non secundum quod opponitur veritati, ut scilicet dicat de se aliqua vilia, quae non sunt, vel neget aliqua magna, quae sunt; sed quia non totam magnitudinem suam monstrat..."—*Ibid.*

tion and pretence [so necessary with the 'smart set'], which pertain to smallness of soul. Nevertheless he gets along well with all, both great and little, as he should "²⁰⁴—in other words, according to all the demands of charity and the social virtues. Finally, his "scorn" for others is not contempt for their lack of greatness, but for their defects.²⁰⁵ And it is scorn in the sense, explained before, of an orderly love. He honors the good in every man and prefers it to his own deficiency.

There is here no opposition to humility; magnanimity is commendable both in itself and in its unusual characteristics. Indeed, it and humility seem to approach and blend together, like shadows. They are in the same part of the soul, the irascible appetite. They have the same material object: remotely, every excellence; proximately, the appetite for arduous good. They possess the same formal object, the rationalizing of hope. They bridle the heart when it kicks at the traces of reason; they whip it to its utmost strength when it recoils from duty. Both of them keep the limitations of character clearly in view, and know the height to which they must attain and beneath which they must not fall. What then is the distinction between them, if there can be one?

The question is even more disquieting when asked of philotimia and humility. Philotimia, the Jude of the virtues, the little sister of magnanimity, is the regulator of the ordinary man's thirst for honor. It helps John Doe and Mary Smith, and the millions of insignificant people all over the world whom history never names, to pursue the life to which Providence has called them, to avoid sinful ambition, and remain firm in the midst of the difficulties that their vocations entail. All that is true of magnanimity is true of it, when foreshortened and reduced from the extraordinarily great and arduous to what is

²⁰⁴ " . . . quia omnino vitat adulationem et simulationem, quae pertinent ad animi parvitatem. Convivitis tamen omnibus et magnis et parvis, secundum quod oportet . . ."—*Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, ad 4: "Similiter etiam magnanimitas contemnit alios secundum quod deficiunt a donis Dei; non enim tantum alios appetitur quod pro eis aliquid indecens faciat."

middling and commonplace. Not that John Doe's talents, hardships, and sweating victories are insignificant before God, but only that in comparison with what is involved in the government of a state or the conduct of a war, for example, they pale and take on their true proportions.

But why posit a special virtue to do what lowliness of heart can evidently do through its secondary act? Again, the real distinction between humility and a virtue similar to it must be questioned.

Detailed scrutiny reveals that the differences between magnanimity, philotimia, and humility are as fundamental as their likenesses are superficial. Their proximate material objects are indeed the same: hope, the appetite of the excellent. But, even though the remote matter of each is honor, it is distinguished by the fact that humility is concerned with every good conceived of as an excellence, magnanimity only with things objectively great,²⁰⁶ philotimia with any objective excellence that merits the ordinary esteem of men.

For its formal object, humility has chiefly the restraining of hope's tendency to go beyond reason, while it is the strengthening of the soul against despair and the urging of it to a reasonable quest of honor that magnanimity and philotimia have principally in view.²⁰⁷ For its formal motive, humility in repressing the presumption of hope looks to reverence for God and submission to Him; in hardening hope, the other two look to the obtaining of man's own good, lest by despair he become unworthy of what is proportionate to his talents.²⁰⁸

As to the mode or general type of their activity, humility represses the soul, and hence is reduced to temperance; magnanimity and philotimia confirm and impel the appetite, hence are reduced to fortitude. In their reaction to a desirable excellence, humility, measuring its deficiency with the height of the work at hand, moves from it—or toward it—as unworthy; the other two move toward it as being worthy, since the talents

²⁰⁶ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 161, a. 1, *corp.*; ad 3; q. 129, a. 1, *corp.*

²⁰⁷ Cf. Art. 1, *corp.*; ad 3.

²⁰⁸ Cf. Art. 2, ad 3.

given by God are in direct proportion to the end to be attained. Thus the attitude of magnanimity to lofty good, e. g., the honor and esteem of men, is that it is worthy of them, account being taken of the gifts the soul itself possesses, great virtue, for example, or specialized learning. But humility, account being taken of man's nothingness, looks on itself as unworthy of any good. As far as persons are concerned, magnanimity "despises" others to the extent that they do not measure up to the talents given them; it does not regard them, in other words, so highly as to do anything in their regard not becoming itself. But humility honors all men and looks upon them as superiors, seeing in them God's wonderful gifts and an image of Him.²⁰⁹

Magnanimity and philotimia have their abode in the sensible-irascible appetite;²¹⁰ humility resides in the will and disposes the lower irascible to follow the voice of reason. Moreover, both the habit and frequent acts of humility are necessary to everyone for salvation; but its sisters, though they must exist habitually in every soul, need be reduced to act, indeed can be reduced to act, only if and when circumstances demand it. John Doe may live and die and attain everlasting happiness without a single act of magnanimity.

Lastly, as to their definitions, which sum up essentially all their other differences, magnanimity is that moral virtue which makes a person of great ability, natural or infused, tend to great works worthy of great honor. Philotimia is that which inclines a person of ordinary abilities, both natural and infused, to the accomplishment of good in proportion to those abilities. Humility is that by which a person, considering his deficiencies, holds himself to what is lowly, according to his measure, out of reverence for God.

The three virtues are, then, utterly different when considered from a speculative point of view. But there is one more difficulty: how can they be reconciled in the practical order? How can a man decide that in general his attitude toward life should

²⁰⁹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 129, a. 3, ad 4.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 60, a. 5, *corp.*; II-II, q. 129, a. 1, ad 1, 2; q. 134, a. 4, ad 1.

be one of endeavor to perform great deeds for the Church or society, or one of self-effacement and content with circumstances as they are? How can he determine, moreover, here and now in this particular opportunity for extraordinary action, that he is to accept or refuse it?

The answer lies in his knowledge of self and his experience, for magnanimity and philotimia as well as humility depend on self-knowledge.²¹¹ The more thorough that knowledge, the more easily can one settle upon the becoming line of action. If experience has taught one, for instance, that he is capable of leading men and has administrative and military genius, he should have no scruple, all things being equal, in accepting a generalship in his country's army. If a diplomat has done well in a minor position and realizes that a mere fraction of his talent has been called into play in the fulfilling of his duties, he may quite blamelessly seek a far more important and exacting assignment. Past experience, then, in similar or even far more trivial lines, is one norm for the choice between advance toward the excellent or abstention from it.

Another norm is the individual's constitutional makeup. Not only has magnanimity, like all the virtues, definite effects on soul and body; soul and body may also have strong dispositions toward magnanimity, and indicate that a young man or woman has been intended by divine Providence as its special instrument. As physical traits, Thomas, following Aristotle,²¹² mentions a slow gait that is the effect not of corpulency, weakness, or disease, but of a habitually absorbed reason; gravity of voice; a deliberate manner of enunciation, not affected but natural.²¹³ One's outstanding social position, as membership in a family that for generations has given its children to the church or state, or even one's great wealth, are further hints that should make the young person ponder his future seriously.²¹⁴

²¹¹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 133, a. 2, corp.; ad 1.

²¹² *Ethica Nicomachea* iv, 3. 1125a 13-15.

²¹³ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 129, a. 3, arg. 3 & ad 3.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, ad 2, 4.

Again, constant preoccupation with the thought of great things—not mere day-dreaming, but practical scheming that seems to cry aloud for realization—is a sign not to be neglected.²¹⁵ If a man's brain and heart insistently clamor that he achieve what the world holds in greatest esteem,²¹⁶ and if the means to do so lie within his own power or in the power of his friends or associates,²¹⁷ God Himself is in all probability at the root of his inclination, and not pride or ambition.

Finally, if the Christian is moved to perform even ordinary actions not simply because they are virtuous and demanded by reason, but even more because they are excellent things that somewhat slake his thirst for the accomplishment of what is loftiest in every virtue, he may deeply suspect that his soul is meant for greater things, and should in gratitude to God investigate where his talents can best serve the community.²¹⁸

Thus even in the practical problems of daily life, self-knowledge assists in making the choice between magnanimity or philotimia accompanied by humility, or of humility alone retreating out of reverence for God from what is above its measure.

VIII. HUMILITY AND RELIGION

Humility is such a simple thing that the Christian easily distinguishes it from all the vices that copy it, and reduces it unerringly to practice. But speculatively, as these pages have shown, it is a theological nightmare. It controls passion, but is subjected in the will. Its material object embraces things both material and spiritual, created and eternal. Demanding subjection to God and others, apparently paying them this subjection as a debt, it is strong in resemblances to virtues of the justice group, but is annexed to temperance.

Dismayed by this heterogeneity, some theologians²¹⁹ refuse to consider it a true unit and maintain that it is not one virtue

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, a. 4, ad 1; a. 6, *corp. fin.*

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, a. 6, *corp.*

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, aa. 1, 2.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, a. 4.

²¹⁹ *E. g.*, the Salmanticenses. *Supra*, p. 159 (note 72).

but several bearing the same name, just as there are several with the common name of temperance: abstinence, sobriety, virginity, and chastity. There is, first, an acquired humility of the sense appetite that has as its object the reasonable functioning of hope in the pursuit of excellence. Its matter is goods of the material order, its motive merely the moral attractiveness that reason sees in a humble life. A purely personal quality, it does not produce subjection to others; it is reduced to temperance as a potential part. A second acquired humility, subjected in the will, has as its object submission to every created superior, and pays this submission as a debt of reason. It is reducible either to justice—where it would be only one phase of that potential part called observance—or to temperance, with which it agrees in attaining its object by repression of the appetite. Its motive is the same as that of the first species. The third and noblest humility, likewise inhering in the will, is not acquired by man's efforts but infused by God, and motivated by reverence for the designs of His Providence. It has nothing to do with passion nor with one's fellow men (or other intellectual creatures), but subjects man to God in his hope for excellence above the material plane. It is reduced to justice.

It extends beyond the limits of one's own good, to give God what belongs to Him by the submission mentioned above; as religion repays Him by worship, and obedience by conformity to the divine precept.²²⁰

This distinguishing of three humilities is erudite and intriguing, but it is hardly good theology. It attempts to split an atom that has no parts to be split into, and multiplies being without necessity. It is the desperate theory of scholars confused (a) by the needlessness of any virtue in the will assisting it to attain its own good; (b) by the apparent impossibility of

²²⁰ "... extenditur ultra limites boni proprii ad reddendum Deo quod suum est per praedictam subjectionem: sicut religio reddit per cultum, et oboedientia per conformitatem ad divinum praeceptum."—Salmanticenses, *op. cit.*, Tract. XII, Disput. II, Dubium II, n. 54. See also the references given in note 72.

the appetite of excellence by the lower irascible; (c) by the fact that humility seems to be just as much concerned with external human relations (the object of justice) as it is with the passion and affection of hope; and (d) by the identity of its formal motive and that of religion.

The problems presented by the inherence of humility in the will and by its similarity to justice have been thrashed out sufficiently already.²²¹ That even the sense appetite can thirst for such an "immaterial" good as superiority is borne out empirically by natural history, for example by the wolf's fierce maintenance of his leadership in the pack, and speculatively by the fact that man's fourth and highest inner sense, known as the *judicative power*, can be moved by the intellect to esteem any good of reason, however spiritual, *as a good of nature*, i. e., as something convenient to the whole man, and to present it as such to the lower irascible appetite.²²²

There is no necessity, then, for three habits of humility, one reducible to temperance and situated in the lower appetite, one reducible to justice and inhering in the will, the last infused by God. Neither is lowliness of heart essentially subject to religion, despite the fact that its formal motive is subjection to God out of reverence for Him. This does give it a certain similarity to latria; but humility cannot be described technically as "a religious virtue," a virtue "permeated with religion."²²³ The doctrine of some theologians that it derives its motive from religion, and their claim that this is the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, must be denied.²²⁴

Religion is the moral virtue which inclines man to give God the cult due to Him as the first principle of all things. Its material object is our subjection to God and all our internal

²²¹ *Supra*, pp. 143-144.

²²² Josephus Gredt, *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae* (7th ed.; Freiburg: Herder and Co., 1937), I, 394 (n. 503, 4; cf. 511).

²²³ Marmion, *op. cit.*, p. 224. Cf. the references in the footnote.

²²⁴ Cf. Blasius Schutz, *Die Demut, ihr Wesen und ihre Stellung in der Moral* (Fribourg [Switzerland], 1926), p. 32; Odon Lottin, *L'Âme du culte* (Louvain, 1920), pp. 40-49; Marmion, *op. cit.*, pp. 223-228 (*esp.* p. 224).

and external acts, insofar as they protest the divine excellence. Its matter is, in other words, the worship of God. Its formal object is to establish, so far as it is possible, equality between this cult and God's right to it; to attempt to pay man's debt of worship to the supreme Being. Its formal motive is not only the special reasonableness of this endeavor, but above all reverence for the Creator. "To revere God is an act of the gift of fear. But it pertains to religion to do certain things *because of reverence for God.*"²²⁵

It does not follow from this that religion lends its motive to humility. It is true that religion can imperate an act of humility, but it is just as true that humility can imperate an act of religion. The affirmation that Thomas, after having attached humility to temperance and obedience to observance, reduced both these virtues to religion,²²⁶ is entirely gratuitous. The Saint seems never to have associated humility and religion, save by way of comparison. Thus, in answering the objection that man is not forced to humble himself before the divine in all men because that would be to worship them, he implies that the reverence given to God by religion is exactly the same as that given Him by humility, even though the case is different in the reverence due to men.²²⁷

Furthermore, there is no philosophical reason for subjecting humility to religion. Neither virtue is specified by reverence for God alone; that is merely a partial object of both. Both, consequently, can be activated by the same motive without

²²⁵ "Revereri Deum est actus doni timoris. Ad religionem autem pertinet facere aliqua propter divinam reverentiam."—*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 81, a. 2, ad 1.

²²⁶ Cf. Lottin, *op. cit.*, p. 49, note 1: "... après avoir rattaché l'humilité à la tempérance, l'obéissance à l'observance, saint Thomas s'est vu amené, par l'évidence de la réalité, à rapporter ces vertus à la religion. La parenté est en effet indéniable."

²²⁷ Cf. Art. 3, arg. 1 & ad 1: "... humilitas praecipue consistit in subiectione hominis ad Deum. Sed id quod debetur Deo, non est homini exhibendum; ut patet in omnibus actibus latriae. Ergo homo per humilitatem non debet se homini subijcere." "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non solum debemus Deum revereri in seipso; sed etiam id quod est ejus, debemus revereri in quolibet: non tamen eo modo reverentiae quo reveremur Deum. Et ideo per humilitatem debemus nos subijcere omnibus proximis propter Deum . . . latriam tamen soli Deo debemus exhibere."

any prejudice to their formal distinction. For one and the same motive can have various effects, as friendship leads to fear of losing the friend and to extreme self-sacrifice for him. In the same way, reverence for God leads to the universal moderation of the irascible appetite by humility and to the adoration of God by religion. Influenced by the fear of offending God by sin because he loves Him, man is led on the one hand to continue paying this reverence *as a debt* that he owes God; and his endeavor to do so becomes an act of religion.²²⁸ On the other hand, motivated by the same filial fear, man sees in unrestrained appetition of excellence an immediate cause of the separation from God that he fears; and his consequent subjection of the appetite to reason is an act of humility.

Humility can be called a "religious virtue," therefore, only metaphorically and improperly; yet it and religion spring from the same deep source, the fear of God. Because of common parentage, the features of one resemble those of the other. They have the faces of sisters.²²⁹

To sum up: humility is neither magnanimity nor philotimia; nor is it a potential part of justice, nor something essentially dependent upon religion, the most important virtue annexed to justice. But its association with the second cardinal virtue is most intimate; it is the serf of legal justice, and depends for its moral uprightness on the presuppositions of particular justice.

IX. THE DEGREES OF HUMILITY

In the sixth article of his tract on humility in the *Summa*, Thomas discusses the degrees of lowliness of heart as they were assigned by Saints Benedict, Anselm, and Bernard.²³⁰ We have

²²⁸ Cf. *III Sent.*, d. 9, q. 1, a. 1, quaest. 1, ad 3: "Revereri inquantum hujusmodi est actus timoris. Sed exhibere reverentiam inquantum est Deo debitum, est proprie latriae."

²²⁹ *Infra*, pp. 399-408, "Humility and the Gift of Fear."

²³⁰ Art. 6, arg. 1: St. Benedict, *Regula*, Cap. VII. M L 66, 371 B-374 C.

Ibid., arg. 3: St. Anselm, *De Similitudinibus*, Cap. C-CIX, esp. Cap. CIX. M L 159, 665 B-669 A.

Ibid., arg. 4: St. Bernard, *Sermo in Octava Epiphaniae*, n. 4 (M L 183, 154 A, B.), quoted by St. Thomas as the *Glossa Ordinaria*, in Matt. 3:15. Cf. M L 114, 82.

seen that he used Bernard's division in the *Commentary* on St. Matthew's Gospel.²³¹ In the *Summa* he shows that it is not essential, deriving from the nature of humility, but purely accidental, made by comparison with the ranks of men, who are superior, equal, or inferior to oneself.²³² As for Anselm's seven grades, he finds them reducible to two of the twelve given by Benedict.²³³ Since he pays the most attention to the latter's division, we shall follow his example.

A word must be said first about the text of the article. In citing the twelve degrees proposed by St. Benedict's *Rule*,²³⁴ Thomas evidently did not have the *Rule* itself to refer to, for he gives them in inverse order. His first degree, "Always to display humility in heart and body," is Benedict's twelfth.²³⁵ Yet, he certainly wished to follow the original order and thought he was doing so. He states explicitly that it was the *Rule* which listed the twelve grades,²³⁶ and reverence for the great work would have prevented him from altering it. Moreover, he answers the second objection (that the order of the degrees is obviously inconvenient, since the exterior traits of humility are mentioned before the interior, whereas all virtues naturally proceed from what is interior to what is exterior) with a defense of the order as he gave it, and without calling the integrity of his text into question.

Where did the vitiated text come from? Dom Lambot, in an interesting article in the *Revue Benedictine*,²³⁷ maintains that Thomas had at hand only a copy of the *capitula*. This was a sort of preface prefixed posthumously to the famous treatise *De Humilitate et Superbia*, as an index and aid to the reader in following Bernard when he lists the degrees of pride and

²³¹ *Supra*, note 131.

²³³ Cf. Art. 6, arg. 3 & ad 3.

²³² Cf. Art. 6, ad 4.

²³⁴ Cf. Art. 6, arg. 1.

²³⁵ "Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguuntur duodecim gradus humilitatis, qui in *Regula* beati Benedicti ponuntur: quorum primus est 'corde et corpore semper humilitatem ostendere,' defixis in terram aspectibus."—Art. 6, arg. 1.

²³⁶ Cf. the preceding note.

²³⁷ "L'ordre et le texte des 'degrés d'humilité' dans s. Thomas," XXXIX (1927), 129-135.

notes their inverse correspondence to the traditional twelve degrees of humility. This short preface, still extant but not from the hand of Bernard himself, summarized the chapter on humility in Benedict's *Rule*, retaining the essential wording of each degree. A comparison of it with the list in the article in the *Summa* leaves no doubt, Dom Lambot affirms, as to St. Thomas' source.

How did it happen that Aquinas followed a text in which the order of the degrees was inverted? The answer is not far to seek. The *capitula* consists of two columns, in the first of which the grades of humility are listed (and therefore numbered) *inversely*, so as to correspond with the opposite degrees of pride. Some scribe, ignorant perhaps of the source of the "index," at all events unable to understand the retrograde order in the first column, reversed the numerals or deleted them. Since the *capitula*, according to Lambot, was almost the only part of the *Rule* of St. Benedict known in the Schools, it is probable that St. Thomas found the erroneous version of it in his manuscript of St. Bernard's works, at the head of the treatise *De Humilitate et Superbia*, which he knew and quoted.²³⁸

However that may be, the preposterous list did not foil the Angelic Doctor. For some unaccountable but happy reason, he begins his commentary on it²³⁹ from the twelfth degree of his own text (Benedict's first), thus employing it in its original order. He does not defend the thesis that the degrees represent strictly the soul's development; he observes that the first six grades are interior qualities pertaining in one way or another to humility, the last six its external manifestations. He states expressly that some of the degrees imply acts flowing directly from other virtues, obedience and patience for example, and shows that, though not elicited by humility, they are imperated by it. "As one vice springs from another, so, in the natural order, the act of one virtue proceeds from the act of another."²⁴⁰

²³⁸ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 162, a. 4, arg. 4.

²³⁹ Cf. Art. 6, *corp. init.*

²⁴⁰ " . . . sicut unum vitium oritur ex alio; ita, naturali ordine, actus unius virtutis procedit ex actu alterius."—Art. 6, ad 1.

The whole article is a splendid example of the marvellous Scholastic genius for analysis. In order that the matter under discussion may be completely before the reader's eyes, the twelve grades are first quoted.²⁴¹ Then criticism is leveled against their convenience. Objections are raised against their general arrangement and certain details;²⁴² they are condemned as contradicting the degrees given by Ambrose and Bernard;²⁴³ finally, the possibility of any complete enumeration whatsoever is questioned.²⁴⁴ No *sed contra* is needed, the weight of Benedict's authority itself making up for the omission of the usual argument from authority.

But it is above all at the body of the article that the student marvels. In a few clear, incisive lines, Thomas first sums up his entire doctrine on humility.²⁴⁵

I answer: we must say that, as is clear from what has been said before, humility consists essentially in the appetite, insofar as one restrains the impetuosity of his soul, lest it tend inordinately toward great things. But it has its rule in knowledge, namely, that a man must not esteem himself above what he is. And the principle of each of these elements is the reverence one has toward God. Now from the interior disposition of humility, there proceed certain exterior signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that which is hidden within, as occurs also in the other virtues; for "a man is known by his look, and a wise man by his countenance."²⁴⁶

No better exposition of the very heart and marrow of humility, we firmly believe, has ever been expressed in theological language. Nevertheless, for all its profundity, it is so simply worded that the youngest seminarian can hardly fail to under-

²⁴¹ Arg. 1.

²⁴² Arg. 1, 2.

²⁴³ Arg. 3, 4.

²⁴⁴ Arg. 5.

²⁴⁵ *Ecclus.* 19:26.

²⁴⁶ "Respondeo: dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, humilitas essentialiter in appetitu consistit, secundum quod aliquis refrænat impetum animi sui, ne inordinate tendat in magna; sed regulam habet in cognitione, ut scilicet aliquis non se existimet esse supra id quod est. Et utriusque principium et radix est reverentia quam quis habet ad Deum. Ex interiori autem dispositione humilitatis, procedunt quaedam exteriora signa in verbis et factis et gestibus, quibus id quod interius latet manifestatur, sicut et in ceteris virtutibus accidit: nam 'et visu cognoscitur vir, et ab occursu faciei sensatus,' ut dicitur."

stand it. Yet it is but an introduction to the rest of the article, the groundwork for an analysis of the various inner characteristics and outward manifestations of the virtue. Thomas shows how each of the elements he has mentioned finds its expression in one or more of the twelve degrees. To afford a better view of this exposition, we give it in diagram form. (See Figure I.)

Thus Thomas not only stamps the mark of his approval on Benedict's doctrine; he also shows how that doctrine corresponds to his own. Or rather, in deep humility, he finds the final approval for his own teaching in that of the great monk, analyzing it and handing it down to posterity with a commentary that will make it ever better understood and loved.

These degrees do not mark an advance in humility alone. Because of the connection of the virtues, the presence of the more lofty among them in a soul signifies the presence of great sanctity. Advanced humility especially indicates great charity. This, the verdict of all orthodox spiritual writers,²⁴⁷ is of course the verdict of St. Thomas.

The more humility a man has, the more he loves God and despises his own excellence, and the less he attributes to himself; so, the more charity a man has, the more humility he has, too.²⁴⁸ Whoever is an imitator of childlike innocence, is greater; for the humbler one is, the higher he is, since "he who humbleth himself shall be exalted."^{249, 250}

The degree of humility corresponds to the degree of charity; but why? Because God gives His grace to the humble, answer the sacred writers, the Fathers, the theologians, throughout the

²⁴⁷ Cf., e. g., Garrigou-Lagrange, *Les trois conversions et les trois voies* (Paris, 1933), pp. 134, 135.

²⁴⁸ "Ergo quanto magis habet homo de humilitate, tanto magis diligit Deum, et magis excellentiam sui contemnit, et tanto minus sibi attribuit: sic quanto homo plus habet de charitate, habet etiam magis de humilitate."—*Comment. in Matt.*, Cap. XVIII, n. 1, p. 244a, *post med.*

²⁴⁹ "Quicumque est imitator puerilis innocentiae, hic major est, quia quanto humilior, tanto altior: quia 'qui se humiliat, exaltabitur.'"—*Ibid.*

²⁵⁰ *Luke*, xiv, 11.

FIGURE I

In the twelve degrees of humility there are found things pertaining:

The Twelve Degrees of St. Benedict

<div> <div>1) to the <i>root and source</i> of humility:</div> <div>2) to the <i>appetite</i>, lest it tend inordinately to its own excellence:</div> <div>3) to the <i>thoughts</i> which make a man recognize his own deficiencies:</div> <div>4) to the <i>exterior signs</i> of humility; of which.....</div> </div>	<div>namely, the fear of God—(12)</div> <div>that a man follow not his own will — (11)</div> <div>that he regulate his will according to the decision of some superior —(10)</div> <div>that he desist not from this because of the difficulties he meets with—(9)</div> <div>that he recognize and confess his own defects —(8)</div> <div>that from a consideration of his defects he consider himself incapable of greater things — (7)</div> <div>that in regard to this he prefer others to himself —(6)</div> <div>one is in deeds—that a man depart not from the common usages of those with whom he lives —(5)</div> <div>two are in words— <div>that a man interrupt not while another is speaking —(4)</div> <div>that he exceed not due measure in speaking —(2)</div> </div> <div>two are in gestures, etc.— <div>in repressing the lifting up of the eyes —(1)</div> <div>in repressing signs of unreasonable mirth —(3)</div> </div>
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early centuries; but their explanations of the latter statement are sketchy and unsatisfying. St. Thomas is clear and complete.

First, why are love of God and lowliness of heart so closely connected? To explain this, the Angelic Doctor has recourse to the opposition of pride and charity; and when he shows that these two are directly contrary, we understand the close bond of love and humility. After the words cited in the paragraph above, "the humbler one is, the higher he is," he continues:

But this can be called into question, since it does not seem to be true, because perfection consists in charity, and only where there is greater charity is there greater perfection. It must be said [in answer] that humility necessarily accompanies charity. And you can see this if you consider who the humble man is. For whereas there are two things in pride, inordinate affection and an inordinate esteem of self, the contrary is true of humility, since it does not consider its own excellence. Likewise, it does not deem itself worthy. This follows necessarily on charity. For *everyone seeks that excellence which he loves*. Therefore, the more a man has of humility [*lege* "charity"?], the more he loves God, and despises his own excellence, and attributes less to himself. Thus, the more a man has of charity, the more he has of humility."²⁵¹

Humility is so intimate with charity because, in the humble, love of God has excluded love of self, and an appreciation of God's excellence has excluded an over-appreciation of man's excellence. This reasoning is expressed more clearly in another passage.

²⁵¹ "Sed potest esse quaestio: videtur enim quod hoc non sit verum, quia perfectio est in charitate; ergo ubi major charitas, ibi major perfectio.—Dicendum, quod charitatem necessario comitatur humilitas. Et potestis hoc videre si consideretis quis sit humilis. Sicut enim in superbia sunt duo, affectus inordinatus et aestimatio inordinata de se; ita e contrario in humilitate, quia propriam excellentiam non considerat. Item non reputat se dignum. Istud de necessitate sequitur ad charitatem. Omnis homo cupit excellentiam quam diligit. Ergo quanto magis habet homo de humilitate, tanto magis diligit Deum, et magis excellentiam sui contemnit, et tanto minus sibi attribuit: sic quanto homo plus habet de charitate, habet etiam magis de humilitate."—*Comment. in Matt., loc. cit.* St. Thomas' reasoning seems to demand that the last sentence read, "Ergo quanto magis habet homo de charitate . . ." instead of ". . . de humilitate." It is an error that might easily have been made by some medieval copyist, even by Thomas himself.

Charity dispels inordinate passion in three ways. First in regard to pride, which is an inordinate appetite for one's own excellence. For one seeks his own excellence inordinately when it is not enough for him to be contained in the grade given to him by God. And therefore it is said, "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God."²⁵² Which indeed happens when he is unwilling to be contained under the rule of the divine ordination. And this is repugnant to charity, by which one loves God above all.²⁵³

Charity is opposed to pride as directly as love of God is opposed to love of self; and humility is as intimate with charity as subjection to God is with love of Him. As we have seen, a creature's perfection consists in its subjection to its superior; the perfection of man's love for God therefore consists in subjection to Him—which is humility.

A simple phrase in the text quoted above from the commentary on Matthew's Gospel provides a clue to the philosophical solution of the question. *Everyone seeks that excellence which he loves.* Love God, and you will seek Him. Love self, and you will seek yourself. The reason, then, for the close relationship of lowliness of heart and charity is the radication of all passions and affections in love. We desire and hope for and delight in only what we love. Charity is love of God.²⁵⁴ If love is right, appetite will be right, and reasonable appetite of one's own excellence is humility. In a word, if love is ordinate, the hope it enkindles will be ordinate.

In the *Summa*, the Angelic Doctor assigns the reason for the intimacy of the two virtues from a theological viewpoint. Humility increases as filial fear of God increases, for, as will be seen in the next chapter, it depends on that fear for its very

²⁵² *Ecclus.*, x, 14.

²⁵³ "... charitas repellit inordinatam passionem, quantum ad tria. Primo quidem quantum ad superbiam, quae est inordinatus appetitus propriae excellentiae. Tunc autem inordinate suam excellentiam quis appetit, quando non sufficit ei contineri in eo gradu, qui sibi est a Deo praestitus. Et ideo dicitur Eccl., 10: 'Initium superbiae hominis, apostatare a Deo.' Quod quidem fit, dum homo non vult contineri sub regula ordinationis divinae. Et hoc repugnat charitati, qua quis super omnia Deum diligit." *Comment. in 1 Cor.*, Cap. XIII, Lect. II (vv. 4, 5), p. 364b *ante med.*

²⁵⁴ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 25, aa. 1, 2.

being. But filial fear grows only as charity does—hence the direct proportion in the augmentation of the latter and of humility.

It is necessary that filial fear, by which one dreads to offend God or be separated from him, increase with the increase of charity, as every effect increases with the increase of its cause; for the more one person loves another, the more he fears to offend him and to be separated from him.²⁵⁵

This receives its final clarification from Thomas' answer to a second question: Exactly why is humility so strong a magnet of God's love? *Because it removes the greatest obstacle of that love, which is pride*—here is the answer in a word. But it resolves itself back to humility's subjection: God's love is ever going out to the soul; the more the soul is subjected to Him by humility, as ripening wheat to the sun by the withdrawal of clouds from the sky, the more it receives the warm beams of His love, the more it matures in grace and charity.

Christ commended humility especially, because it most of all removes pride, the impediment to man's salvation—which salvation consists in this, that a man tend to things heavenly and spiritual; from which he is impeded while he spends his energies in becoming magnified in earthly things. And therefore the Lord, to remove this impediment of salvation, showed by the example of His humility that outward excellence is to be despised. Thus humility is as it were a disposition to the free access of man to spiritual and divine goods.²⁵⁶

In this lies the grandeur of humility. To go back to the lan-

²⁵⁵ "Timor autem filialis necesse est quod crescat, crescente charitate, sicut effectus crescit crescente causa: quanto enim aliquis magis diligit aliquem, tanto magis timet eum offendere et ab eo separari."—*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 10, corp.

²⁵⁶ "Ideo Christus praecepit nobis humilitatem commendavit, quia per hoc maxime removetur impedimentum humanae salutis: quae consistit in hoc quod homo ad caelestia et spiritualia tendat; a quibus homo impeditur dum in terrenis magnificari studet. Et ideo Dominus, ut impedimentum salutis auferret, exteriorem celsitudinem contemnendam monstravit per humilitatis exempla. Et sic humilitas est quasi quaedam dispositio ad liberum accessum hominis in spiritualia et divina bona." Art. 5, ad 4.

guage of St. Bernard and adopt his favorite metaphor of the spiritual marriage, humility assures the immediate flooding of the soul with grace because it opens it to the generative action of the divine Spouse, Whose burning desire is to beget in it the perfect image of Himself. "Super quem requiescet spiritus meus nisi super quietum et humilem?"²⁵⁷

Here the true function of humility with regard to other virtues is explained. It is that which removes from the soul the greatest obstacle to the infusion and increase of the virtues: pride. Its worth is the worth of a *removens prohibens*, no more, no less. It is in this sense that humility is the foundation of all the virtues, and that which conserves them in being. This is the explanation of the terminology used by the Fathers in eulogizing lowliness of heart; this is the necessary qualification with which their praises are to be conditioned.

As the ordered assemblage of the virtues is compared by a certain metaphor to a building, so likewise that which is first in acquiring the virtues is compared to a foundation, which is the first thing laid in the work of construction. Now the virtues are truly infused by God. Hence the first in the acquisition of the virtues can be understood in two ways.

In one way, after the manner of a *removens prohibens*. And in this way, humility holds first place, inasmuch as it expels pride, which God resists, and renders man subject and always wide open to the inpouring of divine grace, inasmuch as it empties out the swelling of pride. . . . And according to this, humility is called the foundation of the spiritual edifice.

In another way, something is first among the virtues directly: namely, that by which one approaches to God. Now the first approach to God is by faith, according to that of Hebrews: "He that cometh to God, must believe."²⁵⁸ And according to this, faith is placed as a foundation in a nobler way than humility.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁷ *Isa*, lxvi, 2, according to the version at times followed by St. Thomas. Cf., however, *infra*, note 266.

²⁵⁸ *Heb.*, xi, 6.

²⁵⁹ "Sicut ordinata virtutum congregatio per quamdam similitudinem aedificio comparatur; ita etiam illud quod est primum in acquisitione virtutum, fundamento comparatur, quod primum in aedificio jacitur. Virtutes autem vere infunduntur a Deo. Unde primum in acquisitione virtutum potest accipi dupliciter.—Uno modo,

Thus St. Thomas gives us an exact description of the role of humility in the spiritual life. Three simple phrases sum up his doctrine: *removens prohibens; esse subditum; esse patulum ad suscipiendum influxum divinae gratiae*. And fundamentally they are one. The friendship with God which we call charity of its very nature implies humble subjection: it is a friendship of master and slave, of Creator and creature.

X. HUMILITY AND THE GIFT OF FEAR

So far all our study has done nothing more than clarify the notion of humility, of its grandeur and beauty, of its rank and station among the other virtues. It is time that we look to see if the virtue is enough of itself to fight man's battle against pride; if the irascible appetite is perfected sufficiently by it to ascend to the fearful elevation of man's divinely allotted place in the universe and not attempt one single step beyond; or if lowliness of heart alone would fail miserably in the face of man's supernatural end.

If he were left to himself, man under God's ordinary promotion and concurrence could arrive safely at his natural goal. His intellect and will, strengthened by the virtues, would assure his ultimate perfection. But he has been lifted up above himself and orientated toward an end infinitely higher. The natural virtues are no longer sufficient, so supernatural ones have been given to him.

And although this second perfection is greater than the first, yet the first is held in a more perfect manner by man than the second; for the first is held by man as a complete possession, but the second as an imperfect one, since we know and love God (by the super-

per modum removentis prohibens. Et sic, humilitas primum locum tenet: inquantum scilicet expellit superbiam, cui Deus resistit, et praebeat hominem subditum, et semper patulum ad suscipiendum influxum divinae gratiae, inquantum evacuat inflationem superbiae. . . . Et, secundum hoc, humilitas dicitur spiritualis aedificii fundamentum.—Alio modo est aliquid primum in virtutibus, directe: per quod scilicet jam ad Deum acceditur. Primus autem accessus ad Deum est per fidem; secundum illud Hebr.: 'Credere oportet accedentem ad Deum.' Et, secundum hoc, fides ponitur fundamentum nobiliori modo quam humilitas."—Art. 5, ad 2.

natural virtues) imperfectly. . . . Now that which possesses a nature or form only imperfectly, cannot operate by itself, unless it be moved by something else. . . . Consequently man can operate by the judgment of reason with regard to things that are subject to human reason, namely in face of the end connatural to him. . . . But in face of his ultimate supernatural end, toward which reason moves according as it is somewhat and imperfectly informed by the theological virtues, the movement of reason does not suffice, unless there is present from above the instinct and motion of the Holy Spirit.²⁶⁰

Hence the insufficiency of the supernatural virtues alone for salvation, and the utter need for aid from God Himself, which we call the Gifts, and attribute to the Holy Ghost. Instead of preparing the soul for the successful and prompt action of reason as the virtues do, they prepare it for the action of Divinity: for prompt, easy movement under the inspiration of God. "As the appetites of man are made obedient, easily subordinate to reason by the moral virtues, so the whole man is made obedient, easily subordinate, readily moved by the Holy Ghost through the gifts."²⁶¹

They are principles of action, habits, as the virtues are; but they operate in a way not human but divine, making man resemble the angels in their immediate application of principle to act, without the laborious steps of ratiocination, deduction, and inference: making the intellect pierce swiftly, instantly to the heart of truth, the will penetrate without hesitation to the highest good.

²⁶⁰ "Et quamvis haec secunda perfectio sit major quam prima, tamen prima perfectio perfectiori modo habetur ab homine quam secunda: nam prima habetur ab homine, quasi plena possessio; secunda autem, quasi imperfecta: imperfecte enim diligimus et cognoscimus. . . . Sed id quod imperfecte habet naturam aliquam, vel formam, aut virtutem, non potest per se operari, nisi ab altero moveatur. . . . Sic igitur, quantum ad ea quae subsunt humanae rationi, in ordine scilicet ad finem connaturalem homini, homo potest operari per iudicium rationis. . . . Sed, in ordine ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio movet secundum quod est aliquantulum et imperfecte informata per virtutes theologicas: non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit instinctus et motio Spiritus Sancti." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 68, a. 2, corp.

²⁶¹ Farrell, *op. cit.*, II, p. 241.

The astonishing beauty of this whole action of the Holy Ghost in us is not the marvel of divine action—we have long known the infinite possibilities of God; it is the fact that these actions are ours. The mode of acting is God's, the very possibility of the action comes from God, but it is our reason that intuitively penetrates, judges, counsels; it is our action that plunges instantly to the heart and perfection of good. That vital assimilation of truth and goodness can come from no other but ourselves.²⁶²

Having seen briefly the perfection of the Gifts, we return to the imperfection of the virtues, and with them, of humility. The question asked above is answered. Humility, even supernatural humility, is insufficient alone. That the irascible appetite may be kept to the appetite of ordinate excellence, it must be perfected by another habit, a gift of God which will dispose it and the whole man to submit to Him promptly and easily when He moves man to abandon all quest for excellence save in Himself.

Which of the seven Gifts can this be? St. Thomas repeats the answer of St. Augustine.

The principal reason for repressing the presumption of hope is found in reverence for God, which makes man attribute to himself no more than what belongs to him according to the rank he has been allotted by God. Hence humility seems to imply principally the subjection of man to God. And because of this, Augustine attributes humility, which he understands by poverty of spirit, to the gift of fear,²⁶³ by which man reveres God.²⁶⁴

According to the Angelic Doctor, then, acts of humility spring not only from the will operating through the virtue but also from the will operating under the Holy Ghost through His Gift of Fear. For Thomas, the divine Spirit is the *Spirit of*

²⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 242-243.

²⁶³ *De sermone Domini in monte*, Lib. I, Cap. IV (n. 11). M L 34, 1234.

²⁶⁴ "Sed in reprimendo praesumptionem spei, ratio praecipua sumitur ex reverentia divina, ex quo contingit ut homo non plus sibi attribuat quam sibi competat secundum gradum quem est a Deo sortitus. Unde humilitas praecipue videtur importare subjectionem hominis ad Deum. Et propter hoc Augustinus humilitatem, quam intelligit per paupertatem spiritus, attribuit dono timoris, quo homo Deum reveretur." Art. 2, ad 3.

Humility, changing proud men into little children and dwelling in their breast.²⁶⁵ The poor of spirit are the humble, who are poor or lowly of heart by their own will *and* by the operation of the Spirit, because "humility gives the Holy Ghost," Who favors the poor *and the fearful*.²⁶⁶ Isaias, says Aquinas, mentioned specially and separately that Christ was filled with the spirit of Fear, lest men should think Him puffed up with pride over the greatness of the other Gifts.²⁶⁷ "Fear excludes the principle of pride, wherefore it is given against pride. Nor does it follow from this that it is identical with the virtue of humility, *but that it is the latter's principle*."²⁶⁸

These citations not only show that it is Fear which corresponds to humility, but also give some notion of the nature of the Gift itself. It is a supernatural habit of the rational appetite making man easily movable by the Holy Ghost, to the end that he may reverence God and dread separation from Him by sin.²⁶⁹ It is not servile, but filial or chaste fear, since the very purpose of a Gift is to make man easily movable by the Spirit.

But in order that a thing be easily movable by a mover, it is re-

²⁶⁵ Cf. *Comment. in Matt.*, Cap. XVIII, n. 1, p. 243b *prop. fin.*: "Et advocans Jesus parvulum" . . . per parvulum intelligitur Spiritus Sanctus, qui facit parvulos, quia est spiritus humilitatis. 'Ponam spiritum meum in medio vestri.' (*Ezechiel*, xxxvi, 27.) "

²⁶⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, Cap. V, n. 2 (v. 3), p. 72a *fin.*: "Ergo 'beati pauperes,' scilicet hi, qui parum habent de spiritu superbiae. Vel accipitur spiritus pro voluntate hominis. Quidam enim sunt necessitate humiles, et isti non sunt beati, sed qui humilitatem affectant. Tertio accipitur pro Spiritu Sancto; unde 'Beati pauperes spiritu,' qui humiles sunt per Spiritum Sanctum. Et istae duae quasi ad idem redeunt. Et dicit, 'pauperes spiritu,' quia humilitas dat Spiritum Sanctum: 'Ad quem respiciam nisi ad pauperulum, et contritum spiritu, et trementem sermones meos?' (*Isaias* lxvi, 2.) "

²⁶⁷ Cf. *Comment. in Isa.*, Cap. XI, p. 475 B, *ante fin.* (in the Parma edition: "Et replebit eum spiritus timoris Domini." (*Isa.*, xi, 3.) . . . Dicitur autem specialiter, quod replevit eum spiritus timoris, ne ex magnitudine donorum superbus credatur, sicut primus angelus."

²⁶⁸ "Timor excludit principium superbiae, propter quod datur contra superbiam. Nec tamen sequitur quod sit idem cum virtute humilitatis; sed quod sit principium ejus."—*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 9, ad 4.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, corp.

quired first of all *that it be subject to that mover*, not opposed to it; for the opposition of a movable thing to its mover hinders motion. But filial or chaste fear accomplishes this (subjection to God), inasmuch as by it we revere God, and refuse to withdraw ourselves from Him.²⁷⁰

So the Gift to which humility corresponds is the awe of the child of God for his Father. Inasmuch as all fear is a shrinking from some evil, it flees from the evil of offending God because He is so immeasurably good to men, and from the evil of separation from Him. It reveres rather than trembles, being less selfish than the servile fear which dreads the loss of God because He is one's own good. It seeks intimacy rather than separation, as the lover seeks the caress of his beloved, in awe of her goodness and beauty.

This is the Fear which—so far as it corresponds to humility—is the divine habit perfecting the soul in its élan to the excellent, setting up in the will a permanent disposition to acts of perfect self-restraint in the face of arduous good, acts here and now beyond the possibility of moral virtue, but easily accomplished under the motion of the Holy Ghost.

Precisely what are the relations between Fear and humility? First, in general, Fear is the *principle* of humility, presenting to it its formal motive. This is evident from the nature of pride, which seeks excellence inordinately, and rebels against subjection to God. Such rebellion is directly opposed to filial fear, which of its essence reveres God. Thus, Fear excludes the very principle of pride; as St. Gregory puts it, it is *the Spirit's gift given against pride*.²⁷¹

Nor does it follow from this that it is identical with the virtue of humility, but that it is the latter's principle. For the gifts of the Holy Ghost are the principles of the intellectual and moral virtues.²⁷²

²⁷⁰ "Ad hoc autem quod aliquid sit bene mobile ab aliquo movente, primo requiritur ut sit ei subjectum, non repugnans: quia ex repugnantia mobilis ad movens impeditur motus. Hoc autem facit timor filialis vel castus, in quantum per ipsum Deum reveremur, et refugimus nos ipsi subducere."—*Ibid.*, corp.

²⁷² *Moralia*, II, Cap. XLIX (n. 77). ML 75, 592 D-593 A.

²⁷³ "Nec tamen sequitur quod sit idem cum virtute humilitatis; sed quod sit

How Fear is the principle of humility, giving it its formal motive, namely reverential awe and therefore subjection to God, is explained by Thomas profoundly and beautifully.

Since it pertains to filial fear to show God reverence and to be subject to Him, that which follows upon this subjection pertains to the gift of fear. Now from the fact that one subjects himself to God, he ceases seeking to be magnified in himself or anyone else except in God. And therefore from the fact that one fears God perfectly, it follows that one does not seek to be magnified in himself by pride, and that one does not seek to be magnified in exterior goods, namely honors and riches.²⁷³

This is the reason why in his treatise on humility Thomas insists over and over on the importance of the element of reverence and subjection. Such an attitude toward God results in reasonable repression of the irascible appetite, which is the formal object of humility.

Though not identical, the Gift and the virtue are alike in many respects. Both regard reverence for God. Both repress the irascible appetite. That they nevertheless differ widely is seen from their different fields of activity,²⁷⁴ and especially from their distinct formal objects.

The gift of fear is distinguished from humility, granted the two are very similar, because even though humility proceeds from subjection and reverence for God to refrain the passions of daring, and presumption and pride . . . yet formally and directly, humility does not produce the reverence and motion of flight which fear elicits; but from its participation of fear humility represses and moderates

principium ejus. Dona enim Spiritus Sancti sunt principia virtutum intellectualium et moralium."—*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 9, ad 4.

²⁷³ "Cum enim ad timorem filialem pertineat Deo reverentiam exhibere et ei subditum esse: id quod ex hujusmodi subjectione consequitur pertinet ad donum timoris. Ex hoc autem quod aliquis Deo se subicit, desinit quaerere in seipso vel in aliquo alio magnificari nisi in Deo. Hoc enim repugnaret perfectae subjectioni ad Deum. . . . Et ideo ex hoc quod aliquis perfecte timet Deum, consequens est quod non quaerat magnificari in seipso per superbiam, neque etiam quaerat magnificari in exterioribus bonis, sc., honoribus et divitiis. . . ."—*Ibid.*, art. 12, corp.

²⁷⁴ The field of the Gift is far wider than that of the virtue, for the former corresponds not only to humility but to temperance and all its potential parts, as well as to theological hope:

presumptuous hope, lest one presume too greatly on himself; and thus humility directly modifies passion, namely the passion of hope. . . . But the fear which is a gift does not modify passion directly, but is concerned with God by way of reverence, falling back into itself from the greatness of His excellence.²⁷⁵

We might simplify and summarize this by saying that whereas reverence for God is the formal motive of humility, it is the formal object of Fear.

Looking at the correspondence of the Gift and virtue more in particular, we see that humility does not correspond to Fear directly, but only indirectly, as temperance does. In itself, Fear is concerned with God, being unwilling to offend Him. It corresponds directly therefore to theological hope, for it dreads to withdraw itself from the help man hopes to have by God's goodness. "And hence filial fear and hope cling together and mutually perfect each other."²⁷⁶ But secondarily and indirectly, Fear is concerned with all the things that one must flee to avoid sin, among which are the pleasures and desires moderated by temperance, to preserve which man needs indeed the very strongest motives of fear.²⁷⁷ Hence the matter of the Gift of Fear as it regards temperance is every motion of the soul, sensible or suprasensible, that needs checking and curbing.

And this is evident, since fear has of itself the most universal of motives, namely in all things to subject itself to God and to have

²⁷⁵ "Et distinguitur (donum timoris) etiam ab humilitate, licet valde similis sit, quia etsi humilitas procedat ad refraenandum passiones audaciae, et praesumptionem, et superbiam ex subiectione, et reverentia ad Deum . . . tamen formaliter, et directe humilitas non facit ipsam reverentiam, et motum fugae, quem elicit timor, sed ex illius participatione humilitas reprimit, et moderatur spem praesumptivam, ne aliquis de se nimis magnifice praesumat, et sic directe moderatur passionem humilitas, scil., motum spei. Timor autem qui est donum non moderatur directe passiones, sed circa Deum versatur per modum reverentiae, resiliens in se a magnitudine eminentiae illius."—John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, Tome VI (in I-II), Disput. XVIII, Art. VI, n. 48.

²⁷⁶ "Et ideo timor filialis et spes sibi invicem cohaerunt, et se invicem perficiunt."—*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 9, ad 1.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 141, a. 1, ad 3.

reverence for Him; wherefore it can embrace any matter that calls upon the soul for repression, that the passions may be refrained. And all this is the matter of temperance, either in its principal matter . . . or in the other adjoined (matters) that are less principal, as in moderating anger, daring, hope, presumption, etc.²⁷⁸

We see that the correspondence of Fear to humility is indirect, being of the same type as its correspondence to the cardinal virtue of temperance.

The nature of the latter relation will be understood better if the relations of Fear to theological hope, and indeed to all the virtues, are investigated in contrast to its relations with temperance. Fear corresponds to *hope* by reason of the object it reveres and to Whom it subjects itself; and thanks to this subjection it represses the presumption opposed to hope. It can correspond to *every virtue* inasmuch as it avoids and flees any offense of God whatsoever. But it corresponds to *temperance* because of the effects which it, Fear, produces in the soul, just as all fear does. Temperance directly represses pleasure, which dilates and expands heart and soul; but Fear represses pleasure indirectly, by contracting and shrinking the soul, as the experience of daily life bears witness, and thus keeps the soul from the exuberation and overabundance of desire and delectation.²⁷⁹

And it is not only these two passions, the ones more directly connected with the sense of touch, that are chilled by Fear, nor the accompanying emotions of the will. Hope in both the inferior and superior appetites receives a severe check, too; and hence the appetite for excellence is well presided over by the Gift of Fear.²⁸⁰ Because its motivating principle, the divine Spirit, is loftier and infinitely stronger than the human prin-

²⁷⁸ "Et hoc patet, quia timor habet de se universalissimum motivum, sc. in omnibus se Deo subicere, et reverentiam ad eum habere; ergo omnem materiam complecti potest, quae restrictione animi indiget, ut passiones refrenentur. Et haec sunt omnis materia temperantiae, sive in materia principali . . . sive in aliis adjunctis, quae sunt minus principales, ut in moderanda ira, audacia, spe, praesumptione, etc. . . ." John of St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*, n. 40.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, nn. 52-53. Cf. n. 51.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

ciples, the reason and will, which employ the virtue of humility, the Gift enables man to act as a rational creature raised to divine sonship where, left to himself, he would inevitably fall into sin.

One thing more should be remarked. Though the correspondence of the Gift to humility is indirect, it is, so to say, more direct even in its indirectness than its correspondence to temperance. As Thomas says,

the inordinate magnifying of man either in himself or in other things [which is contrary both to humility and to the Gift] is more directly opposed to subjection to God, which filial fear produces, than extrinsic delectation. This is, however, opposed to fear *ex consequenti*; since he who reveres God and is subject to him, does not delight in things other than God.²⁸¹

In the case of the former, Fear is repressing what is directly opposed to it and what is in the same part of the appetite, the irascible; in the case of the latter, it is repressing pleasure and desire, which oppose it only *ex consequenti*.

To sum up, Fear corresponds to humility because it has the power, under the inspiration of the Giver of all gifts, to produce the same acts that humility produces; but it will succeed in circumstances where humility would fall short. Fear, with its roots in faith, hope, and charity,²⁸² and guided especially by Wisdom²⁸³—Fear, moved by the thought of man's infinite

²⁸¹ "Directius opponitur subiectioni ad Deum, quam facit timor filialis, indebita magnificatio hominis vel in seipso vel in aliis rebus, quam delectatio extranea. Quae tamen opponitur timori, ex consequenti: quia qui Deum reveretur et ei subicitur, non delectatur in aliis a Deo." *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 12, ad 2.

²⁸² Cf. *ibid.*, a. 9, ad 4; I-II, q. 68, a. 4, ad 3. Filial fear is founded on charity because of its very nature it presupposes love, and on hope because it would not fear to be separated from God unless it could hope that it would one day receive the full union with God of which its earthly union is but the seed and the beginning. As for faith, it is the cause of filial fear, "quo quis timet separari a Deo, vel quo quis refugit se Deo comparare, reverendo ipsum: inquantum, per fidem, hanc existimationem habemus de Deo, quod sit quoddam immensum et altissimum bonum, a quo separari est pessimum, et cui velle aequari est malum. . . . [Timoris] filialis est causa fides formata, quae per caritatem facit hominem Deo adhaerere et ei subjici."—*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 7, a. 1, corp.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 68, a. 4, ad 5.

distance from God²⁸⁴ and of His divine excellence,²⁸⁵ moved no less by love for Him²⁸⁶ than by horror of offending Him²⁸⁷—Fear, thus motivated, turns from all that can separate the soul from Him, from all that, in other words, can destroy its subjection to Him. Therefore it flies from every inordinate seeking of excellence, this being directly contrary to the subjection it wills to preserve.²⁸⁸

From this Fear, then, flows constantly the motive for humility,²⁸⁹ namely, reverence for God; and when man under the influence of this motive produces any act of humility, this act is one of the Fruits of the Spirit, attributed to Him as the giver of actual grace.²⁹⁰ But when an act of humility is of the utmost perfection, produced under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit by the Gift of Fear, it corresponds to the first Beatitude, that of poverty.

From the fact that a man fears God *perfectly*, it follows that he does not seek to be magnified in himself by pride, and that he does not seek to be magnified in exterior things, namely honors and riches, both of which things pertain to poverty of spirit, inasmuch as poverty of spirit can be understood either as the emptying out of a swollen and haughty spirit, as Augustine expounds it,²⁹¹ or also as the abandonment of temporal things, which is accomplished by the Spirit—that is, by one's own will through the instinct of the Holy Spirit, as Ambrose²⁹² and Jerome²⁹³ expound it.²⁹⁴

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 11, ad 3.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 68, a. 4, ad 5.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 2, ad 3.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, corp.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, art. 12 corp.

²⁸⁹ What was said about Fear in the last paragraph is the ultimate analysis and final explanation of the formal motive of humility.

²⁹⁰ Gal. 5:23. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 70, aa. 1, 2. It is to be noted that this Fruit is probably not the "modesty" mentioned by St. Paul (Gal. v, 23), "which observes moderation, in all words and deeds," as St. Thomas says. (*Ibid.*, art. 3, corp. ante fin.) Nor is it necessary to attempt to find some other of the twelve that will correspond to it. The Pauline list is not intended to be complete; "*potuissent vel plures, vel etiam pauciores fructus enumerari*" (*ibid.*, ad 4); to complete it, one would have to name the acts of all the infused moral virtues.

²⁹¹ *De sermone Domini in monte*, I, Chap. IV (n. 11). ML 34, 1234.

²⁹² *Expositio Evang. sec. Luc.*, V, n. 50 (in 6:20). ML 15, 1650 A.

²⁹³ *Comment. in Evang. Matt.*, I (in 5:3). ML 26, 34 A.

²⁹⁴ "Et ideo ex hoc quod aliquis perfecte timet Deum, consequens est quod non

XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

What has been said of the tract on humility in the *Summa* should enable the reader to realize how perfectly St. Thomas coordinated and developed the traditional doctrine passed down to him. In the six-article Question, there is enough thought to make a Cajetan smack the lips of his intellect, enough spiritual dynamite to rid Washington of most of its Congressmen. Fortunately, we do not have to go outside the text for its most perfect résumé. The recapitulation at the beginning of Article VI renders any other attempt superfluous.

Humility consists essentially in the appetite, insofar as one restrains the impetuosity of his soul, lest it tend inordinately toward great things. But it has its rule in knowledge, namely, that a man must not esteem himself above what he is. And the principle of each of these elements is the reverence one has toward God. Now from the interior disposition of humility there proceed certain external signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that which is hidden within.²⁹⁵

It would be a fine thing to end this study with these last words ringing in our ears, and the memories of a knotted trail laboriously followed. But gratitude prompts us first to discharge a debt that the world owes St. Thomas, and to the present has left unpaid: the duty of forming an estimate of his personal contribution to the traditional doctrine of his age.

To try to pay the obligation in full would be a stupendous undertaking, like discharging war debts. It would be necessary to study the works of every prominent Christian theologian from the first century to the thirteenth, and dig into the dustiest parts of the universities of Europe. World circum-

quaerat magnificari in seipso per superbiam, neque etiam quaerat magnificari in exterioribus bonis, scilicet honoribus et divitiis, quorum utrumque pertinet ad paupertatem spiritus, secundum quod paupertas spiritus intelligi potest vel exinanitio inflati et superbi spiritus, ut Augustinus exponit, vel etiam abjectio temporalium rerum, quae fit spiritu, id est, propria voluntate, per instinctum Spiritus Sancti, ut Ambrosius et Hieronymus exponunt."—*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 12, corp.

²⁹⁵ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 161, a. 6.

stances have made this impossible, of course, but it is still within our power to take the first steps: to list the greatest writer-saints of the Western Church; to select those who seem to have treated more fully than others of humility; and to compare their doctrine with that of Aquinas.

Such a study should give us a rough idea of how much of the latter's teaching is traditional, how much the fruit of his own genius. But when, in the following paragraphs, the statement is made that this or that point is peculiar to one of the writers studied, or that some clarification was not known before his time, there is no intention of giving him credit individually. Probably he has merely restated the conclusion of his contemporaries. The fine synthesis given us by the Angelic Doctor, for instance, may well have been conceived in his mind alone; on the other hand, it may be only a repetition, in his own words and style, of what was common teaching in his day. Our lack of knowledge, however, demands that we call it the "doctrine of St. Thomas"; and the same is to be said for the others. Careful study indicates that the works of Augustine, Cassian, Benedict, Gregory the Great, and Bernard of Clairvaux are best suited for our purpose.

Common to them and to all Christian writers is the doctrine that humility is something virtuous when it submits the soul reasonably to God and other men; that it is morally evil, and in fact the worst type of pride, when it is the fawning exterior of hypocrisy. But no attempt was made to define humility precisely, and thus distinguish it from closely allied virtues, till Bernard's birth foreshadowed the Scholastic age. The bad effects of this vagueness are seen in the not infrequent confusion by early writers of humility and fear, compunction and justice, even of humility and charity. Bernard defined humility as the virtue by which a man, truthfully acknowledging what he is, becomes in his own eyes worthless. Briefly, it is contempt of self. Unfortunately, this definition is not universally applicable, since the ordinary beginner in the spiritual life is incapable of much self-contempt. Nor is it complete, for it

confines itself to the intellectual element. Thomas alone has given us a formula that differentiates humility from all else, especially from justice, from which it is specifically distinct only by reason of its formal motive, reverence for God.

As to the part of the soul in which the virtue inheres, Augustine is unclear, Gregory entirely unconcerned. Cassian and Bernard attribute it to the reason. Thomas denies this, because humility's function is evidently to control the *élan* of the appetite; he shows that it is subjected principally in the will *qua* irascible. But the error of Cassian and Bernard discloses the common doctrine of all—the indispensability of self-knowledge for lowliness of heart. Augustine insisted on this more than on any other element, while Gregory and Bernard preferred to dwell upon the contempt of self that should characterize those advanced in love of God.

The mysterious link between humility and grace led the early theologians to attribute to the former a sort of secondary function in the active seeking of the perfection of charity. Principally the virtue fights against pride, but, that danger once avoided, it advances ever higher in the love of God. Bernard expressed himself in similar language, though he also attributed the quest for perfect sanctity to what he termed magnanimity. Thomas, too, saw as an utterly necessary second act of humility the encouraging of souls inclined to despair of their power and ability, to live up to the gifts with which God endowed them.

Such precision is due to Aquinas' understanding of the essential act of the virtue. It is not self-knowledge, nor self-subjection, nor self-contempt, but hope kept reasonable out of reverence for God: the ordinate appetite of one's own excellence. It is, then, not a "passive" but an "active" virtue. Hope is an *élan* of the soul toward a goal difficult to achieve; and, controlled or running wild, an *élan* is still an *élan*. The nature of pride, too, clarified for Thomas this aspect of humility; for pride is above all else *motion toward* what is above one's allotted place.

He paints more precisely, too, that aspect of humility which,

because of its subjection to God and reverence for Him, despises all earthly greatness; for he shows that this scorn is not a blind, unreasoning thing, but an *ordered* contempt, even an ordered love. What is earthly is to be looked down upon only insofar as it is or can be a threat to one's subordination to God; inasmuch as it is a help to salvation, it merits our love as the created exemplar of a divine Idea.

Augustine in his *De Virginitate*, Cassian in his *Conferences*, Gregory in his *Homilies*, Bernard in his sermons and especially in his treatise *De Humilitate et Superbia*, had said much about the extent of humility, showing how the Christian must be subject not only to God but also to his every neighbor. But Thomas in a few words reduced their examples and long discussions to principle: Humility subjects itself to God and to all there is of God in others. His application of this principle made immediately clear what was perhaps never clear before: that to deem oneself the worst of all men and the greatest sinner is not of precept, but of counsel.

It is needless to say that the reduction of humility to the cardinal virtue of temperance, as a species of moderation, is proper to St. Thomas. Indeed, there had been no previous attempt to correlate humility to the other virtues; Gregory had made the only progress by showing (and that merely by inference) that humility is outside and beyond the moral virtues, as pride is outside and beyond the capital sins or vices, as their "mother" and "queen." Perhaps the notion of humility would be clearer in the minds of the Catholic laity today if theologians and ascetical writers insisted on it more as a restriction of the élan of the appetite to the limits of reason than as a quality entailing the lowering of the eyes and external submission.

As there seems to have been no progress in the categorization of humility, so there seems to have been none until after Bernard in the explanation of the lofty titles of humility and in the determination of its rank among the virtues. Thomas alone explains adequately the titles of foundation, of root and strengthener of the other virtues; he alone assigns it a definite

place, under justice but above the remaining moral virtues, even above religion, fortitude, and temperance. He alone enunciates the basic reason why humility plays such an important role in the spiritual life: because it is the destroyer of pride, the greatest obstacle to grace, therefore the opener of the soul to the inflow of divine love, therefore the *sine qua non* of the other virtues. It was Thomas alone, too, who finally clarified the relation of humility to justice, with which Bernard seems to have partially identified it; to magnanimity, which, in contrast to Bernard, he distinguished clearly from humility; and to the Gift of Fear, with which theologians had always associated it.

The Angelic Doctor, moreover, solved the difficulties of the connection between lowliness of heart and charity. The reason for their close relationship is to be sought in the radication of all passions and affections in love. We desire and hope for and delight in only what we love. Charity is love of God. If love is right, appetite will be right, and appetite of one's own excellence is humility. In a word, if love is ordinate, the hope it kindles will be ordinate. The same line of thought is suggested in saying that love of God excludes exaggerated love of self and accordingly demands humility, which alone can preclude such an inordination.

We will end our study with a reference to Augustine's concept of the "humility of God": The Word of God, the second Person of the blessed Trinity, humbled Himself before His Father not only in His incarnate life on earth, but from eternity. In a few words, Thomas shows that humility cannot be attributed properly and formally to a Being Who is in no way subject; and therefore not to the Word. Yet this qualification of Augustine's thought leaves its mystic content intact. To kindle our weak love of a God Who loves us infinitely, we may indeed think of the Word as from all eternity subjecting Himself to the decree of His Father: determining to conceal the splendor of His Divinity, in the fullness of time, beneath the rags of humanity; to empty Himself and take the form of a

servant, becoming man to die on a cross for the sins of an ungrateful world. "Humiliavit seipsum usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis." This, the humility of God the Word, is the divine Idea the Christian must gaze upon and understand and imitate, because his Master was meek and humble of heart.

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BOOK REVIEWS

- Education at the Crossroads.* By JACQUES MARITAIN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943. Pp. x + 120, with index. \$2.00.
- The University and the Modern World.* By ARNOLD S. NASH. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1944. Pp. xxiv + 312. \$2.50.
- Liberal Education.* By MARK VAN DOREN. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1944. Pp. xi + 186, with index. \$2.50.
- What is Education?* By EDWARD LEEN, C.S. Sp. New York, Sheed & Ward, 1944. Pp. 288. \$3.00.

We are being forced to think; for that we should be grateful to God. Especially, we are being forced to think about our educational ideals and procedures; for education in the broadest sense is the best means given us to revolt against conditions that seem to be imposed upon us by the course of history. In that revolt we proclaim our mastery of history under God. Thinking will be of little use to us, however, if it is not straight thinking. The best guarantee of straight thinking is plenty of discussion, guided by the traditional principles of Catholic Faith and human reason. Such discussion is a real necessity among Catholic educators; it must be carried on without fear of the consequences. There is reason to fear the consequences; our complacency has been great, which accounts for the blindness that has come upon us. We have, in fact, fallen into a way of thinking that Fr. Leen rightly condemns: "It is but reasonable to expect that a Catholic school should give a Christian formation. It would be a great mistake to think that it does this because it is staffed with Catholic teachers, offers facilities for the frequentation of the Sacraments, and has each day half-an-hour's doctrinal instruction sandwiched in between the other subjects in the scholastic programme" (p. 79-80).

If we are certain that Catholic education is perfect, we need not engage in discussion of it; if, on the contrary, we have even the slightest doubt about our own integrity as Catholic teachers, we are obliged to seek out the defects and ask God for the grace to remedy them. This advice is necessary; for, when we shall see how very far astray we have wandered, we shall need the strength of Divine grace to give us the courage to admit our defections and set about the remedying of them.

The four books chosen for this review represent four distinct points of view; a consideration of them may give us a chance to clarify our own notions about Catholic education.

In "Education at the Crossroads," M. Jacques Maritain is presenting

what might be called the liberal Catholic viewpoint. By "liberal" here we mean the view of those who believe that the best way to approach non-Catholics is to show them how close they are to the Catholic faith. It must be kept in mind that this particular work of Maritain was given originally as "The Terry Lectures" at Yale University; they were directed, it must be presumed, to a predominantly non-Catholic audience. This would explain why many things were not said by an outstanding Catholic thinker. It does not excuse some of things that were said.

It is generally agreed that the whole world is standing at the cross-roads. What are those roads, where do they lead? One is the road that leads to God, through Jesus Christ and His Church; the other is the road that leads to chaos and perdition. Everyone must make his choice of these roads, educationalists not excepted. In speaking of this crisis, then, a Catholic thinker, even though his audience were non-Catholics, should be expected to make this clear. The choice is not between a humanistic type of education no matter how complete and integral and the chaotic thing known as education today, but between an integral Catholic education and any other kind.

There is a more fundamental difficulty behind this attitude of mind. Several of the recent Holy Fathers have made it clear that in the present crisis it is prudent for us to call upon all men of good will, all who believe in God alone, or in God and His Divine Son, to join with us in stemming the tide of destruction. Note the word "prudent." All those who deny the divinity of Christ and of His Church are objectively wrong; this denial and the gradual secularization of life that has historically followed upon it are the causes of our chaos. Nevertheless, there are many outside the Catholic Church who are subjectively justified in the sight of God and living by His grace; we have no way of knowing just who they are, as we have no way of knowing for certain that we ourselves are worthy of praise or blame in the judgment of God. Yet, it is prudent to judge that if Catholics lead the fight for the preservation of the rights of God, His Church, and the temporal civilization that has grown up under Catholic influences, these men of good will will be inspired by God to join us in the task.

Some Catholic thinkers have deduced two conclusions from the advice of the Holy Father, both of which are, I believe, alien to his thought. The first is, that an appeal must be made to non-Catholics to join us because we cannot accomplish the task of ourselves. Even as a statement of fact, this has a defeatist sound; as a theoretical statement it is false. It may be true that Catholics are so little inspired by the love of Christ that they will not respond wholeheartedly to the directives of the Holy See. But tomorrow God could raise up enough apostolic souls to win the world back to Him. Perhaps all that is needed is eager desire and prayer on our part for such a

happy event. Certainly, an idea that Christ's Church is no longer capable of winning the world to Christ is a very poor preparation for God's mercy.

The second false conclusion drawn from the Holy Father's directive is that we must look for a common basis of agreement between Catholics and non-Catholics on a theoretical level. Instead of basing ourselves on the dark judgment of faith that there are men of good will in the world who are not members of the Catholic Church, we start to look for a common basis in the objective teachings of Jews, Protestants and Catholics. There the danger lies, grave danger. This tendency is partially expressed by M. Maritain in the following passage: "There does exist, indeed, among the diverse great metaphysical outlooks, if they recognize the dignity of the spirit, and among the diverse forms of Christian creeds, or even of religious creeds in general, if they recognize the divine destiny of man, a community of analogy as concerns practical attitudes and the realm of action, which makes possible a genuine human cooperation" (p. 7). It is clear that Maritain is concerned with unity of action in the practical sphere; yet his formulation of the principle of unity is in the theoretical sphere. He is applying the analogy of common proportionality in the realm of philosophy and faith in a way that it does not apply. The idea of man that governs the philosophical principles of education is a mere logical abstraction that can cover "the most orthodox religious forms of thought" as well as the "mere humanistic ones." But with such an abstraction the very practical activity of educating a human being for his true end is impossible. A vague, generalized education is all that can be hoped for from such an analogously common idea.

More dangerous is the formula: "the analogy of faith." It is bad enough to attenuate the notion of man; to seek the proportionately common in the realm of faith is destructive both of faith and education. There is only one faith: the Greeks did not possess it, the Jews lost it, the protestants and the humanists perverted it. It is the faith of Jesus Christ and of His Church. Again, there is only one creed, only one Church; to talk about inter-credal or inter-Church cooperation on the basis of the proportionately common is to turn the reality of Christ's revelation and of His Church into a logical abstraction. If a non-Catholic believes in God and in His Divine Son, as he should, that is, unto salvation, he believes in them by Catholic faith, not by some analogously common faith. If he does not believe as he should, then we must bend all our prayers and our efforts to bring him to the true faith, not by showing how close he is to it, but by showing how far from it he is. And, in fact, there is an infinite gulf between the true faith and the religious opinions of mankind.

One of the practical consequences of this tendency to seek the proportionately common is seen in Maritain's discussion of the role of theology

in higher education. "With regard to non-denominational colleges, the practical solution would depend on the recognition of the pluralist principle in such matters. Theological teaching would be given, according to the diversity of creeds, by professors belonging to the main religious denominations, each addressing the students of his own denomination. And of course, those students who nurture a bias against theology would be released from attending these courses and allowed to remain incomplete in wisdom at their own pleasure" (p. 75). By contrasting the student who does not feel like studying theology with those who do study theology (any theology at all) there is created the impression that a complete wisdom can be attained without a true theology; for here again we must insist that there is only one theology, which takes its principles from revealed truth held by divine faith.

Many of M. Maritain's suggestions for changes in the general educational set-up are excellent, though they add little to what has already been proposed by Hutchins, Adler, and the authorities of St. John's College, Annapolis. Yet all these writers have had to discuss the fundamental problems of education half-heartedly and offer half-truths for their solutions, because they were addressing audiences that could not stand the whole truth. It is well for us to remember that when we read their books. We shall find much good in them, materially speaking; the vital spirit and the formal element of education can be, after Christ, only the Spirit of Christ. We shall return to this point again.

Mr. Nash's *The University and the Modern World* represents a rather strict protestant view of the educational problem and its solution. His work is divided into three parts: The Plight of the Liberal Democratic University; The Totalitarian University: A True Diagnosis but a False Remedy; Towards Reconstruction. These titles clearly forecast the trend of the book. The first two sections are excellent, except for one point. While on the surface, Mr. Nash is discussing only two totalitarianisms, Nazism and Communism, he succeeds in rhetorically linking up a third totalitarianism with them, Catholicism. He does this by characterizing Nazism and Communism as scholasticisms. It is then very easy to associate the scholasticism of the Middle Ages with the two modern forms. Mr. Nash is obviously uneasy about the power of Catholic thought in the modern world. He goes very far out of his way to criticise the opinion of Whitehead that the scholastics of the Middle Ages prepared the way for the development of modern science.

In the third part of his work, Mr. Nash presents two suggestions that will contribute to the reconstruction of the university in the modern world. First of all we must recognize the social character of thinking, or rather of the origins of thinking. The author distinguishes between the psychology

and the sociology of knowledge. There is no doubt that one's social environment does influence thought, though not to the extent admitted by Mr. Nash. In fact, it is still the individual, singularly blessed, no doubt, that can penetrate the social character of his own and others' thought. Traditionally, this social aspect of thought has been treated by other sections of philosophy besides psychology and by theology.

We can heartily agree with the author's final suggestion; we need, he says, a *speculum mentis*, an integral view, that is specifically Christian. As one of the aims of Christian scholarship, he suggests: "To work towards an intellectual synthesis for the twentieth century which, as an interpretation of human life and destiny, can be set over against the positivistic, the Marxist, the liberal humanitarian *Weltanschauungen* now current in the liberal democratic world. Such a *speculum mentis* will be dialectical between the poles of unity and freedom. Like Scholasticism it will derive its unity from its theological basis which will provide its presuppositions. But it will differ from Scholasticism in that the specifically theological sections of such a map will not determine the nature and character of the (non-theological) sections. God, not theology, or any other system is sovereign" (p. 293). The last statement is true, but cannot mean much to one who denies that God can establish a Church and guarantee its inerrancy in matters of faith and morals. Mr. Nash's observation about scholasticism shows that he is unacquainted with it except at second-hand and through the eyes of non-Catholic writers. In its best representatives, Scholasticism never attempted to dictate the conclusions of the other sciences. St. Thomas' preoccupation with Aristotelianism, for example, can be explained on the ground that he wanted to penetrate the reality of things in themselves according to their proper formalities. St. Thomas, better than any other thinker, knew that every reality can be viewed under a twofold aspect—as it is in itself, with a proper nature determined by God, and as it is in relation to the whole universe and ultimately to God. The only one who can penetrate the order of all things to God is the theologian; the determination of the proper formalities of things belongs to the philosopher, the scientist, the artist, the politician, and so forth. There is no evidence that St. Thomas ever dictated a conclusion in any field of learning, unless it were a theological conclusion; he would, however, not admit that the theological aspect of reality conflicted with the scientific, artistic, sociological, political, or any other. A theology that ignores philosophy and derides the use of reason, as protestant theology did from the start, is quite incapable of building up a *speculum mentis* without dictating theologically to the lower sciences. Only a theology that allows reason the utmost play in the domains that are proper to it can attain the aim of *unity with freedom*.

Mark Van Doren in his *Liberal Education* has given us a well-written and

persuasive defense of his subject. Again we meet with vague generalities about the ends of education; with such statements as "But that is what education at the top does call for—each man becoming more than he is" (p. 17). Strangely enough there are constant hints of the Catholic synthesis with the regretful judgment that it is out-of-date. He lays his finger on the heart of the educational problem in his initial chapter "Nobody Thinks He is Educated": by this confession, the ordinary man means that "he does not find in himself a reasonably deep and clear feeling about the bearings upon one another, and upon his own mind, of three things, to name not more: art, science, and religion. He has never been at the center from which these radiate—if there is a center" (p. 11).

Although Mr. Van Doren is rather vague about the end of man, he has the traditional notion of the formal and material components of human nature. Hence, his discussion of liberal education is valuable for Catholic educationalists, who have accurate notions of all these elements and yet do not have much appreciation of the liberal arts. "St. Augustine paid his education the compliment of saying that as a result of it he could read anything that was written, understand anything he heard said, and say anything he thought" (p. 76). Here, obviously, St. Augustine is speaking of his liberal education, obtained before he became a Catholic, but never abandoned by him when he turned to the pursuit of eternal Truth. It is with that part of education that Mr. Van Doren is concerned; and what he has to say is important. The chief concern of a liberal education is the liberal arts. They fall midway between the useful and the fine arts. "The liberal arts are always, and properly, left in a middle position between those with which we manipulate objects and those with which we create them—or, if man cannot in reality create, with which we render individual things, such as a hero in story or a form in painting, more luminous than they were. The liberal arts are the specifically intellectual arts" (p. 73).

Mr. Van Doren does not ignore the problem of the relation between the intellectual and the moral virtues. He rejects the present tendency to look upon intellectual training and moral training as two distinct functions of education. There is a danger of separating character from intellect: "Doubtless no one would deny that the world should be saved from ignorance. But a popular form of ignorance is the belief that life can be ordered by those who do not know what they are doing; fervor is enough" (p. 63). This is another way of making the point we insisted on earlier: subjectively, there are many men in the world who are justified in the sight of God; that does not mean that their ideas are objectively right. Ignorance may excuse a man in the sight of God, it does not prevent him from being a danger to his fellow-men. Failure to realize the moral character of intellectual activity is another dangerous error, which Mr. Van

Doren avoids. "Character is both intellectual and moral. . . . But they are mutually dependent, and at specific points, as for instance at the point where the moral virtue of desiring or willing to be taught must precede being taught, and where only courtesy decides that learning shall take place. It is moral virtue which makes a pupil studious rather than curious . . . ; which makes the scholar brave enough for genuine enquiry" (p. 64). It is foolish to look for ways and means of training character by extra-curricular activities, when we have the chance to mold the moral character of a student in every one of his class activities. All intellectual activity in the concrete is moral activity; it can have its vices and its virtues. The moral and spiritual attitude of a student towards his intellectual operations is more important in the long run than the success of those operations. A man can be a better man, even intellectually, by making a mistake in a mathematical calculation, than by being correct.

Catholic educators must meet the challenge thrown down by the present-day advocates of traditional liberal education. However, they must also beware of thinking that the liberal arts are the vitalizing principle of education, that Catholic education can be saved through the liberal arts training. The vital principle of Catholic education is the faith; the liberal arts are merely instruments, necessary instruments, we believe, for the full application of the faith to all the fields of knowledge. The Catholic faith is the center to which Mr. Van Doren unwittingly refers; the work of manifesting it as the center belongs to theologians and they have not as yet done the work as fully as they should.

After reading a few pages of Fr. Leen's book, one becomes conscious of the challenge in his title: *What is Education?* He does not attempt to define a vague thing that could be common to all men, or even most men; he frankly states that in the present order of things there is only one true education. In this he is merely echoing the Sovereign Pontiffs, who do not hesitate to point out to the world that salvation is through the Catholic Church and its educational system. Of course we should expect such outspokenness from Fr. Leen, who is primarily a theologian. Most Catholic writers realize that the ultimate judgment on education must come from the Catholic faith and its chief instrument, Catholic theology; yet they persist in talking about a Catholic philosophy of education. Perhaps they feel that the general public would not listen to them if they spoke in the name of theology. The books we are reviewing refute that idea: Mr. Nash explicitly looks to theology for the needed synthesis of modern knowledges; Mr. Van Doren must continually, though tentatively, refer to scholastic theology to complete his picture of liberal education. The latter says expressly: "But in human history there has seldom been a greater need for slow, deep thinking on a level comparable to that which theology once

dominated" (P. 35). There is a hint here that theology, or theologians, are no longer capable of this "slow, deep thinking"; we know that is false, though in fact theologians do not fulfill their traditional function of ordering all things to God.

Fr. Leen, then, is a theologian looking at the problem of education; he is also an Irishman conscious of the fact that many brilliant Irish Catholic writers of the last few decades fell away from their Church and dedicated their gifts to falsehood. He lays the blame for this on the shoulders of educationalists. He has a shrewd eye for the defects of our educational system; most important, however, is his clear view of the meaning of an integral education. He tries, and with considerable success, to manifest the Catholic faith as a center around which all other knowledges revolve. In the light of Christian tradition he determines the relative value and distinctive place in the educational set-up of moral training, vocational preparation, intellectual formation, scientific knowledge, philosophy and art. Much more could be said on all these subjects; for example the chapters on the particular sciences and art do not sufficiently analyse these great modern educative forces in the light of theology and philosophy. What Dr. Leen says about them is true enough, and probably adequate for the type of secondary education he is mainly concerned with; much more light must be thrown on them for the sake of the specialists in the field of science and art.

Dr. Leen also bravely faces the question of women's education; his solution may not be popular, but it is unquestionably the traditional Catholic one. Men and women are different; they have different functions in life; they should be educated differently.

The discussion of religious education will probably be more striking to Fr. Leen's Irish readers than to ourselves. There have been several attempts to reform the teaching of religion in the primary and secondary grades that follow closely the suggestions of the author; notably the work of Sr. Jane Marie, O.P. in her *Christian Religion Series* (Milwaukee: Bruce). Notable, also, is Fr. Leen's defense of the Christian classics for use in Latin courses. Their neglect is due to the fundamental idea, handed down from the Renaissance, that the form of a literary production is much more important than its content. On that premiss, Cicero is more valuable than St. Augustine; but for a Catholic graduate to know Cicero and be ignorant of St. Augustine, is an injustice and a condemnation of a system that calls itself Christian.

There is one noticeable weakness in Fr. Leen's book; in fact, it is found in all four of the books we are considering. They all cling to the unjustifiable distinction between individual and person in human nature. In the writings of some modern Thomists these words have lost all precise philosophical meaning and have become almost symbols for all that is ignoble and noble in human nature.

M. Maritain is a foremost exponent of the distinction; let us see how he uses it: "The notion of personality thus involves that of wholeness and independence. To say that a man is a person is to say that in the depth of his being he is more a whole than a part and more independent than servile" (p. 8). Note the relation established between being "a part" and "servile." There is no justification for this. In itself this statement is simply false; in the depths of his (created) being, man is more a part than a whole. Man is a whole only in reference to himself; for St. Thomas, person is a subsisting whole, whose parts are: his nature, his individuating principles, his existence. Man is not a whole in respect to his parents, brothers and sisters, he is part of a greater whole—the family; man is not a whole in respect to his fellow-citizens—he is part of the greater whole—the nation; man is not a whole in respect to the rest of the universe—he is a part of a universal common good; even in the supernatural order man is a child of God, sharing with others the Common Good of the divine Essence.

Note now how individuality is explained: "Now it should be pointed out that personality is only one aspect or one pole of the human being. The other pole is—to speak the Aristotelian language—individuality, whose prime root is matter. The same man, the same entire man who is in one sense a person, or a whole made independent by his spiritual soul, is also, in another sense, a material individual, a fragment of a species, a part of the physical universe, a single dot in the immense network of forces and influences, cosmic, ethnic, historic, whose laws we must obey" (p. 9). Well might Mr. Van Doren say that we have a difficult time placing man in his right place since we have lost all knowledge of the angels. All Thomists admit that the angels are not individuated by matter; in fact, they are specifically, not numerically distinct from one another. Yet each of them is "a single dot in the immense network of forces and influences" that together form the universe.

This distinction between person and individual may seem too abstruse to have any practical value; actually its practical value is immense. There is no possibility for a realistic view of man and his relation to the rest of the universe if that distinction is distorted. Actually, the good coming to man as a person, a whole, enclosed within himself, is slight; the plenitude of goodness comes to him only in sharing it with others—the common good of the family, the nation, the world, the universe, the Supreme Common Good, which is grasped in the beatific vision.

Fr. Leen, I believe, unconsciously hits upon the fundamental fault of Catholic Education, and hence of all education. "The catechism is a simple compendium of theology in a convenient, correct and condensed form. It is hard to see why, being but this, it is expected to produce such great effects on souls. In seminaries, students in their theological course

make an intensive study of all the matter contained in brief in the catechism. Theology can exert a spiritualizing effect on the soul—but it does not necessarily do so. Ordinarily it is not expected to have this effect. The students, as a rule, do not seek in theological science the inspiration of their spiritual life. For them theology is something to learn and to know. It is approached as a science. The best theologians are not necessarily the most spiritual men" (p. 171). How true and how false that statement is! How true of the contemporary teaching of theology, how false of the traditional! Take, for instance, the last sentence. Who are the theologians of the Church? The Fathers and Doctors officially designated by her. And they must be canonized saints. Once more a valuable distinction of St. Thomas is being wrested to our own destruction. St. Thomas distinguished the intellectual and moral virtues, theology and the theological virtues. The chief aim of theology is scientific exposition of the truths of faith. But certainly he did not expect us to apply this theoretical distinction in the practical order. Every step in the acquisition of theological wisdom should contribute to our love of God and neighbor; if it fails to do this it is being wrongly imparted or wrongly imbibed. St. Thomas places the psychological origin of theology in the *cogitatio* that accompanies the assent of faith; its culmination he finds in the beatific vision. Moreover any cultivation of theology that would hinder the workings of the higher Wisdom of the Holy Ghost would be a waste of time for the individual, though accidentally it might benefit the Church or the faithful.

When theology is taught vitally, then there will be some hope for a revitalization of all education. We must remember that the great developments in literature, the arts, the particular sciences, mathematics, have taken place since the reformation and the renaissance; no deep theological thinking has been devoted to them. They are taught in our schools almost as they are taught in secular schools, where they contribute time and again to the destruction of the faith of Catholics. We cannot bring them unpurified into our own schools without turning these schools into dens of thieves. They must first of all be judged by theologians who are expert philosophers; only then can we be sure that they are contributing to the total picture of the universe that we wish to present to our students.

With a few obvious reservations we can echo the plea of Mr. Nash: "What, therefore, is the conclusion of the matter? It is that the Christian Churches need a fellowship of lay theologians or Christian scholars who would view it as part of their vocation as a Christian intelligentsia to create a Christian world view within which the conclusion of the specialized subjects of the university curriculum could be given their ultimate meaning in terms of a specifically Christian philosophy of man and his relation to

the historical process. The task is one in which all Christian scholars whether they be natural scientists, social scientists, historians, philosophers, literary critics and the like are called to cooperate. It is nothing less than the creation of a Christian *speculum mentis*, which, on the one hand, avoids the Charybdis of the liberal conception of the complete autonomy of each academic subject and, on the other, the Scylla of totalitarian scholasticisms in which facts have to be twisted into a dogmatic framework" (p. 287). We believe that such a gigantic task can be accomplished by Catholic theologians with the cooperation of experts in all fields of knowledge. It must be accomplished if we are to redeem the intellect of the world for Christ.

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BRIEF NOTICES

The Nature of Martyrdom. By JAMES EDWARD SHERMAN. Paterson, N. J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1942. Pp. xiii + 320, with index.

Martyrdom has always been considered in the Church as the highest manifestation of one's faith and love for Christ; the martyrs were held in veneration from the beginnings of Christianity. The faithful have ever seen in the blood of martyrs the seed of the Church. When the Church is vitally struggling against the evil and the corruption of the world, it is subject to attacks by the world and many of its children are called upon to sacrifice their lives. The struggle goes on till the Church is victorious and a period of peace descends. The Church is once more on the march and her martyrs are multiplying. Fr. Sherman's book is a careful and detailed study of the dogmatic and moral elements in the nature of martyrdom. The author defends the opinion that a Catholic soldier who sacrifices his life in a just war for the defense of his country and orders the sacrifice to the love of Christ as well as of his country is in the strict sense a martyr.

The Eucharist. By FRANCOIS MAURIAC. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1944. Pp. 75. \$1.50.

This little book contains the reflections of the author on the liturgical functions of Holy Thursday. The aim is not primarily dogmatic, although much solid doctrine is contained in it. The author ranges over his own childhood experiences, the lives of the saints, the pages of literature, and gathers a host of inspiring thoughts that add to one's appreciation of what happened and still happens on the day before Christ died for us.

Notre Dame dans ma vie. By M.-V. BERNADOT, O.P. Ed. du Cerf, distributed by Lévrier, Ottawa-Montreal, 1937. Pp. 206.

The title indicates accurately the whole contents of this book, and is developed comprehensively and beautifully. What place does the Blessed Virgin hold in our spiritual life? That of a Mother. She does for us in a spiritual manner everything that an earthly mother does for her child: gives it birth, nourishes it, supplies it with materials for growth. Mary is our Mother in an eminent way; through her we have the life of grace, through her it is increased. She prepares and teaches us to pray with joy and faith. It is she who defends our spiritual life from the attacks of the demon, the

world, and even from ourselves. She unites us to God and leads us to perfection. The wisdom contained in this book is the gift of the Mother to her child.

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We are happy to learn that a new analytical bibliography of Thomistic literature is in process of publication. According to information we have received, Dr. Vernon J. Bourke, learning that no supplement to the *Bibliographie thomiste* of Mandonnet-Destrez (ending with the year 1920) was planned by the original publishers, and assured of their wish to see the work undertaken, has compiled a list of over 4,000 titles covering the years 1920-1940. There are four indices, and the book is so arranged according to categories that it will serve as a supplement to Mandonnet. Dr. Bourke has added a critical introduction on the chronology and authenticity of the works of St. Thomas, with some useful information about the various editions of these works.

The book is being printed as a supplement to Volume XXI of *The Modern Schoolman*, and will run some two hundred and eighty-eight pages. It is promised for the end of July of this year and priced at \$2.00 in paper, or \$2.50 in cloth.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- Berdyayev, Nicholas. *Slavery and Freedom*. New York: Scribner's, 1944. Pp. 271, with index. \$2.75.
- Bernanos, Georges. *Plea for Liberty*. New York: Pantheon Books, Inc. 1944. Pp. 272. \$3.00.
- Cardwell, Ann S. *Poland and Russia*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1944. Pp ix + 251, with index. \$2.75.
- Chapman, Dom John. *The Four Gospels*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1944. Pp. 85. \$1.25.
- Franciscan Institute Publications, No. 1. *The Tractatus de Successivis Attributed to William Ockham*. Edited by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1944. Pp. xi + 122.
- Hamm, V. M. *Pico della Mirandola: Of Being and Unity*. (Translated from the Latin, with an introduction) Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1943. Pp. 34.
- Jessup, B. E. *Rational Value Meanings*. Eugene, Oregon: The University of Oregon Press, 1943. Pp. 175, with index. \$1.25.
- Johnson, F. E. (Ed.). *Religion and the World Order*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944. Pp. 223, with index. \$2.00.
- McGarrigle, F. J., S. J. *My Father's Will*. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1944. Pp. xii + 323, with index. \$2.75.
- MacIver, R. M. (Ed.) *Group Relations and Group Antagonisms*. New York: Harper Brothers, 1944. Pp. 237, with index. \$2.00.
- McSweeney, A. J., C. P. *The Social Role of Truth According to St. Thomas Aquinas*. (The Catholic University of America: Philosophical Series, Vol. LXXVI), Washington, D. C.; The Catholic University Press, 1943. Pp. xii + 157.
- Maritain, Jacques. *Christianity and Democracy*. New York: Scribner's, 1944. Pp. 98. \$1.25.
- Mumford, Lewis. *The Condition of Man*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1944. Pp. x + 467, with index. \$5.00.
- Plumpe, J. C. *Mater Ecclesia: An Inquiry into the Concept of the Church as Mother in Early Christianity*. (Catholic University of America: Studies in Christian Antiquity, No. 5), Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University Press, 1943. Pp. xxi + 149, with index. \$2.00.
- Sencourt, Robert R. *Carmelite and Poet: A Framed Portrait of St. John of the Cross*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1944. Pp. 278, with index. \$3.00.
- Spellman, Francis J. *The Risen Soldier*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1944. Pp. 39. \$1.00.